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Abstract
Rationalism is the view that intuitions are a defeasible source of noninferential justification. The first part of this dissertation is an exposition and
defense of this view. I begin with an account of what it is for a proposition to
seem true, arguing that seemings are a sui generis, irreducible propositional
attitude that is importantly related to, yet distinct from, perceptual, memorial, and introspective experiences. I then defend the view that intuitions
are seemings of a certain sort. I argue that seemings generally, and thus intuitions in particular, are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification,
and I defend the epistemic value of seemings and intuitions against various
objections. The second part of my dissertation assesses a familiar argument
in defense of the epistemic value of intuitions. Roughly, the argument goes
like this: “to have an argument which gives us a reason to reject the epistemic
value of intuitions, one must rely on intuitions as though they had epistemic
value. Thus, such arguments are self-defeating and are therefore unable to
give us a reason to reject the epistemic value of intuitions.” Against this, I
argue that some self-defeating arguments can give us a reason to not believe
in the epistemic value of intuitions. I conclude my dissertation by addressing
certain puzzles raised by the phenomenon of self-defeating arguments.
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1

Introduction

In philosophy the appeal to intuitions as evidence is familiar, pervasive, and
historically well-entrenched.1 This epistemic use of intuitions raises many
questions about the nature and epistemology of intuitions. I aim to answer
some of those questions. The principal questions I have set myself to address
are the following:
(Q1) What are intuitions?
(Q2) What explains the justificatory power of intuitions?
(Q3) Can epistemically self-defeating arguments threaten the use
of intuitions as evidence?
(Q4) What are epistemically self-defeating arguments and why
can’t they justify their conclusions?
These are, of course, not the only salient questions one can ask of intuitions,
but they are some of them.
My dissertation takes up questions (Q1)-(Q4) in the order they were
posed. In chapter 2 I oﬀer a reductive account of the nature of intuitions, arguing that intuitions are seemings which do not occur in virtue of other sorts
1

By claiming that intuitions are appealed to as evidence I just mean to say that they
are taken to be reasons that can justify believing their contents. See Pust (2000, chapter
1) for an extended defense. For others who think philosophical activity largely involves
appeals to intuitions as evidence see Sosa (2007, chapter 3), Bealer (1998), Goldman and
Pust (1998), BonJour (1998), Chalmers (1996, 110), Dennett (1984, 12), Kripke (1980,
42), and see the various essays contained in the Knobe and Nichols (2008) volume on
experimental philosophy.
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of conscious experience to be specified. After introducing the phenomenon of
intuitions in philosophy in section 2.1, I introduce the phenomenon of seemings generally in section 2.2. There I argue that seemings are a sui generis
representational propositional attitude that has a certain sort of phenomenology. In section 2.3 these characteristics of seemings are used to motivate
the reductive thesis that intuitions are the specified sort of seemings for intuitions are also a representational propositional attitude with that same
phenomenology. Absent any further reason to think intuitions and seemings
distinct, simplicity mandates that intuitions be reduced to seemings. The
remainder of section 2.3 is dedicated to defending the adequacy of the thesis
that intuitions are the specified sort of seemings against plausible counterexamples.
Chapters 3-5 address the epistemology of seemings, and, by extension,
the epistemology of intuition. Chapter 3 explains diﬀerent options one might
take toward the epistemic eﬃcacy of seemings. I endorse the following view:
Liberalism. Provided one lacks defeaters for p, if it seems to one
that p, then one thereby has justification to believe p.
If correct, and if, as I argue in section 2.3, intuitions are seemings, then
Liberalism implies the following view with regard to the epistemology of
intuitions:
Rationalism. Provided one lacks defeaters for p, if one intuits
that p, then one thereby has justification to believe p.
9

Chapter 3 concludes by highlighting Liberalism’s (and thus Rationalism’s)
theoretical modesty. For these are epistemological positions which have far
fewer controversial commitments than have often been attributed to them.
Chapter 4 takes up the defense of Liberalism. In section 4.1 I begin by
summarizing Huemer’s argument on behalf of “Phenomenal Conservatism,”
a view which is very closely related to Liberalism. In section 4.2 I assess
Huemer’s argument and conclude that it is inadequate as it stands. In section
4.3 I go on to rehabilitate an abductive version of Huemer’s argument, one
that is not susceptible to the criticisms on which Huemer’s original argument
foundered. Section 4.4 indicates the way in which my defense of Liberalism
supports Rationalism, thus explaining how it is that intuitions are source of
justification. I conclude chapter 4 with some remarks on the relationship
between Rationalism and experimental philosophy, arguing that even if we
have evidence of the unreliability of intuitions, that in itself is consistent with
Rationalism. I go on to show what other assumptions and arguments must
be made if evidence of unreliability is to threaten Rationalism.
Chapter 5 addresses objections to Liberalism. There are certain objections Liberalism faces due to its putative relationship to “basic knowledge”
or “basic justification”, i.e., knowledge/ justification one has by some source
s independently of having knowledge/ justification to think that s is reliable.
Section 5.1 clarifies the nature of the relationship between Liberalism and basic knowledge/ justification, arguing that one can endorse Liberalism without
endorsing the existence of basic knowledge/ justification. Section 5.2 shows
10

that those who endorse Liberalism and the existence of basic knowledge/
justification need not endorse the legitimacy of bootstrapping arguments,
thus dodging one familiar objection to views like Liberalism.2 Section 5.3
dislodges a relatively new objection to views like Liberalism: such views
are said to be incoherent because they entail their own denial. Section 5.4
responds to the charge that arguments for Liberalism cannot provide one
with justification to believe Liberalism because they are epistemically circular, depending in some way on the ability of seemings to provide one with
justification. Section 5.5 addresses the problem of cognitive penetrability
as it pertains to the epistemology of seemings. Roughly, the worry is that
some seemings may have causes which, intuitively, compromise their ability
to bring about justification.
Frequently, arguments against the epistemic eﬃcacy of intuition turn out
to be epistemically self-defeating in the sense that belief in that argument’s
conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s
premises. Chapter 6 explores what threat epistemically self-defeating arguments against intuition might pose to the practice of treating intuitions as
evidence, where an argument counts as epistemically self-defeating if believing its conclusion would defeat one’s justification to believe at least one of its
premises. My principal concern in this chapter is how we ought to evaluate
2

Bootstrapping arguments, also known as track-record arguments, are arguments which
employ a putative source of justification to justify premises in an argument whose conclusion is that that very source of justification is reliable. For an example see section
5.2.
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the following argument:
The Unreliability Argument
Something is a source of evidence that justifies beliefs only if it
is reliable.
Intuition is unreliable.
Therefore,
Intuition is not a source of evidence that justifies beliefs.
My conclusion is that the epistemically self-defeating nature of this argument
makes it such that (a) one can use it to compromise one’s justification to think
intuitions are a source of justification, but (b) it cannot be used to justify one
in believing that intuitions are not a source of justification. At most, then,
this argument can be used to put one in a skeptical position with respect to
the epistemic value of intuition.3
As one may notice, (Q4) seems to bear only a distal relation to (Q1) and
(Q2) which concern the nature and epistemology of a putatively fundamental source of non-inferential justification. But only brief familiarity with the
literature demonstrates that issues of inferential justification follow closely
on the heels of questions about non-inferential justification. For in attempting to justify that some putative source of non-inferential justification is a
source of justification one inevitably engages arguments that have bearing
3

This chapter forthcoming in Philosophical Studies under the title “Epistemically SelfDefeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition.”
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on these issues. When the premises of such arguments ultimately depend on
some fundamental source of non-inferential justification (e.g., sense perception, memory, introspection, intuition) interesting questions arise concerning
the role a source of justification can play in one’s attempt to justify that
source’s ability to bring about justification. In the case of intuition questions
concerning inferential justification take on a new twist with the phenomena
of epistemically self-defeating arguments. For there are not only the usual
questions concerning what role intuition can play in its own justification,
but what we should think of arguments against intuition which in some way
rely on intuition. Hence (Q4), which asks general about the phenomenon of
epistemically self-defeating arguments whereas (Q3) is a specific instance of
this general question.
Chapter 7 turns to general questions about the relationship between epistemically self-defeating arguments and transmission failure. I begin by considering a variety of arguments that are aptly labeled ‘epistemically selfdefeating’.

What is interesting, and troubling, about epistemically self-

defeating arguments is that we cannot always chalk up their inability to
justify their conclusions to the presence of any actual defeater. This in turn
threatens our ability to articulate plausible, counterexample-free transmission and closure principles for justification. I provide an informative general
characterization of what epistemically self-defeating arguments are in terms
of why it is that epistemically self-defeating arguments cannot justify their
conclusions.
13

2

Intuitions as Seemings

Intuitions lie at the heart of much philosophical activity and the aim of this
chapter is to give an account of their nature. Roughly, I will be arguing that
what it is for one to intuit that p is for p to seem true, where p’s seeming true
does not obtain in virtue of any perceptual, memorial, or introspective experience, or any inference involving such experiences. Section 2.1 introduces the
phenomena of intuitions. Section 2.2 argues that seemings are a sui generis
propositional attitude. Section 2.3 argues that intuitions are seemings which
do not obtain in virtue of any of the aforementioned experiences.

2.1

The Phenomena of Intuitions

The appeal to intuitions as evidence is a familiar phenomenon in philosophical
literature. Frequently, philosophers begin with some target claim for evaluation, and then present one with a hypothetical scenario that is intended
to elicit an intuition which has some bearing on the claim under evaluation.
Here’s an example. Suppose one was considering the following thesis:
(T) A belief forming method M can yield knowledge even if one
is in a position to know that M is unreliable.
Consider now the following scenario:
The Coinflip Case. Dave likes to play a game with flipping a
coin. He sometimes gets a “special feeling” that the next flip will
14

come out heads. When he gets this “special feeling”, he is right
about half the time, and wrong about half the time. Just before
the next flip, Dave gets that “special feeling” the feeling leads him
to believe that the coin will land heads. He flips the coin, and it
does land heads.4
Now consider the question: Does Dave know that the coin would land heads
via the “special feeling” method? Upon considering this case many have the
intuition that Dave does not know it.5 Consider a further question: Why
does Dave lack knowledge via the “special feeling” method? I suspect that
many will share my intuition that Dave lacks knowledge via the specified
method because he’s in a position to know that forming beliefs in that way
is unreliable. Here, the first intuition indicates that (T) is false, being a
straightforward counterexample to it, while the second intuition indicates
why (T) is false. Both intuitions appear to provide us with a good reason to
disbelieve (T).6
4

This case is from Weinberg, et al. (2001, 36).
It may be of note that unlike other hypothetical cases which Weinberg, et al. (2001)
put to their subjects, this case elicited the same judgment in all but a very small minority
of the subjects.
6
Joel Pust has aptly pointed out to me that the example with (T) and the Coin flip
case may be unsound. For (T) holds that it is not a necessary condition of knowing p
by method M that one lack reason to think M unreliable. But Dave’s not knowing via
the special feeling in the coin flip case doesn’t obviously falsify (T) as Dave might fail
some other necessary condition of knowledge. However, in the Coinfilp Case the belief and
truth conditions for knowledge are satisfied, and there is no gettierization. That leaves
the justification condition, which appears to be the only condition lacking in the Coinflip
Case. Thus, in order for Pust’s unsoundess worry to stick, it must be the case that the
justification condition may be satisfied even when one is in a position to know that M
is unreliable. However, my intuition is that being in such a position always prevents one
from satisfying the justification condition and for that reason prevents one from having
5
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Other examples from philosophical literature will be familiar: Searle’s
Chinese nation, Thompson’s violinist, Putnam’s Twin Earth, Lehrer’s gypsy
lawyer, and Jackson’s Mary. In such cases, hypothetical scenarios like the
Coinflip Case are constructed and then used to elicit an intuition with respect to some target philosophical thesis. One’s intuition is then treated as
evidence either for or against that thesis.
But reflection on hypothetical cases is not always necessary for having an
intuition. Take the following claims:
De Morgan. p&q is equivalent to ¬(¬p _ ¬q).
Negation Elimination. ¬¬p is equivalent to p.
Parthood’s Transitivity. If x is part of y and y is part of z, then
x is part of z.
Leibniz’s Law. If x = y, then anything true of x is also true of y.
For many, simply considering these propositions will bring about the intuition that these propositions are true and reflection on hypothetical cases is
unnecessary.
There are diﬀerent locutions used to refer to intuitions. Above I relied on
the locution ‘has the intuition that’ to identify the target contentful mental
state I intend to give an account of (i.e., intuiting) because it was natural to
do so. ‘Intuition’ is not a philosopher’s term of art, but a term commonly
used in natural language to refer to the target mental state. Nevertheless,
knowledge.
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other locutions could have served the same purpose. For example, I could
have said that to many it will seem to be case that Dave does not have
knowledge via the “special feelings” method, or again, to many it will appear
to be the case that Dave does not have knowledge via the “special feelings”
method. There are still other locutions that would have done equally well: ‘it
is obvious that...’, ‘it is clear that...’, and ‘one can see that...’. Each of these
expressions are natural ways of referring to a familiar type of propositional
attitude had in response to considering hypothetical cases and propositions
like the ones above.
In what follows I will use the term ‘intuition’ to name the general type
of contentful mental state gestured at above. The plural form of this term,
‘intuitions’, will also be used to refer to that type of mental state, but it will
also be used to refer to tokens of this type of mental state, where context will
clarify the intended denotation. This understanding of the reference of the
term ‘intuition’ should be understood as distinct from the locutions ‘has an
intuition that’ and ‘intuits that’ which typically refer to the contents of tokens
of that general type of mental state. It should be noted that commitment to
there being intuitions does not entail a commitment to the more robust thesis
that there is a unique cognitive faculty which is itself solely responsible for
every tokening of the type. Finally, to admit that such things as intuitions
exist does not commit one to the existence of a priori justification; though
many proponents of the epistemic value of intuition take it to be a source of
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a priori justification, one need not do so.7
In what follows I oﬀer a reductive account of what it is to have an intuition. This project may be viewed as an attempt to satisfy the following
schema:
For S to intuit that p just is for S to

that p.

Here, the ‘just is’ relation is taken to be a reductive equivalence relation,
where what appears on the right-hand-side specifies what it is to have an
intuition in the sense that intuiting that p is nothing other than -ing that p.
Yet for an instance of

to be plausible there are two criteria it must satisfy.

First, it must be extensionally adequate in the sense that, necessarily, one
intuits that p iﬀ one s that p. Typically, we test for extensional adequacy
by considering, for any given substitution of , whether or not one can intuit
without -ing, or vice versa. If so, one’s substitution for

cannot be correct.

Second, it must be qualitatively adequate, that is, the properties of intuiting
must likewise be properties of -ing. Otherwise, by Leibniz’s Law, we must
regard intuiting and -ing as distinct states.

2.2

On Seemings

My reductive analysis of intuitions (to be introduced) will involve the claim
that intuitions are a kind of seeming. So before I introduce and defend
7

Bealer (1998), Pust (2000), and BonJour (1998) each take intuition to be a source of
a priori justification, whereas Kornblith (2002, 7-8) and Devitt (2010, 292) take intuition
to be, at best, a source of a posteriori justification. Williamson (2007) and Hawthorne
(2007) abjure the distinction between these two kinds of justification altogether.
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my theory of intuition’s nature, I will needed to say some things about the
nature of seemings. In section 2.2.1 I characterize certain distinguishing
characteristics of seemings, and in section 2.2.2 I argue that seemings are a
sui generis propositional attitude.
2.2.1

The Phenomenology of Seemings

Seemings are, I think, quite common and detached from anything peculiar
to philosophical investigation. To fix ideas here consider your immediate
environment and how you might describe it. Your description, you should
notice, will be constituted by a series of propositions each of which seems
true. For example, as I write this I sit in my oﬃce, and my immediate
environment is (partially) described by the following:
(A1) There is a shelf of books to my left.
(A2) There are many pencils to my right.
(A3) The books outnumber the pencils.
Each of these propositions seem true to me, and they seem true to me because
of the particular visual experience I’m having as I write. But these are not
the only propositions that seem true to me as I write. Upon consideration,
the following also seem true:
(B1) There was a fireplace in my childhood home.
(B2) I’m not presently in any pain.
(B3) I’m not-not-not presently in any pain.
19

It is in virtue of having certain memorial experiences that (B1) seems true
(I clearly recall my childhood home). (B2) seems true to me in virtue of my
introspective awareness of my own mental life. And (B3) seems true to me
not immediately, but because (B2) seems true and because I can “see” that
(B3) must be true given (B2).
There are several things to note about seemings. First, seemings are a
kind of propositional attitude, i.e., they are a mental state whose object is
a proposition. Second, seemings are a kind of propositional attitude that
represent the world as being a certain way: for it to seem true that a cat is
hairy is, partly, for one to be in a mental state that represents the world as
being such that a cat is hairy is true. Seemings are like beliefs in this respect:
to believe that p is (partly) to represent the world as being such that p is true
of it. Third, part of what distinguishes seemings from other representational
propositional attitudes is, for lack of a better term, their phenomenological
texture. The language used to characterize the phenomenological aspect of
seemings varies but it’s all of a kind. Tolhurst describes seemings as having
“the feel of truth” or “the feel of a state whose content reveals how things really
are.” 8 Huemer refers to it as the “forcefulness” of seemings, and characterizes
seemings as a kind of propositional attitude that “represent their contents
as actualized.” 9 Tucker describes this as the “assertiveness” of seemings,
which he further describes as being the sort of state that “recommends” or
8
9

Tolhurst (1998, 298-299).
Huemer (2001, 22, 77-9).
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“assures” us of the truth of its content.10 Pryor, helpfully describes this
phenomenology:
Our experiences represent propositions in such a way that it “feels
as if” we could tell that those propositions are true–and that
we’re perceiving them to be true–just by virtue of having them
so represented. (Of course, to be able to articulate this “feeling”
takes a high grade of reflective awareness.) I think this “feeling” is
part of what distinguishes the attitude of experiencing that p from
other propositional attitudes, like belief and visual imagination.
Beliefs and visual images might come to us irresistibly, without
having that kind of “phenomenal force.” ... It is diﬃcult to explain
what this “phenomenal force” amounts to...11
Let us refer to this diﬃcult-to-describe phenomenal quality of seemings by
saying that seemings are alethically presentational states, where anything
counts as an alethically presentational state just in case it has the sort of
phenomenology characteristic of seemings.12
10

Tucker (2010, 530).
Pryor (2000, 547). See also Pryor (2004: 356-357), Chudnoﬀ (forthcoming), and Siegel
(2011).
12
Chudnoﬀ (forthcoming) oﬀers the following account of (alethically) presentational phenomenology: “What it is for an experience to have presentational phenomenology with
respect to p is for it to both represent that p and make it seem as if you are aware of a
truth-maker for p.” In conversation, Chudnoﬀ has clarified that this was not meant to be
an account of the nature of presentational phenomenology (as the expression ‘what it is
for...is for...’ suggests), rather, it an account of that in virtue of which an experience has
presentational phenomenology. Although I think his account serves reasonably well concerning our normal introspective, perceptual, and quasi-perceptual memorial experiences,
I doubt it will hold up in the case of intuitive experiences and merely propositional memo11
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Fourth, although this will not play a significant role in what follows, there
is one further possible aspect of the phenomenology of seemings that is of
interest. It is what we might call their epistemic presentationality. When a
proposition seems true it is presented to one in such a way that it feels as
if that proposition is something one has good epistemic reason to believe.
Seemings, in some sense, commend their contents for belief. Arguably, this
sort of presentationality is not to be mistaken with any aspect of the content
of a seeming, it is rather a part of the way in which a seeming presents its
content.
However, it is also arguable that this so-called epistemic presentationality
can be given an eliminative analysis in the following way:
(Elimination) (A) There is no epistemic presentationality; this
term does not refer to any unique phenomenological aspect of
seeming states. The reason it seems as if there is epistemic presentationality is owed to the fact that (B) when a proposition p
seems true, at least upon consideration, it would (at least typically) also seem true that one has an (epistemic) reason to believe
p.
My disagreement lies not with (B), but (A). But even if (A) is correct, it will
not aﬀect any of the arguments to follow, which only require seemings to be
rial experiences. For in such experiences it seems dubious that one seems to be aware of
some further object which is a truth-maker for what intuitively or memorially seems true.
See The Problem of Intuitions in section 2.2.2.
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alethically presentational states.13
Finally, seemings appear to be essentially occurrent mental states. For
it’s hard to even imagine what it would be like for a proposition to seem true
without it’s content being part of your conscious experience. Notice, the
claim isn’t that p cannot seem true unless one is conscious that it seems true
that p. Rather the claim of essential occurrence concerns only the first-order
state. In this way seemings are more like reflecting than believing: whereas
one can have non-occurrent beliefs, one cannot non-occurrenty reflect on
anything.14
In summary, I have noted four principal properties of seemings: seemings
are essentially a kind of (P1) propositional attitude that is (P2) representational, (P3) alethically presentational, (P4) epistemically presentational, and
(P5) essentially occurrent.
13

Seeming states also appear to be self-presenting states, states which are such that if
one is in it, one is, in some sense, in a position to know that they are in it. Perhaps the
way to characterize this is as follows:
If p seems true to S, then if S were to consider the question (with understanding) whether p seems true, then ‘p seems true to S’ would also seem
true to S.
The converse of this must be denied, for often it is the case that we are presented to
in certain ways, though we are unaware of the further fact that we are presented to
in such-n-such a way. Self-presentation plays a crucial role in some (access) internalist
epistemologies, e.g., Chisholm (1982, 9-11). The epistemology of intuition I defend in the
next chapter does not rely on this aspect of seemings.
14
Compare Bealer (1998) and Pust (2000).
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2.2.2

Seemings are Distinct from Canonical Experiences/Attitudes

There are certain canonical experiential states and propositional attitudes
that are closely related to seemings, but should be regarded as distinct from
them. These canonical experiences and propositional attitudes include the
following: perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences as well as
propositional attitudes such as belief, the attraction to believe, and the disposition to believe. A question arises as to the relationship between seemings
and these other contentful mental states. Some have held the view that seemings are not sui generis states, but are rather to be reduced to some other
kind (or perhaps kinds) of canonical mental state. I reject this. My view is
that seemings are a sui generis propositional attitude, irreducible to other
sorts of experiences and attitudes.15 The principal reason to regard seemings
as sui generis is that no reduction of seemings to some other canonical experience or propositional attitude is going to be extensionally or qualitatively
adequate. That is, for any proposed reduction we can either point to obvious
counterexamples or to some paradigmatic property a seeming has but the
proposed reductive state lacks.
Let’s start by considering some propositional attitudes with which one
might try to identify seemings: belief, the attraction to believe, and the
disposition to believe. It is clear that seemings are distinct from beliefs. A
15

Tucker (2010c) and Cullison (2010) also hold this view. Bealer (1998) clearly maintains
that intuitive seemings are distinct from these other states, but he at least appears to
maintain that other kinds of seemings are reducible to some of these states. For example,
Bealer writes: “sense perception is a sensory seeming,” (1998, 208). Tolhurst (1998, 300)
and Huemer (2001, 58-79) appear to hold something similar to Bealer.
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proposition can seem true without being believed. Consider the Muller-Lyer
illusion: when presented with the lines it seems to be the case that they are
of diﬀerent lengths, but we know better than to (and so we don’t) believe it.
Or consider the naive comprehension axiom: it seems true, but, again, we
know better than to (and so we don’t) believe it.16
Might seemings be reducible to having a disposition to believe? An initial
problem, noted by Pust, is that it is by no means clear that dispositions to
believe are even mental states.17 For example, take someone who has recently
suﬀered brain death: such a one has a disposition to have further thoughts
were their brain to be “revived” (such things do occur), but it is far from
clear that a brain dead person is in any kind of mental state while brain
dead. But even if such dispositions are mental states there is a more serious
problem. The disposition to believe is not itself a propositional attitude, it’s
a disposition to have a propositional attitude. So no dispositional account of
seemings will do. One further problem with this account has to do with the
essential occurrence of seemings: dispositions are not essentially occurrent.
Might seemings, then, be identifiable with the attraction to believe? Sosa
and others maintain that they are.18 One advantage of this view is that it
16

Bealer (1998).
Pust (forthcoming).
18
Sosa (2007, chapter 3) treats seemings as attractions to “assent” but he refrains from
oﬀering any contrast between belief and assent. Moreover, in his subsequent characterization of his own view (Sosa (2009, 142)) he chooses the term ‘belief’ rather than ‘assent’.
Accordingly, I interpret Sosa’s position as one where belief and assent refer to the same
kind of mental state. Boghossian (2009) has also interpreted Sosa this way. For others
who appear to endorse this view see Lynch (2006) and Williamson (2007).
17
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will not be challenged by the essentially occurrent nature of seemings, for attractions are, intuitively, essentially occurrent.19 Moreover, we are attracted
to believe what seems true. So the view that seemings are attractions to
believe is much more plausible than the previous options.
But even so there are several problems with this view. First, one can
have an attraction to believe something without it seeming to be true.20 For
example, one can have practical reasons that generate an attraction to believe
a proposition that does not seem true: oﬀering a poor man a million dollars to
believe that the moon is made of cheese will generate an attraction to believe
it, though this will not make the proposition seem true.21 Second, seemings
are representational states, but attractions to believe are not representational
states; attractions to believe are attractions to be in a representational state,
namely, belief. One may try to resuscitate this view by claiming its seeming
true that p is an attraction to believe p where one also puts some small degree
of belief in p. But the trouble with this view is that there are propositions
which seem true though we put no credence in them. For example, while
looking at the Muller-Lyer illusion it seems true that one line is longer than
the other. Although there may be some lingering attraction to believe it,
I do not believe it–not even to some small degree. Third, seemings have a
phenomenology that attractions to believe do not. Seemings are alethically
presentational states, but attractions to believe need not be, as witnessed by
19

See Sosa (2007, chapter 3).
Huemer (2007), Cullison (2010), and Pust (forthcoming).
21
See also Cullison (2010, 264-65).
20
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the fact that one can be attracted to believe something that does not seem
true for practical reasons. Fourth, as Huemer has pointed out, it is natural for
us to explain our attraction to believe at least some things in terms of what
seems true. But if seemings are attractions to believe then such explanations
are, at best, trivially true.22
Finally, and somewhat tendentiously, when it seems to be the case that p,
that seeming is appropriately treated as an epistemic reason to believe p;23
but attractions to believe are too desire-like and thus inappropriate to be
treated as epistemic reasons for belief. In response to this those who wishing
to maintain that seemings are reducible to attractions may emphasize that
it’s not attractions simpliciter which have the ability to rationally ground
belief; rather, it’s attractions to believe which occur in specific circumstances
that have this ability. For example, suppose one held that seemings are attractions which arise from certain kinds of epistemically suitable experiences
(e.g., perceptual, memorial, introspective experiences). Arguably, such attractions may not be inappropriate epistemic grounds for belief. But there
is a problem: take hoping that, wishing that, being suspicious that, worrying
that, being happy that, being attracted to consider, being attracted to conjecture, being attracted to wonder whether, etc. These are attitudes one could
have due to perceptual, memorial, or introspective experiences; e.g., it could
be that when one has a perceptual experience as of a cat one hopes that there
22
23

Huemer (2007).
See sections 2.3.1 and 4.1-4.3 for a defense of this.
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is a cat or is attracted to wonder whether there is a cat.24 But, presumably,
such states cannot serve as rational foundations for believing that there is
a cat: it would be irrational to base one’s belief that there is a cat on the
fact that one has any of the above attitudes towards that content, even if
that attitude were the result of one’s perceptual experience which had the
same content. But why, then, can attractions to believe serve as rational
foundations if these other states cannot? There must be something about
this kind of state, the state of being attracted to believe, that makes it the
sort of state that is suitable for rationally grounding belief. But I see no
relevant diﬀerence between it and, at least some of, these other states. So
assuming seemings can serve as rational foundations (something I will argue
for in section 4), we have reason to resist the attraction view.
An alternative reductive strategy, then, is to deny that seemings are a sui
generis propositional attitude by identifying seemings with (perhaps some
aspect of) certain kinds of contentful experiences that have properties (P1)(P5). For example, take your present visual experience as of English text.
Upon having this visual experience and considering the proposition “there
is English text nearby,” it will seem true to you that there is English text
nearby. On the present view, this seeming is not to be construed as a propositional attitude distinct from your perceptual experience, but it is rather to
be identified with some aspect of your present perceptual experience. This
24

Perhaps some such cases will involve a bit of deviant psychology, for typically one’s
competent grasp of concepts in p will not bring it about that one is, say, happy that p.
However, we can imagine such a possibility, which is all the objection needs.
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sort of view has merit insofar as perceptual and introspective experiences as
well as certain kinds of memorial experiences have representational content
that is alethically and epistemically presentational.25 On this view, then,
seemings are not a natural kind of mental state but are rather a class of
mental states unified by their having properties (P1)-(P5).
The thesis under consideration, then, is this:
Seemings as a Less-Than-Perfectly-Natural Kind (SLK)
Seemings are not a sui generis mental state. For a proposition p
to seem true to S is just for S to be in some token mental state
that (i) has p as a content and (ii) is such that (P1)-(P5) hold of
that state. Such mental states include, but might not be limited
to, perceptual experiences, introspective experiences, and certain
kinds of memorial experiences.26
However there are several diﬃculties facing (SLK), problems that simply
evaporate if one grants that seemings are a mental state in their own right.
Here are the problems:
The Propositional Content Problem. Although perceptual, introspective, and certain memorial experiences have representational content, it is not clear that the contents of such experi25

Pryor (2004: 356-357), Martin (2002, 399), Heck (2000, 518), and Siegel (2010).
As is standard, talk of perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences is to be
understood non-factively: one can have a perceptual experience without perceiving, one
can have a memorial experience without remembering, one can have an introspective
experience without correctly introspecting.
26
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ences are propositions. For example, one’s visual experiences or
quasi-visual memorial experiences are as of objects having certain
properties, not propositions about objects having certain properties. But seemings have propositions as contents. Similarly, in
the case of introspection, when one is in pain one is aware of pain,
but pain is no proposition. But in order for (SLK) to be true,
these experiences must be propositional attitudes.27
The Seemings Explanation: Seemings have properties
(P1)-(P5) and can occur in virtue of, though they remain distinct from, one’s perceptual, introspective, and
memorial experiences. Thus, for example, when one
has a perceptual experience as of p, it can, other things
being equal, cause some propositional description of the
27

Although some have argued that perceptual experience is a propositional attitude
(see Byrne (2005) and McDowell (1994)) there remains good reason to resist the thesis.
First, as just mentioned, it is decidedly unnatural to identify (as opposed to describe)
the content of experience with a proposition about an object; as Crane notes: in veridical
experience “you hear the sound of the coach on the cobbles; you taste the sourness of the
wine; you feel the ferns tickling your leg” (Crane (2008, 465) emphasis mine). (In the case
of hallucinatory and illusory experiences, one has only apparent perceptual experiences as
of such objects.) Second, the accuracy of the content of perceptual experience admits of
degrees, but a proposition’s accuracy (= its truth) does not, i.e., a perceptual experience’s
content can be more or less accurate depending on how well it represents what it is about
while a proposition cannot be more or less true (Crane (2008, 458); cf. Siegel (2010, 3033)). Third, events can be the content of a perceptual experience, but events cannot be
the content of a propositional attitude, e.g., one experiences the event of falling rain, but
one does not believe or hope that falling rain (Crane (2008, 464)). Fourth, we can perform
logical operations on the contents of propositional attitudes, but not on the contents of
experience, e.g., what might the negation of one’s perceptual experience of falling rain or
the sound of the coach amount to? (Crane (2008, 462)).
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content of one’s perceptual experience to seem true.28
The Problem of Modally and Probabilistically Qualified Content.
Some of the propositions that seem true involve modal and probabilistic concepts in a way that our perceptual, memorial, and introspective experiences do not. For instance, suppose you were to
see a bird nearby by in optimal perceptual circumstances. Upon
reflection, it would not only seem true to you that there is a bird
nearby, but also: that it is probable that a bird is nearby, and that
it is possible that that bird might not have been nearby. Although
such seemings may depend on one’s perceptual experience, it is
arguably not part of one’s perceptual experience: for perceptual
experience purports to present us with how the world is not how
it probably is, or possibly is, or might not be. (We could easily
add examples involving memorial and introspective experiences.)
Again in order for (SLK) to be true there must be some sui generis
mental state that has properties (P1)-(P5) that has the specified
modally and probabilistically qualified content.
The Seemings Explanation. A seeming state is a kind
of sui generis mental state that has properties (P1)28

If the objection holds up, then we cannot say that the perceptual experience with content p makes p seem true without obfuscating matters. For the p-ish content of experience
is, on this view, not a proposition, while the p-ish content of a seeming is a proposition. For
convenience in what follows I will ignore this point, and simply speak as if the very same
content can be shared between seemings and perceptual, introspective, etc., experiences.

31

(P5) and hosts the modally and probabilistically qualified propositions.29 In the cases specified above, the
seemings are partly owed to one’s present perceptual
experience as of a bird. It’s hard to say what else these
seemings are owed to. But this is not the unique burden of sui generis seemings theorists for anyone who
grants that such modally and probabilistically qualified
propositions can seem true owes such an explanation.
The Problem of Mixed Contents. Consider the conjunction of two
simple contents of some distinct presentational states, e.g., one’s
introspective experience that I’m in pain and one’s perceptual
experience that there is printed English text here. Plausibly, not
only can these propositions seem true individually, but so can
their conjunction. But the conjunction itself cannot be part of
either type of experience (one cannot see pain nor can one introspect printed English text). What is needed, then, for (SLK) to
be viable is for there to be some further sort of sui generis mental
state that has properties (P1)-(P3) and can have that conjunctive
proposition as a content.
The Seemings Explanation: A seeming state is a kind
of sui generis mental state that has properties (P1)29

By “hosting propositions” I simply mean “has the specified propositions as contents”.
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(P5) and can host the conjunctive proposition. When
seemings do so, it is typically because the individual
conjuncts each seem true and because their conjunction
obviously follows.
The Problem of Persisting Seemings. Suppose you were holding
as well as reading a printed version of this paper in an isolated
environment (e.g., the middle of some desert). In such a circumstance it would seem true to you that there is English text
nearby because of your visual experience as of English text. However, that seeming can persist even when your visual experience
has changed so that it’s no longer of English text. For example,
if you were to close your eyes while still holding the document or
if you were to turn your head so that the text was just barely in
the periphery of your vision, it would still seem true that there
is English text nearby even though your visual experience ceased
to be as of English text. But then the seeming is not essentially
part of your perceptual experience; neither is the seeming part
of some tactile or memorial experience: one cannot feel printed
text nor does one recall how things are, but rather how things
were.30 Again in order for (SLK) to be true there must be some
sui generis mental state that has properties (P1)-(P5) that has
30
To say that this content is not part of your memorial experience is not to say that
your memorial experiences are irrelevant. See the next seemings explanation.
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the specified content.
The Seemings Explanation: A seeming state is a kind of
sui generis mental state that has properties (P1)-(P5)
and hosts the proposition that there is English text
nearby. In this case the seeming is partly explained by
one’s memory of one’s previous visual experience. It is
hard to say what else together with one’s memory explains the seeming, but lack of an easy explanation here
is no mark against the sui generis seemings theorist,
for this is an explanation everyone must provide—well,
at least everyone who grants that there are seemings
about our immediate environment that were but are
not longer contents of one’s perceptual experience.
The Presentational Enrichment Problem. Suppose you were looking at an abnormal chess board: instead of having 8 squares on
each side of its perimeter it has 5. Under normal visual circumstances, you would be having a visual experience as of a checkered
surface. But you would not be having a visual experiences that
presents you with a 25-squared checkered surface, even though
the board has as many squares. It’s just too many squares for
one’s visual experience to present to one. But to anyone reasonably competent in basic arithmetic it will seem true that there is
34

a checkered surface with 25 squares. It is implausible to maintain that after doing the math the presentational aspect of one’s
visual experience has been enriched so as to include the content
that there are 25 squares on the board.31 Yet the proposition that
there are 25 squares on the board seems true.32 Again in order
for (SLK) to be true there must be some sui generis mental state
that has properties (P1)-(P5) that has the specified content.
The Seemings Explanation: A seeming state is a kind
of sui generis mental state that has properties (P1)(P5) and hosts the proposition that there is a checkered surface with 25 squares. This particular seeming
is explained by one’s particular visual experience, one’s
ability to count the number of squares on the perimeter
of the checkered board and do the relevant math.
The Problem of Intuitions. When one has an intuition that p,
p seems true. Call such seemings ‘intuitive seemings’. In order
for (SLK) to hold, there must be some sui generis mental state
that has properties (P1)-(P5) that hosts the content of intuitive
seemings. Perceptual, memorial, and introspective experiences
31

I’m taking for granted the idea that perceptual experiences can have representational
content that is not (alethically or epistemically) presentational.
32
Siegel (2010) argues that the content of perceptual experience can be enriched in
certain ways. But my argument here is not that perceptual experience cannot be enriched,
but that there are some cases where it is not enriched in ways that correspond to what
seems true.
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are obviously not candidates for this. What we need then to
account for intuitive seemings is some mental state having properties (P1)-(P5), but none is forthcoming.33,34
The Seemings Explanation. A seemings theorist can
claim that seemings are the sui generis mental state
that has properties (P1)-(P5) and hosts the content of
intuitions.
In summary, we have a series of problems facing (SLK). Each of these problems is resolvable if seemings are themselves a sui generis propositional
33

We may be able to raise a similar problem concerning proprioception, which, like
intuitions, does not appear to be accompanied by anything like a sense perceptive state.
34
Some have held that there are sui generis intuitive experiences which are quasiperceptual in nature. However, those who have held this view have maintained that the
content of these experiences is objectual, i.e., is of abstract objects and structures, and
not of propositions. (For proponents of this in the special case of mathematical intuition
see Gödel (1964), Parsons (1995) and (2000), Katz (1998, 44-45). For a proponent of
this in the case of intuition generally see Chudnoﬀ (2010) and (forthcoming).) However,
I, like Sosa (2007, chapter 3), find the idea of objectual intuitive experiences diﬃcult to
accept (at least across the board). When I consider whether (i) 2+2=4 is necessarily true
or whether (ii) justified beliefs can be false, both claims seem true to me but I do not
detect any experience in addition to these proposition’s seeming to be true. There is no
quasi-perceptual intuitive experience I have in virtue of which they seem true.
Although I’m happy to grant that there can be an imaginative experiences that can
play some role here. I can imagine two pairs of objects “coming together” and creating
a foursome where this helps me understand the claim that 2+2=4, and I can imagine
a circumstance where some arbitrary thinker has a justified false belief. But in neither
case can the seemings be identified with the imaginative experience. The chief problem
being that imaginative experiences are neither representational nor presentational. To
imagine a flower sprouting from my forehead and catching fire is not to represent it as
being true nor it is it presented to me as being true. See (Huemer (2001)). But a further
problem may concern the content of what is imagined. The content of (i) and (ii) include
the modal concepts of necessity and possibility, but it’s unclear whether such concepts
can be pictured or otherwise represented in the imagination. What one pictures in the
imagination is people having false beliefs and groups of objects forming larger groups, but
where’s the necessity or possibility of this? (Answer: it is intuited.)
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attitude distinct from other canonical propositional attitudes and experiences. In the absence of any better resolution and explanation, we have a
strong abductive reason to maintain that seemings are a perfectly natural
sui generis, irreducible propositional attitude that stands alongside other
canonical propositional attitudes and experiences.

2.3

Intuitions as Seemings

Intuitions in my view are just a certain sort of seeming. Roughly, my view
is that intuitions are seemings which do no occur in virtue of “empirical”
experience. Section 2.3.1 clarifies this claim. Sections 2.3.2-2.3.4 defend
the extensional and qualitative adequacy of my account of intuitions. Since
my account diﬀers from other accounts of the nature of intuition, especially
so-called “philosophical” intuitions, section 2.3.2 shows how my account can
accommodate pre-existing theories of the nature of “philosophical” intuitions.
Section 2.3.3 responds to possible counterexamples to my theory. Section
2.3.4 defends the qualitative adequacy of my account of intuitions as a kind
of seeming.
2.3.1

What Intuitions Are

Now, upon consideration, propositions other than (A1)-(B3) seem true to me
as I write. For instance, I have, upon reflection, the following intuitions:
(C1) If a statement is metaphysically necessarily true, then it is
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true.
(C2) It is possible to have a justified false belief.
(C3) Two morally assessable actions in type-identical circumstances cannot diﬀer in moral status.
For one to intuit these propositions is for one to be in an occurrent contentful
mental state that is both a propositional attitude and representational. For
example, to have the intuition that it’s possible to have a justified false belief
is to be in a mental state that occurrently represents a certain proposition as
correctly describing the world. Is one’s intuition essentially occurrent? It’s
hard to even imagine what it would be like to intuit p without it’s content
being part of your conscious experience. Notice, the claim isn’t that one
cannot intuit that p without being aware that one is intuiting that p. Rather
the claim of essential occurrence concerns only the first-order state. In this
way intuiting is more like reflecting than believing: whereas one can have
non-occurrent beliefs (e.g., dispositional beliefs), one cannot non-occurrenty
reflect on anything. No one writing on intuitions doubts that intuitions can
be occurrent, and some take essential occurrence to be a crucial ingredient
of any plausible theory of intuition.35
35

See Bealer (1998) and Pust (2000). See also Sosa (2007). In any case, for the purposes
of upholding my account of intuitions as seemings, all I will need is the weaker claim that
intuitions can be non-occurrent iﬀ seemings can be also. Let me mention one poor reason
for thinking that intuitions (and seemings) can be non-occurrent: the fact that one has
a disposition to have certain intuitions and seemings. We must carefully separate the
disposition to be in a state from being in that state. Even in the case of belief we must,
as Audi (1994) has argued, distinguish dispositional beliefs from dispositions to believe,
where the former, but not latter, are beliefs.
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Maintaining that having an intuition is a representational propositional
attitude is not an entirely uncontroversial point. For instance, those who hold
that intuitions are dispositions to believe, must grant that intuiting that p is
not even a propositional attitude much less a representational one. Rather,
they must hold that intuiting is a disposition to have such an attitude. Similarly, those who hold that intuitions are attractions to believe, must deny
that intuiting that p is a representational propositional attitude.36 For, on
such a view, an intuition is just an attraction to be in representational state.
Both views are problematic for nothing is intuited unless it is represented
to one as being correct. Consider the oddity of someone claiming the following:
(Oddity) I have the intuition that p, but p does not have even
slightest appearance of being true.
Although I think we should parse the phrase “having the slightest appearance
of being true” in terms of seemings, this does not matter. What matters is
that it is a way of indicating that p is being represented to one as correct.
Arguably, what’s odd about aﬃrming instances of (Oddity) is that doing
involves the simultaneous aﬃrmation and denial that p is being represented
to one as true.
36

Sosa (2007), Lynch (2006), Nimtz (2010), and Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009) all
hold that intuitions are attractions to believe. However, Nimtz and Earlenbaugh and
Molyneux hold the interesting view that there are seemings (in something like my sense
above) but they deny that intuitions are seemings. By contrast, Sosa (2007) holds the
view that seemings just are attractions to believe. It is unclear what Lynch’s settled view
is.
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Permutations of the attraction view will not salvage the account from this
particular criticism.37 For example, suppose one claimed that intuiting p is
the attraction to believe p plus having some, possibly small, degree of belief in
p. Since even a very weak belief is a representational propositional attitude,
one might think the account saved. But there are counterexamples owing to
the existence of propositions we intuit but fail to even weakly believe. For
instance, consider the following:
(C4) There are more even and odd numbers than there are even
numbers.
(C5) For every condition C there is a set that consists of just
those things that satisfy C.
(C6) Simultaneity is transitive. If e1 occurs at the same time as
e2, and e2 occurs at the same time as e3, then e1 occurs at the
same time as e3.
Again, and for familiar reasons, I believe these not even a little even though
I have the intuition that they are true.38
37
Sosa once held the dispositional view (see Sosa (1996) and (1998)), but this view
has been roundly criticized by Pust (2000), and none seem to defend it anymore. I will
not rehearse all objections and counters to that view, rather I will concentrate on issues
pertaining to attraction view, which is the chief rival to the view I defend here. Similarly,
I will ignore the view that intuitions are beliefs, it too being in wide disrepute due to
familiar counterexamples (e.g., the existence of unbelieved intuitions).
38
We have mathematical proofs which indicate that all countably infinite sets are of
the same cardinality; we have Russell’s paradox which shows us that there cannot be
a set for every condition; and we have Einstein’s theory of relativity which has shown
us that simultaneity is relative to a frame of reference, so (C6) cannot be true without
relativization to some such frame.

40

Another problem with the attraction to believe view is that attractions
to believe (qua attraction) are not alethically presentational, but intuitions
are alethically presentational states.39 When one considers Gettier cases, its
as if one can just “see” that justified true belief is insuﬃcient for knowledge.
Similarly, when one intuits (C1), (C2), and (C3) its as if one can just “see”
that they’re true. Because visual experience is clearly an alethically presentational state, the visual metaphor here is telling, and it is no accident
that philosophers have often been tempted to employ it in descriptions of
intuition.40
A final problem with the attraction view is that attractions appear to
be, while intuitions do not appear to be, inappropriate bases for belief. In
response, those who maintain the attraction view will emphasize that it’s
not attractions simpliciter which have the ability to rationally ground belief.
39

For others who defend the idea that intuitions have alethically presentational phenomenology see Bengson (MS) and Chudnoﬀ (2011) and (forthcoming).
40
Bengson (2010) oﬀers various arguments for the view that intuitions are alethically
presentational sates, one of which is that it explains the pervasive use of perceptual language to describe what happens when one has an intuition. Here are some examples he
gives:
Locke (1689, IV.2.i ) emphasis mine: (T)he Mind...perceives the Truth, as
the Eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. The Mind perceives,
that White is not Black, That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are
more than Two, and equal to One and Two...by bare Intuition...”
Spinoza (1677, 2p40s2) emphasis mine: “Given the numbers 1, 2, and 3...we
arrive at the fourth number (6) from the ratio which, in one intuition (uno
intuito), we see (videmus) the first number to have to the second.”
Ayer (1946, 79) emphasis mine: “If one knows what is the function of the
words ‘either’, ‘or’, and ‘not’, then one can see that any proposition of the
form ‘Either p is true or p is not true’ is valid, independently of experience.”
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Rather, they maintain that it’s attractions to believe which occur in specific
circumstances that have this ability. For example, Sosa’s view is that intuitions are attractions to believe that are grounded in one’s competent grasp
of the concepts involved, and that these attractions have the ability to rationally ground belief.41 But there is a problem: take hoping that, wishing
that, being suspicious that, worrying that, being happy that, being attracted to
consider, being attracted to conjecture, being attracted to wonder whether, etc.
These are attitudes one could have been due to one’s competent grasp of the
concepts involved.42 But, presumably, such states cannot serve as rational
foundations for belief: it would be irrational to base one’s belief in p on the
fact that one has any of the above attitudes towards p, even if that attitude
were the result of one’s competent grasp of the concepts involved. But why,
then, can attractions to believe serve as rational foundations if these other
states cannot? There must be something about this kind of state, the state of
being attracted to believe, that makes it the sort of state that is suitable for
rationally grounding belief. But I see no relevant diﬀerence between it and,
at least some of, these other states. So assuming we are right that intuitions
can serve as rational foundations, we have reason to resist the attraction
view.
41

Sosa (2007, 60-61).
Perhaps some such cases will involve a bit of deviant psychology, for typically one’s
competent grasp of concepts in p will not bring it about that one is, say, happy that p.
However, we can imagine such a possibility, which is all the objection needs.
42
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Where, then, does this leave us? What, then, are intuitions? We have
observed that intuitions are a kind of occurrent representational propositional attitude that is not reducible to beliefs, the attraction to believe, or
dispositions to believe. Moreover we have observed that intuitions are not
only alethically presentational, but seem to be epistemically presentational
as well. In short, intuitions have properties (P1)-(P5).
As noted above, seemings also have (P1)-(P5). So what is the relation
between seemings and intuitions? Consider (C1)-(C3). They seem true, and
the way in which they seem true does not appear to diﬀer from the way
in which (A1)-(B3) seem true. When I turn my mind from (A1) to (B1)
and then to (C1) each proposition seems true in the same manner. What
diﬀers, however, is that in virtue of which each seems true: (A1)-(A3) seem
true to me at least partly in virtue of the particular visual experience I’m
having as I write, while (B1)-(B3) seem true to me at least partly in virtue of
certain memorial and introspective experiences I have. In the case of (C1)(C3) I cannot easily say just why (C1)-(C3) seem true to me; I find myself
unable to easily “point to” anything that plays the same role as my conscious
perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences with respect to (A1)(B3).43 Nevertheless, (C1)-(C3) seem true; upon considering them, it is as if
I can just tell that these accurately describe how the world is.
There are two options, then, with regard to the relationship between
seemings and intuitions:
43

Lynch (2006) refers to this as the “source-opacity” of intuition.
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Irreductionism. Intuitions are a sui generis mental state having
properties (P1)-(P5), which are distinct from, though they bring
about, seemings in their content.
Reductionism. Intuitions are reducible to seemings of a certain
sort. Because seemings have (P1)-(P5), intuitions do also.
Provided we can oﬀer an Reductionist account of intuitions that is both
extensionally and qualitatively adequate (in the sense discussed in section
2.1), simplicity mandates that we endorse Reductionism. In the remainder
of this section I spell out a Reductionist account of intuitions. In sections
2.3.2-2.3.4 I defend the extensional and qualitative adequacy of the account.
Although it is introspectively unclear just why (C1)-(C3) seem true, it
is easy to see that their seeming true has nothing to do with any present
perceptual, memorial, or introspective experience I have. This is not peculiar
to these intuitions, but it holds of intuitions in general (consider the examples
of intuition introduced in section 2.1). My thesis, then, is that intuitions are
seemings of a certain sort. Specifically, what distinguishes intuitions from
other types of seemings has something to do with that in virtue of which they
occur. However, specifying just what it is in virtue of that intuitions occur is
diﬃcult for at least two reasons. We’ve already noted the first reason: unlike
cases resembling (A1)-(B3), it is often not introspectively obvious just why
one intuits what one does. Second, paradigmatic cases of intuitions exhibit a
certain degree of disunity that makes suspect the idea that we can say that
all intuitions occur in virtue of the same type of thing (see section 2.3.2).
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Even so, this diﬃculty of saying what it is in virtue of does not preclude us
from being able to characterize what an intuition is in a useful manner.
To save breath and ink, we’ll introduce an abbreviation. Let ‘some CEE’
abbreviate the following:
Some Conscious Empirical Experience
(a) some conscious perceptual or introspective experience, or (b)
some conscious memorial experience as of past perceptual or introspective experiences, or (c) some inference involving the contents of (a) and/or (b).
Paradigmatic cases of intuitions involve propositions which seem true though
not even partly in virtue of some CEE, which suggests the following account
of intuitions:
Intuitions as Seemings (IAS). For S to intuit p (at t) just is for
p to seem true to S (at t), but not even partly in virtue of some
CEE.44
On this view, intuition is not to be identified with any perfectly natural
propositional attitude simpliciter ; rather it is to be identified with a perfectly natural propositional attitude (a seeming) that occurs in specific circumstances, i.e., circumstances where the seeming at issue is not even partly
owed to some CEE.
44

This last ‘at t’ is redundant insofar as we’ve defined ‘some CEE’ in terms of certain
conscious, and thus occurrent, episodes. However, it has been added for clarity.
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Let me clarify some aspects of this account. First, the phrase ‘in virtue
of’ can be used to denote a variety of diﬀerent dependence relations, however
not just any dependence relation is suitable for present purposes. The target
dependence relation(s) here are any that can explain why p seems true in
terms of some CEE.45 This is a functional characterization of the target
in virtue of relation(s), and it leaves open just what specific dependence
relation(s) are at issue.46 This is a dialectical virtue because it absolves me
from having to specify and then argue for substantive claims about (i) the
nature of perceptual, memorial, and introspective experience and (ii) how a
proposition p seeming to be true can depend on those experiences in such
a way that explain why p seems true. This is acceptable insofar as we are
already committed to it being the case that there are propositions which seem
45

For exposition and defense of the idea that in virtue of relations are dependence
relations that have explanatory value, see Audi (forthcoming), Fine (2012), Raven (2011),
and Rosen (2010).
46
Here are two possible options. Let a perceptual seeming be any seeming that one has in
virtue of one’s conscious perceptual experiences. Take a perceptual seeming with content
p. One might maintain that that perceptual seeming is a constitutive part of perceptual
experience–though this position depends on perceptual experience being a propositional
attitude, something we have reason to doubt (see footnote 26). (Concerning constitution,
I assume only that if x is constituted by y, then x holds at least partly in virtue of y.
Jonathan Schaﬀer reportedly holds the same view, see Audi (forthcoming, footnote 17).)
But one might maintain that that perceptual seemings are at least partly and appropriately caused by one’s perceptual experience. The qualification that the causal dependence
be appropriate is due to the fact that not every causal dependence relation that can hold
between, say, a perceptual experience and a seeming will be such that it explains the
seeming. (For example, one may have a bizarre association between candy canes and the
mathematical truth that 1+1=2 such that anytime one has an experience of a candy cane
one is caused to reflect on the statement that 1+1=2. Although 1+1=2 may seem true
whenever one considers it, it’s seeming true is not explained by the experience of a candy
cane which causes it.) The constitution view and the causal view are not mutually exclusive positions and both of them specify an in virtue of relation with explanatory merit
that holds between the seeming and the perceptual experience.
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true, where their seeming true at least partly depends on and is explained
by some CEE, e.g., cases like (A1)-(B3) above.47
Second, the claim that intuitions are seemings that do not occur in virtue
of some CEE involves the qualification that perceptual, introspective, and
memorial experiences be conscious. This may seem contentious for it threatens to allow, say, seemings that occur in virtue of, say, super blindsight to
count as intuitions.48 For in such a case certain propositions seem true without one having any conscious perceptual experience. Yet this is a consequence
I am comfortable with. Suppose, for example, it seems to one that there is a
chair next to the window while one lacks anything resembling a normal perceptual experience as of a chair next to the window or any memory involving
such. This is strikingly similar to cases where one intuits that parthood is
transitive: in both cases a proposition seems true, but not because of some
CEE, and in such a situation it would be quite natural to describe that seemings as an intuition. In connection with this it will help to consider the third
point.
Third, my characterization of intuitions does not prevent us from drawing
useful distinctions among intuitions. We can distinguish intuitions by their
47

Notice also that (IAS), so construed, allows intuitions to depend on past and present
perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences, and inferences in other ways. For
example, (IAS) is consistent with maintaining that when one intuits p, past experiences
and one’s present memories explain how it is that one understands p.
48
Here, super blindsight is an imaginable scenario where one has all the seemings one
would have if one were to have a normal visual experience of one’s immediate environment,
though one lacks the usual visual imagery that usually attends normal visual experience.
However, usual characterizations of the imagined phenomenon is do not usually involve
such a specified notion of seemings. See Block (1997).
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etiology, their modal force, their content, their epistemic worth, and other
ways. Nothing about (IAS) prevents this and in the next section I will
discuss various distinctions we can draw among intuitions and how (IAS)
compares with what others have said about a unique subclass of intuitions:
philosophical intuitions.
2.3.2

Extensional Adequacy I: Philosophical Intuitions

In this and the following section I address the issue of (IAS)’s extensional
adequacy. For one challenge to (IAS) comes from the idea that intuitions,
strictly speaking, are something peculiar to the domain of philosophical inquiry. As I indicated above, I think this is wrong for I think that there are
intuitions which, in some sense, are non-philosophical, e.g., possible cases of
seemings via super blindsight.49 However, I also think there is some sense
to the idea that there are uniquely philosophical intuitions. Let us begin by
characterizing this notion functionally:
Functional Characterization (FC). Something is a philosophical
intuition just in case it’s an intuition that some philosopher has
(or would have) treated as evidence in the construction and evaluation of philosophical theories.
(FC) picks out philosophical intuitions by an extrinsic property certain intuitions possess, namely, their (potential) role in philosophical activity. How49

Again, super blindsight is an imaginable scenario where one has all the seemings one
would have if one were to have a normal visual experience of one’s immediate environment,
though one lacks the usual visual imagery that usually attends normal visual experience.
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ever, this way of picking out philosophical intuitions is relatively uninformative. Philosophers have oﬀered diﬀerent, and less trivial, accounts of what
it is to be a philosophical intuition, and in what follows I show how their
general views can be situated within the (IAS) account given above.
Many philosophers have claimed that those intuitions appropriate to
philosophical theorizing are deeply connected to modality such that one intuits p iﬀ one actually does intuit that p is necessarily true (or would under
appropriate circumstances intuit such).50 On the (IAS) account we are able
to capture this thought with the following condition:
Modal Intuitions. For S’s intuition that p to be a modal intuition
is for S to intuit that p and also to intuit that p is necessarily true
(or else would have such an intuition upon considering whether p
is necessarily true).
Another related claim about those intuitions of interest to philosophers is that
such intuitions occur just in virtue of one’s understanding of the concepts
involved in the proposition at issue.51
On the present account, we are able to capture this thought with the
following condition:
Conceptual Intuitions. For S’s intuition that p to be a conceptual
50

Bealer (1998, 207), BonJour (1998, 107), Pust (2000, chapter 1), and Sosa (2007, 61).
See also Chisholm (1977, 46), Ludwig (2007), and Plantinga (1993, 106).
51
Bealer (1998), BonJour (1998), Ludwig (2007, 135), Peacocke (2000), and Sosa (2007,
60).
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intuition is for S to intuit that p solely in virtue of S’s understanding of the concepts involved in p.
Some may wish to define the class of philosophical intuitions in terms of
modal and/ or conceptual intuitions, however this proves diﬃcult, owing to
the phenomena of deeply contingent intuitions.52
Consider the following examples:
Contingent Intuitions
(CI1) If there is a unique most unlikely event e that could occur
just after reading this sentence, then e will not occur after reading
this sentence.53
(CI2) If I were a ticket holder in just one lottery that was fair,
was extremely large, and was to have only one winner, I would
be holding a losing ticket.
(CI3) Given evidence E, if H is the best explanation of E, then H
is not unlikely to be true.54
52
Bealer (1999, 50 fn.9) concedes that if there is in fact contingent a priori knowledge,
then his account of intuitions would need to be revised to accommodate that possibility
in some way or other.
53
This example is owed to Turri (2011, 337-340).
54
This is inspired by Hawthorne’s (2002) example which involved claims like the following, which are supposed to be capable of a priori justification: If E1 is the best explanation
of H1 , then E1 is true. Turri (2011, 335-337) argues that this is mistaken for we lack (presumably a priori) reason to think best explanations always turn out to be correct. My
contention, expressed in (CI3), is that best explanations are, if not true or likely to be
true, are at least not unlikely to be true. See my discussion of impure “intuitions” in the
next section.
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These intuitions appear to be modally strong in the sense that they could not
easily have been false, yet for all that they are contingent.55 It is easy to see
that (CI1) and (CI2) are contingent for it is easy to see that there is some
world where their antecedents are true but consequents false. Concerning
(CI1), it’s the world where there is a unique most unlikely event that occurs
after reading (CI1), and concerning (CI2) it’s the world where I’m holding
the winning ticket in such a lottery. Whether (C3) is contingent may be
controversial, but here’s a reason to think it contingent. Suppose E is some
brute fact and thus is a fact which has no correct explanation. There may
yet be some candidate false explanation, H, of E that is better than all other
competing explanations of E. But, here, H is unlikely to be true because E’s
bruteness makes it unexplainable.56
Being contingent, (CI1)-(CI3) cannot count as modal intuitions. Might
they count as conceptual intuitions? Perhaps, but I find the idea diﬃcult to
justify. Firstly, because it is introspectively diﬃcult to tell what the etiology
of intuitive seemings are. In general, I think our claims about the etiology
of intuitions is more an inference to the best explanation than any sort of
55

I reject Kripke’s (1980, 56) examples of contingent a priori propositions as being cases
of intuitions or a priori knowledge. To know that the length of the standard meter bar is
one meter long one must know that such a bar exists. But such knowledge is neither a
priori nor had solely via intuition. I think Kripke’s examples are best construed as cases
that are partly a priori and partly a posteriori depending on both intuition and some
empirical information. BonJour (1998, 12-13) and Turri (2011) defend this view.
56
Plainly, driving this example home would require precisifications of the target notions
of explanation and likelihood. This is an undertaking for another occasion, and is, in
any case, unnecessary for present purposes provided I’m correct that (CI1) and (CI2) are
contingent intuitions.
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immediate apprehension of their origin–except, perhaps, in cases where only
stipulative definitions are in play. Secondly, the following principle seems
plausible:
(CRN) If a relation R obtains between some concepts c1 ...cn , then
(i) that relation holds necessarily, and (ii) the proposition that
that relation holds between c1 ...cn is itself a necessary truth.57
(CRN) says that conceptual relations are necessary, but the relations that
hold between the concepts present in (C1)-(C3) hold only contingently. So,
(CRN), to the extent that it’s plausible, poses a significant challenge to
the thesis that (C1)-(C3) are grounded solely in our understanding of their
constituent concepts.58
A further class of intuitions involves the appeal to cases. This class of
intuitions is distinguished by the role of reflection on hypothetical situations. For example, the Coinflip Case above is such a possible situation, and
reflection on it typically yields the intuition that Dave does not have knowledge.59 Other examples will be familiar from philosophical literature, involving Searle’s Chinese nation, Thompson’s violinist, Putnam’s Twin Earth,
Lehrer’s gypsy lawyers, and Jackson’s Mary. We can characterize such intuitions thus:
57

Ludwig (2007) appears to endorse such a principle.
Though Turri (2011) regards (CI1) (or his slightly diﬀerent version of it, anyway) as
an intuition we have solely on the basis of its conceptual etiology.
59
There is some debate about the structure of the nature of the content of intuitions
had in response to such scenarios. See Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009).
58
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Concrete Case Intuitions. For S to have a concrete case intuition
that p is for S to intuit p at least partly in virtue of reflection on
some hypothetical situation.
Not all modal and conceptual intuitions are concrete case intuitions, for
some intuitions are had independently of any considerations having to do
with concrete hypothetical scenarios. Moreover, although many concrete case
intuitions are conceptual and modal intuitions, some are not. For instance,
(CI2) is arguably neither conceptual nor modal, though it is a concrete case
intuition.60
So what are philosophical intuitions? One thing we can say is that philosophical intuitions include modal, conceptual, and concrete case intuitions.
It may turn out that these categories are coextensive, but that is a matter I
will leave open. Shall we limit philosophical intuitions to these categories? I
think it clear that these categories capture the vast majority of philosophical intuitions. However, the contingent intuitions (CI1)-(CI3) should give us
pause. For these are clearly not modal, nor are (CI1) or (CI3) concrete case
intuitions, and, as noted above, it’s unclear whether any of these are conceptual intuitions. Accordingly, I will also leave it open whether all philosophical
intuitions are either modal, or conceptual, or concrete case intuitions. Thus,
in the end, I’m not sure we can do much better than (FC) with respect to
providing necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the category of philosoph60

It is a concrete case intuition because one cannot even consider it without considering
the hypothetical scenario described in its antecedent.
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ical intuitions. Though we can helpfully add to (FC) the observation that
most, though not all, philosophical intuitions are either modal, conceptual,
or concrete case intuitions.
2.3.3

Extensional Adequacy II: Impure “Intuitions” and Cornerstones

Here I wish to parry another potential objection to (IAS)’s extensional adequacy. Roughly, the problem is that philosophers can be quite liberal with
their use of the term ‘intuition’ and thus there are things that are sometimes referred to as intuitions but which fail to satisfy (IAS). The goal of
this section is to help explain why some might be inclined to regard certain
non-intuitions, according to (IAS), as genuine intuitions.
Here are some examples of (possible) seemings that would not count as
intuitions according to (IAS), but nevertheless have some claim to the name
“intuition”:
Impure “Intuitions”
(Upon seeing my own hands in normal circumstances and considering whether (IPI1) was true, it would seem true that) (IPI1) I
have justification to believe that I have hands.
(Upon witnessing someone break a promise solely for one’s personal convenience and considering whether (IPI2) was true, it
would seem true that) (IPI2) That person did something wrong.
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(Upon seeing the standard meter bar (and recognizing it as such)
in normal circumstances and considering whether (IPI3) was true,
it would seem true that) (IPI3) The length of that bar is one meter
long.
(IPI1)-(IPI3) would each seem true in the specified cases, but according to
(IAS) none of these count as intuitions because each of them depends on
some CEE, i.e., on some conscious perceptual or introspective experience or
memories as of such past experiences, or inferences therefrom. Yet the fact
that each of these seem true does not depend solely on some CEE. Rather,
each partly depends on an intuition one has (or at least would have if one were
to consider the matter). (IPI1)’s seeming true depends on one’s intuitions
about those conditions suﬃcient for having a justified belief; (IPI2)’s seeming
true depends on one’s intuitions about the moral acceptability of promise
breaking for personal convenience; (IPI3)’s seeming true depends on one’s
intuitions about how stipulative definitions function. We may characterize
such impure “intuitions” thus:
Impure “Intuitions”. For S to have an impure “intuition” that p
is for p to seem true to S partly in virtue of intuitions one has
(or would have) and partly in virtue of some CEE.
A further class of putative “intuitions” are propositions Wittgenstein has referred to as “hinge-propositions” and Wright had dubbed “cornerstone propo-
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sitions.” 61 Often, these are propositions which reside at the core of our web
of belief and, often, do not admit of evidential support.62 Here are some
examples:
Cornerstones
(Corn1) The world will not be instantaneously annihilated in the
next five minutes and then immediately recreated so as to exactly
resemble its pre-annihilated state.
(Corn2) The human bodies that I usually encounter in the actual
world enjoy genuine mental states.
(Corn3) I’m not presently dreaming or the subject of the deceptions of an evil-demon.
(Corn4) My cognitive faculties are reliable.
Some might worry that these cornerstone propositions are not seemings in
the target sense because, when one reflects on these claims, they lack the sort
of phenomenology that is characteristic of seemings.63,64 Why, then, might
some be inclined to think such cornerstones are intuitions? One reason is
the existing tendency to deploy the term ‘intuition’ quite liberally. But a
61

Wright (2004); Wittgenstein (1969).
At least non-circular evidential support.
63
This is my experience when I reflects on (Corn1)-(Corn4). It is not as though I can
tell, just by reflecting on them, that they are true. Nevertheless, I do believe them, and
quite strongly at that.
64
Though some cornerstones may be seemings. For example, consider: (Corn5) There
are material objects. In my view this is not simply a deeply rooted belief, but a claim
that seems true when one has a normal visual experience and considers whether (Corn5)
is true.
62
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further, and much more interesting, reason people may be inclined to regard
such cornerstones as intuitions is because we have certain impure “intuitions”
with respect to (Corn1)-(Corn4). Namely, we have the impure “intuition”
that our belief in these propositions is epistemically justified. That is, what
seems true are the following:
(ECorn1) I am justified in believing that the world will not be
instantaneously annihilated in the next five minutes and then immediately recreated so as to exactly resemble its pre-annihilated
state.
(ECorn2) I am justified in believing that the human bodies that I
usually encounter in the actual world enjoy genuine mental states.
(ECorn3) I am justified in believing that I’m not presently dreaming or the subject of the deceptions of an evil-demon.
(ECorn4) I am justified in believing that my cognitive faculties
are reliable.
The reason these do not count as intuitions is that they depend on some CEE,
specifically, one’s introspective awareness that one believes (Corn1)-(Corn4).
But they do count as impure “intuitions” because they also depend on intuitions one has (or would have) about the epistemic acceptability of forming a
belief in (Corn1)-(Corn4) in circumstances such as those one is presently in.
Namely, I think those who share the impure “intuitions” (ECorn1)-(ECorn4)
do so, in part, because they have (would have) the following concrete case
57

intuition:
(Y) If anyone were in circumstances such as I am in and also believed (Corn1)-(Corn4) as I do, then they would justifiedly believe
(Corn1)-(Corn4).65
So there is something quite plausible to be said on behalf of the (IAS) theorist in response to those who may be inclined to (mistakenly) label impure
“intuitions” and cornerstones as intuitions.
2.3.4

Qualitative Adequacy

In section 2.1 we said that any account of the nature of intuition must be
qualitatively adequate. In this regard it is a mark in favor of (IAS) that
paradigmatic cases of intuitions share not only properties (P1)-(P5) with
seemings, but intuitions also share certain other properties that are characteristic of seemings, namely:
Shared Principal Properties
Fallibility. Seemings and intuitions can have false contents.
Scalarity. Seemings and intuitions come in degrees.
Stability. Seemings and intuitions are contextually stable; if it
seems to you that p in circumstances C, then in relevantly similar
circumstances it will also seem to you that p.
65

I take this to be a concrete case intuition for the same reason I take (CI2) to be:
understanding the antecedent requires reflection on a hypothetical situation, which in
turn will yield the intuition that (Y) is true.
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Source-opacity. Both intuitions and the sort of seemings indicated
by (IAS) lack an obvious phenomenal etiology.66
The remainder of this section elaborates on these shared properties.
Fallibility. Fallibility is uncontroversial. Intuitions and seemings have
propositional contents that can be false. It is wildly implausible to think
that every seeming and intuition must be true; the very fact that people
have inconsistent intuitions and seemings is evidence of their fallibility.
Scalarity. Scalarity tells us that seemings and intuitions are degreed,
i.e., there is an introspectively detectable sense in which some seemings are
stronger than others. I weakly but distinctly recall that my oﬃce is fewer
than five feet from the departmental book display, and so it seems true to
me that my oﬃce is fewer than five feet from the departmental book display.
But something changes when I measure the distance between my oﬃce and
the book display. The proposition in question continues to seem true, but
the seeming has increased in strength in a way that’s hard to articulate.
Nonetheless, the change in strength will manifest in both belief and behavior:
upon measuring I become more confident that my oﬃce is fewer than five
feet from the display, I’m less likely to regard past disconfirming evidence
(suppose someone down the hall told me that it is exactly six feet from
the display), and I’m more likely to engage in behaviors that manifest my
confidence that there is not much room between my oﬃce and the book
66

The term ‘source-opacity’ is borrowed from Lynch (2006), though it has a slightly
diﬀerent use there.
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display (I would advise others to refrain from attempting to put a large
couch between them). The same is true of intuitions. Some intuitions are
stronger than others: the intuition that what is necessarily the case is the
case is stronger than the intuition that what is possible is necessarily possible;
my intuition that parthood is transitive is stronger than my intuition that it
is reflexive.67
Stability. That seemings and intuitions are contextually stable is another
seemingly obvious truth about seemings. If upon having a visual experience
as of some birds soaring over the department and it seems to me that there
are birds soaring, then, other things being equal, on any other occasion where
I have that same sort of visual experience it will likewise seem true to me that
birds are soaring. The ‘other things being equal’ clause has the unfortunate
eﬀect of trivializing the given statement, but this does not prevent it from
expressing an informative truth. For it calls to our attention the fact that
seemings are not, typically, random occurrences. This is also true of intuitions: our intuitions are characteristically stable: in general, what we find
intuitive remains so. Consider the naive comprehension axiom for sets; it is
highly intuitive despite the fact that we know it to be self-contradictory. For
comparison consider belief. No matter what things seem true, we need not
67

As Williamson (2007, 236) notes: “on any reasonable view, intuitions vary in strength.
An adequately fine-grained theory of intuitions would have to distinguish weaker ones
from stronger ones in (epistemological) impact.” See also Bealer (1998, 208) and Pust
(2000, chapter 2). Also, any who maintain that intuitions are beliefs or are inclinations
(attractions) to believe will find this plausible also, for it is widely thought that belief,
in some sense, comes in degrees; it is also likely that inclinations do too for there is an
introspectively clear sense in which some inclinations are stronger than others.
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have any corresponding belief. Belief is subject to manipulation by factors
that seemings are typically resilient to: intimidation, cajoling, countervailing
authorities.68 Upon having a visual experience as of a bird, it seems true that
there is a bird no matter what I might be brought to believe (e.g., that it is a
cleverly crafted piece of wood). Or take the claim that the the even numbers
are fewer than the natural numbers: it persists in seeming true though we
believe it to be false.
Source-opacity. I assume that one is always caused to be in whatever
conscious state they happen to be in; conscious states are not uncaused.
Sometimes it is quite easy to become aware upon reflection on one’s own
mental life what has (proximately) caused one to be in a particular conscious
state. For instance, an auditory experience as of a barking dog can cause
me to believe that there is a dog barking not far from me. If asked why
I have that belief, upon reflection it is obvious that the belief is caused by
the auditory experience. But sometimes it is not easy to discern just what
has caused one to be in a certain conscious state. For example, you might
distrust someone but be very uncertain as to why it is you distrust them
even after careful reflection. The idea of source-opacity is grounded in the
observation that paradigmatic cases of intuition are ones where there is no
obvious conscious experience doing the work that, say, sense and memorial
experience do for propositions about our immediate environment or our per68

Bealer (1998, 208).

61

sonal history.69 This condition does not rule out that there might be some
sort of phenomenal etiology that is accessible upon reflection; only that if
there is one, it is at best opaque. What sorts of seemings have a non-opaque
etiology? Those that clearly derive from sensory, memorial, introspective,
and inferences. And since the sort of seemings (IAS) claims to be intuitions
are just those that have this opaque etiology, such seemings and intuitions
have this further property of source-opacity in common. Notice that the
point here is contingent: there might be other possible worlds where we have
much better epistemic access to our own mental lives such that the causes of
any given mental state is always something we can easily become aware of.
69

Grundmann (2007, 69-70) notes that we only call something an intuition if we do not
know its source. According to Lynch (2006), one only intuits that p if one’s intuiting “does
not knowably derive from memory, perception, inference or any of the usual sources of
evidence.”
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3

The Epistemology of Seemings I: Exposition

In the next three chapters I explain and defend a general epistemological
thesis about seemings: namely, that seemings are a defeasible source of noninferential justification. I call this position ‘Liberalism’.70 If Liberalism is
correct, and if intuitions are seemings, then it follows that intuitions are
also a defeasible source of non-inferential justification. I call this position
‘Rationalism’.71
Liberalism and Rationalism are extremely modest epistemic theses, being
consistent with a very wide variety of epistemological positions. Although
consistency with other theses is not necessarily a reason to endorse Liberalism or Rationalism, it does prevent the view from being subject to certain
sorts of objections. The remainder of this chapter further clarifies just what
Liberalism, and by extension, Rationalism are, and what salient issues they
are neutral on.

3.1

Liberalism, Rationalism, Conservatism

In normal circumstances, if you were to see a bird perched on a tree branch
just outside your oﬃce window, several propositions, at least upon reflection,
would seem true: that there is a bird near your oﬃce, that you’re not very far
from at least one bird, that at least one bird still lives, that many other birds
70

My use of the terms ‘Liberalism’ and ‘Conservatism’ follow Silin’s (2007) usage.
My use of the term ‘Rationalism’ follows, roughly, the use of BonJour (1998), Bealer
(1998), and Peacocke (2000).
71
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could simultaneously be perched on the same tree, that the tree outweighs
the bird, that that bird is not identical to anything that is not a bird, and
so forth. You might also believe each of these claims, but, then again, you
might not. Suppose a friend standing nearby with binoculars said the bird
was a well crafted and expertly painted piece of wood. You might therefore
suspend belief, but the propositions would still seem true.
In the previous chapter I argued for a particular thesis about the nature
of seemings, I argued that they are a sui generis representational propositional attitude with a unique phenomenology. However, as it concerns the
epistemology of seemings there is room for disagreement about the nature
of seemings. One can maintain that seemings are reducible to some other
sort of contentful mental state and still maintain that they have some important epistemic role in our intellectual lives. Nevertheless, in what follows
I will be taking for granted the conclusions of the previous chapter on the
nature of seemings and their relation to other contentful mental states in the
neighborhood.
Turning, then, from metaphysical to epistemological questions about seemings, let’s distinguish two questions:
(Q1) If it seems to one that p, does that experience bring about
justification to believe p?
(Q2) If so, in virtue of what do seemings generate justification?
In response to (Q1) there are many answers one could adopt. Here’s a familiar
64

option:
Conservatism. Provided one lacks defeaters for p, if it seems
to one that p and one has collateral information

, then one

thereby has justification to believe p; and if one lacked collateral
information , its seeming to be the case that p would not give
one justification to believe p.72
According to Conservatism, seemings are not themselves able to provide one
with justification; rather it’s seemings plus one’s collateral information that
have this ability. I leave it to Conservatives to say just what that information
must be, as well as the manner in which one must possess that information.73
72

Throughout when I speak of “having justification to believe p” (= propositional justification) I always mean “having ultima facie justification to believe p”, where one has ultima
facie justification to believe p iﬀ one has undefeated prima facie justification to believe
p. To have prima facie justification to believe p is to have a degree of justification strong
enough to merit belief in p from the epistemic point of view. (See Alston (1989, 7), Pollock and Cruz (1999, 32), and Senor (1996).) A defeater for a proposition p is any mental
state one is in (e.g., a belief or experience or combination thereof) that prevents one from
having ultima facie justification to believe p. (This is roughly Pollock and Cruz’s (1999,
195) definition; cp. Bergmann (2005) who defines defeaters in terms of justified belief (=
doxastic justification) rather than propositional justification.) Also, one lacks defeaters
for p iﬀ one either has no defeater for p or one has only defeated defeaters for p.
73
Candidates for include the claim that seemings are reliable, that seemings are a
source of justification, that certain skeptical alternative fail to obtain, or, perhaps, that
seemings are pragmatically necessary for achieving some epistemic goal. Conservatives
may diﬀer on the manner in which one must be related to , and options include: belief in
, having justification to believe , justifiedly believing , knowing , or having some kind
of pragmatic entitlement to accept . Views akin to Conservatism have been endorsed
by Cohen (2002), White (2006), and Wright (2004). (Their views are “akin” to what I’m
calling “Conservatism” because their primary concern is with perceptual justification and
not explicitly with seemings, and they have only asserted that perceptual justification
depends on such collateral information without specifying exactly how it depends on such
collateral information–though certain non-conservatives have attributed to conservatives
the idea that the dependence relation is roughly as indicated by the principle above, e.g.,
see Silins (2007) and Neta (2010).)
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Another view with respect to (Q1) is the following:
Weak Liberalism. Provided one lacks defeaters, if it seems to S
that p, then S thereby has only some small degree of justification
for believing that p. If S has more than a small degree of justification for p, it is because S has some source of justification for p
other than a seeming.
Weak Liberalism is the view that seemings by themselves aﬀord us some
degree of justification but never enough to justify a belief. As stated, Weak
Liberalism is consistent with Conservatism, but it is also consistent with its
denial.
But here’s another answer to (Q1) some have preferred:
Liberalism. Provided one lacks defeaters for p, if it seems to one
that p, then one thereby has justification to believe p.74
Liberalism is the view that seemings themselves are a defeasible source of noninferential justification, and Liberalism’s distinction lies with its bold stance
on one familiar issue: it implies that the ability of seemings to bring about
justification is, in some sense, independent of one’s justification to believe
seemings reliable or on one’s having any other collateral information to the
eﬀect that seemings have positive epistemic value. This bold stance makes
74

Huemer (2001), (2006), and (2007), and Tucker (2010) defend roughly the same position as I defend here. Pryor (2000) and (2004), Pollock and Cruz (1999), and Pollock
and Oved (2005) defend Liberal positions with respect to perceptual seemings. Chudnoﬀ
(2010) holds it with respect to intuitive and perceptual seemings. See also Swinburne
(1998, 20) and Conee in Feldman and Conee (2004, 15).
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Liberalism vulnerable to Cohen’s easy knowledge and incoherence objections.
I will explain and address these objections in chapter 5.
Liberalism tells us that seemings are a defeasible source of non-inferential
justification. If correct, and if, as I have argued, intuitions are seemings, it
follows that:
Rationalism. Provided one lacks defeaters for p, if one intuits
that p, then one thereby has justification to believe p.
Rationalism can then explain and justify the correctness of the epistemic
practice of taking (undefeated) intuitions as evidence. To defend Rationalism, then, I will be defending Liberalism. The remainder of this chapter
clarifies various other, important epistemological issues that Liberalism (and
Rationalism) are neutral about. The next chapter, chapter 4, provides arguments for Liberalism while chapter 5 provides responds to various arguments
against Liberalism.

3.2

Liberalism’s Theoretical Modesty

It is a significant feature of Liberalism, one often overlooked, that it leaves
several controversial epistemological matters open. As we will see this neutrality is significant because it allows Liberalism to either dodge certain objections altogether or allows people to endorse Liberalism without having
to endorse certain other, objectionable views some have thought implied by
Liberalism.
67

First, and in response to (Q2), Liberalism is silent on the matter of why
seemings have this ability to bring about justification. Thus, for example,
Liberalism is consistent with each of the following theses:
Brutalism. Liberalism is a brute fact, there is no explanation for
its correctness.75
Phenomenalism. Liberalism is true because of the phenomenology of seemings.76
Really Impure Coherentism. Liberalism is true because seemings
typically cohere with one’s set of beliefs, or some relevant subset
of them.77
Pragmatism. Liberalism is true because treating seemings as evidence for their contents is the only way we can achieve goal .
Reliabilism. Liberalism is true because seemings are reliable.78
Perspectival Reliabilism. Liberalism is true because we have justification to believe seemings are reliable.79
75

Price (1950) and Chisholm (1989) appear to have held a view somewhat like this. Cf.
Steup (2004, 409).
76
Pryor (2000) and Chudnoﬀ (2010) endorse this view for at least some seemings.
77
Pure coherentism is the view that coherence is the only property that makes a set
of beliefs justified; impure coherentism allows for some things other than coherence (e.g.,
perceptual experiences) to bring about some justification but not enough to justify a belief;
Liberalism cum really impure coherentism implies a weak version of foundationalism that
shares with pure coherentism the idea that facts about justification ultimately depend on
facts about coherence.
78
This is one of many possible externalist explanations. Others include explanations
that appeal to some kind of subjunctive condition (safety, sensitivity) or proper function. Bergmann (MS) defends the compatibility of Liberalism with externalist theories of
justification.
79
In my paper “How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism”
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To further clarify the relationship these explanations bear to Liberalism it
will help to focus on the diﬀerence between Conservatism and Perspectival
Reliabilism. Although the two views may appear the same, they are distinct because they say diﬀerent things about what brings about justification.
Conservatism says that seemings plus one’s relation to some additional information bring about justification, whereas Perspectival Reliabilism says that
seemings themselves bring about justification. Put diﬀerently, both views
agree that when one has justification for p which depends on a seeming that
p, then that justification depends also on one’s collateral information; however, these views disagree about the manner in which that justification for p
depends on one’s collateral information.
We can explicate this diﬀerence in terms of the epistemic basing relation
which requires one to base their belief in p on a ground (or reason) which
aﬀords one justification to believe p (= a justifying ground). When p seems
true, Conservatism says one’s additional information is a partial justifying
ground to believe p, whereas Perspectival Reliabilism gives one’s additional
information an ancillary role of making that seeming a complete justifying
ground to believe p. Since having a justified belief requires one to base that
belief on a justifying ground, Conservatism entails that a seeming cannot
justify a belief unless that belief is based on the seeming as well as one’s collateral information; Perspectival Reliabilism allows one’s belief to be justified
the view I call “Metaphysical Conservatism” is a version of Perspectival Reliabilism with
respect to perceptual experiences rather than seemings.
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by being based only on the seeming. Since few epistemic agents always base
their justified beliefs on such collateral information, some have regarded this
entailment of views like Conservatism a strong reason to reject them.80 Those
who endorse views according to which justification via a source “depends on”
certain collateral information have not been very clear as to whether they
have intended to be endorsing a version of Conservatism or Liberalism cum
some perspectival explanation.81
Notice that Liberals may also adopt a bifurcated explanation of why
seemings have epistemic power, claiming that some seemings have justificatory power in virtue of their phenomenology, while the remaining kinds
of seemings have justificatory power because they are reliable, or one has
justification to believe they are, or whatever. So options are available, and
endorsing Liberalism leaves these broader explanatory matters up for debate.
In what follows I will neither defend nor presuppose any particular answer to (Q2). I regard answering (Q2) as primarily an in-house debate for
Liberals, and my aim in this chapter is to persuade others of the correctness
of Liberalism however (Q2) happens to be best answered.82
The second issue on which Liberalism is neutral concerns Moore’s strategy for responding to skepticism. For Liberalism is neutral concerning the
contested issue as to whether or not its seeming to one that p has the power
80

See Silins (2007, 118); compare Huemer’s (2007) self-defeat argument.
E.g., see Cohen (2002), White (2006), and Wright (2004).
82
Notice that Liberalism is not stated as a necessary truth, this is important especially
in the absence of an answer to (Q2). For some ways of answering (Q2), e.g., Reliabilism,
will entail that Liberalism is only a contingent truth.
81
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not only to justify one in believing p but also has the power to justify one in
rejecting various skeptical alternatives one knows or justifiedly believes to be
incompatible with p. For instance, a Liberal can maintain that although it’s
seeming to one that the wall is red justifies one in believing that the wall is
red, that seeming cannot by itself justify one in believing the obvious entailment that the wall is not a redly lit white wall. Here’s another way to make
the point: because Liberalism, as construed here, is a thesis about seemings
bringing about non-inferential or immediate justification it implies nothing
with regard to the conditions that must be satisfied for an inference to bring
about inferential justification.83 Accordingly, Liberalism is not susceptible
to Cohen’s easy knowledge via closure objection.84
Third, Liberalism only stipulates a suﬃcient condition for justification,
thus leaving it open that there are sources of justification other than seemings. So Liberalism does not automatically limit the ways in which one can
come by justification. Thus, for example, Liberalism is consistent with the
idea that direct acquaintance and reliable causation are suﬃcient to bring
about justification apart from any seeming.
Fourth, Liberalism entails only a weak form of foundationalism, one that
claims that there are some propositions we have justification to believe whose
83

Silins (2007) discusses and defends this option for Liberals about perceptual justification at length. Sosa (2009, 219-221) also endorses such a view. See them also for a defense
of the compatibility of closure principles with this option.
84
Cohen (2002). Nor is Liberalism susceptible to Cohen’s easy knowledge via bootstrapping objection, for Liberals can maintain that bootstrapping arguments are, for some
reason, unable to transmit justification (see Vogel (2008) and Weisberg (2010)).
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justification does not arise from their relations to other propositions we believe. Thus, Liberalism is consistent with maintaining that there are, nevertheless, some propositions we have justification to believe whose justification
is ultimately derived only from their relations to other propositions we believe. Even more, because Liberalism is only a thesis about justification it is
consistent with some anti-foundationalist theories of knowledge.85
Finally, Liberalism is consistent with the view that seemings in various
domains fail to bring about justification. For if there were good reason to
think that there is some domain about which seemings are not suﬃciently
reliable to merit belief, then one would have a defeater for all seemings of
that domain, thereby nullifying the ability of seemings to justify claims in
that domain. But that does not contradict Liberalism, it only implies that
one of the necessary conditions for a seeming to bring about justification has
not been met. Thus one can be a Liberal and not only resist the idea that
every sort of seeming brings about justification but even maintain that most
seemings fail to bring about justification.
The upshot of these considerations is that Liberalism turns out to be a
rather modest epistemic position, one that is consistent with many diverse
epistemological theses.
85

Accordingly, adopting Liberalism can help coherentists about knowledge deflect the
familiar basing objection. For expression of this objection see Pollock and Cruz (1999,
79-80).

72

4

The Epistemology of Seemings II: Defense

Now, I have defended neither Liberalism nor Rationalism. I have simply
explained the views and their relevant commitments (or lack thereof). In
what follows I oﬀer a defense of both views. Michael Huemer has argued that
we base all of our belief on seemings, and thus we cannot rationally reject
the idea that seemings are a source of justification. I begin my defense of
Liberalism in section 4.1 by presenting Huemer’s argument in greater detail
and showing how it can be used to support Liberalism with the help of
an anti-skeptical assumption. Section 4.2 discusses problems for Huemer’s
argument while section 4.3 shows how a revised version of Huemer’s argument
for Liberalism can survive these objections. Section 4.4 discusses how this
revised argument for Liberalism is likewise an argument for Rationalism.

4.1

Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument

Liberalism’s modesty is a pleasant feature of the view, but what reason do
we have to think Liberalism true? Here I think we can do little better than
turning to Huemer’s self-defeat argument for the view that seemings are
a defeasible source of justification. In this section I show how Huemer’s
argument supports Liberalism, and in the next sections I oﬀer objections to
his argument and then produce a revised version of his argument that can
resist those objections.
Huemer advocates the following principle about seemings which he calls
73

“Phenomenal Conservatism”:
If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby
has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.86
Because it’s consistent with Phenomenal Conservatism that undefeated seemings give us just a bit of justification but never enough to make a belief
justified, the diﬀerence between Phenomenal Conservatism and Liberalism
is that Phenomenal Conservatism does not imply that undefeated seemings
ever yield enough justification to bring about a justified belief –something
that Huemer quite clearly wishes to aﬃrm. Liberalism avoids this problem,
and for ease of exposition in what follows I treat Huemer’s arguments as
though they were marshaled in defense of Liberalism.
Now, Huemer has oﬀered the following argument against views that reject
the justificatory power of seemings:
The Self-Defeat Argument
(H1) All our beliefs (in relevant cases) are based upon seemings.87
(H2) A belief is justified only if it is based on a justifying ground.
Therefore,
(H3) If it’s seeming to be the case that p is not a justifying ground
for p, then all our beliefs are unjustified, including the belief (if
86

Huemer (2007, 30).
Huemer (2007, 39) says that the relevant cases which are exceptions to this involve
self-deception and leaps of faith which are cases where beliefs are formed in response to
one’s desires rather than how things seem.
87
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one has it) that Liberalism is false.88
The basing relation referred to in (H1) and (H2) is the relation that obtains
between one’s belief and one’s grounds for believing what one does (= the
reason for which one holds that belief). For example, when one has a visual
experience as of a cat and on those grounds (= for that reason) forms the
belief that there is a cat nearby, one’s belief is said to based on one’s visual
experience.
Together (H1) and (H2) entail (H3). Huemer takes (H1) to be a more
or less introspectively obvious empirical truth, and he takes (H2) to follow
from the familiar and rarely disputed view that a justified belief that p must
be based on a justifying ground for p, i.e., a ground or reason that gives one
justification to believe p. We’ll discuss both premises shortly, but first I want
to show how we can get an argument for Liberalism out of (H3).
According to Huemer, “the argument here is not directly an argument
that (Liberalism) is true, but rather that epistemological theories that oppose (Liberalism) are self-defeating.” 89 Nevertheless, the inevitable force of
his argument is apparent: the opponent of Liberalism finds himself in the
following dilemma:
(H4) Either (a) Liberalism is true and we thereby avoid a problematic form of skepticism, or else (b) Liberalism is false and,
88

Huemer (2011, 1) and (2007, 39-42). Huemer’s (2011, 1) formulation of (H2) is equivalent: “a belief is (doxastically) justified only if what it is based upon constitutes an
adequate source of (propositional) justification.”
89
Huemer (2007, 41); cf. Huemer (2011).
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therefore, a problematic form of skepticism is true, indeed, a form
that precludes us from even being able to justifiedly reject the
view that Liberalism is false.
Given (H1), the problematic form of skepticism indicated by the denial of
Liberalism is the view that we lack justified beliefs, and hence knowledge,
entirely. Thus, since it’s more reasonable for us to endorse a view that
implies that we know/justifiedly believe many of the things we think we do
rather than endorse global skepticism about knowledge/justified belief, it is
more reasonable for us to endorse (a) than (b). Thus, we seem forced to
accept Liberalism. Specifically, we get from (H4) all the way to Liberalism
by maintaining some kind of opposition to skepticism, e.g.:
(H5) The problematic form of skepticism implicated by the rejection of Liberalism is false.
(H5) is a vague form of a familiar anti-skeptical assumption presupposed by
epistemologists wanting to table that issue. I too will be taking it for granted
that we know/justifiedly believe much of what we think we do. (Those who
do not endorse this (skeptics of some sort or other) can construe the arguments oﬀered on behalf of Liberalism as conditional on the correctness of this
assumption.)
Together (H4) and (H5) imply:
(H6) Liberalism is true.
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Thus, from an anti-skeptical assumption ((H5)), the basing requirement
((H2)), and the claim that we actually base all our beliefs on seemings ((H1)),
one can marshall a significant argument in favor of Liberalism.

4.2

Assessment of Huemer’s Argument

In my view Huemer’s argument has homed in on something important,
something that, in the end, gives us a strong reason to endorse Liberalism. Though, as it stands, this reason is in need of some refinement and
clarification. But let’s begin with something that need not be refined: (H2).
(H2) makes a familiar and widely acknowledged point about the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. Intuitively, one can
believe p, have ultima facie justification to believe p (= propositional justification), and yet fail to justifiedly believe p (= doxastic justification). This
sort of case occurs when one’s belief in p fails to be epistemically based on
that which brings it about that one has justification to believe it (= a justifying ground).90 When there is no such failure, one has a justified belief.91
90

If one has (ultima facie) justification to believe p, there are two kinds of factors
responsible for it. The first kind of factor is positive, involving the presence of certain
features of one’s situation that make it the case or bring it about that one has prima facie
justification to believe p (e.g., certain sorts of experiences). Such positive factors I call
justifying grounds or reasons. The second sort of factor is negative, involving the absence
of certain features that would prevent one’s prima facie justification provided by one’s
justifying ground from rising to the level of ultima facie justification (e.g., defeaters).
As it concerns these two types of factors and the basing relation, I make the standard
assumption that to have a justified belief one need only base that belief on those positive
factors, i.e., one’s justifying grounds.
91
For expression and endorsements of the distinction between propositional and doxastic
justification see Feldman (2002, 46), Korcz (2000, 525-526), Kvanvig (2003, section B1),
Pollock and Cruz (1999, 35-36), Pryor (2000), Silins (2005), Swain (1979, 25), and Turri
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Although there is considerable debate about exact nature of the epistemic
basing relation, none seem to challenge this theory neutral way of drawing
the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Thus (H2)
seems sound.
(H1) is a diﬀerent story. As others have noticed, Huemer needs a stronger
premise than (H1) to reach his conclusion, (H3). For it’s not enough that all
our beliefs be based on seemings, they need to be based solely on seemings.
For (H1) allows that all our beliefs have multiple bases, and that it’s the
bases which are not seemings that aﬀord us justification, in which case no
skeptical problem follows.92
This is not a mere hypothetical worry, for if, as argued above, seemings
are distinct from perceptual, memorial, and introspective experiences then
it will be arguable that those experiences are themselves defeasible sources
of justification and that many of our beliefs are based on those experiences
and not, or at least not entirely, on the seemings that are related to those
experiences. Notice that this worry remains irrespective of the exact relationship between seemings and these other sorts of experiences. For example, a
perceptual seeming that p might simply be a seeming that is caused by a perceptual experience with content p. In which case, one might base their belief
in p on the perceptual experience rather than the seeming. Alternatively, a
perceptual seeming that p might simply be a seeming that is a constitutive
(2010).
92
For related opposition to (H1) see DePoe (2011) and Hasan (forthcoming).
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part of one’s perceptual experience with content p. Either way, the seeming
will not be identical to the perceptual experience and so one can maintain,
in opposition to (H1), that seemings are not always themselves the bases of
our beliefs nor are they always the source of our justification.93
But for Huemer to make his argument, all our beliefs must be based on
seemings alone.

4.3

Reviving Huemer’s Argument

I do not know if the considerations against (H1) are conclusive. Fortunately,
the case for Liberalism rests on nothing so strong as (H1). For even though
it’s diﬃcult to make the case that all our beliefs are based solely on seemings,
it’s quite plausible to think that many of our beliefs are based solely on
seemings. As it turns out, this is enough to forge an argument on behalf of
Liberalism. The improved Huemerean argument for Liberalism is this:
The Abductive Argument
(A1) We justifiedly believe, and perhaps know, many of the things
we think we do, e.g., we justifiedly believe many things about
93

There are other possible examples where a belief is based on something other than a
seeming. For instance, one may believe p on the basis of a very long argument involving
complex reasoning even though p seems neither true nor false (perhaps because of the
complexity of the argument or because of the complexity of the conclusion itself). For
another example, it is far from clear that our many merely dispositional beliefs, i.e.,
beliefs we have but have never occurently considered, are based on any seemings. Lastly,
its is unclear that testimonial beliefs are based on seemings, for one’s testimony that p
does not typically make p seem true. True, our awareness of testimony may depend on
perceptual seemings, but our belief in what is testified is, arguably, not (properly) based
on perceptual seemings alone.
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ourselves, about others, about our immediate environment, about
philosophical matters, etc.
(A2) Very many of these justified beliefs either (i) actually are
based solely on seemings or (ii) they could have been based solely
on seemings and remained justified beliefs.
(A3) Liberalism not only can explain (A2), but it is also the best
explanation of (A2).
Therefore,
(A4) Liberalism is true.
(A1) is just the familiar anti-skeptical premise. Those skeptical of this may
regard the argument as conditional on the truth of (A1). In what follows I
oﬀer defense of (A2) and (A3).
In Defense of (A2)
Notice first that (A2) is going to be much more diﬃcult to refute than (H1).
For (A2), unlike (H1), does not make the overly ambitious claim that all or
even most of our justified beliefs are based solely on seemings. Thus the
mere fact that we might have many justified beliefs that fail to be based on
any seeming will not be enough to refute (A2).
But what reason have we to think (A2) true? First, in support of (A2)(i),
notice that there are certain domains of justified beliefs which seem to be
based on nothing other than seemings. For example, we have many justi80

fied beliefs about what we would do, or believe, or think, or feel in certain
counterfactual circumstances, e.g., I justifiedly believe that:
(a) If a Harvard scientist were to tell me that a team of researchers
just discovered a previously unknown property of zinc and I had
no reason to think he was lying to me, I would believe him.
But such beliefs appear to be based on nothing other than the counterfactual
proposition seeming true.
Similarly, when it comes to philosophical matters, our reliance on intuition for belief seems to be nothing other than a reliance on certain propositions seeming to be true.94 For example:
(b) If p is true, then p is true.
Here I believe (b) but on no other grounds than the fact that it seems to be
the case.
Consider also some beliefs you have about your past which do not depend
on any kind of quasi-perceptual memorial experience. For example, you may
recall that:
(c) At some time prior to this moment you learned that the German word ‘schnee’ refers to snow.
Here one’s belief in (c) appears to be based solely on its seeming to be the
case that (c)–at least for those of us who do not who don’t have any kind of
94

Many regard intuitions as simply a kind of seeming. See Bealer (1998), Chudnoﬀ
(2010), Pust (2000), and Sosa (2007).
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quasi-perceptual memorial experience as of learning that the German word
‘schnee’ refers to snow. These are but a few examples, and it should be of
note that those who have challenged Huemer’s (H1) have not called (A2)(i)
into question.95
Second, in support of (A2)(ii), notice that even in those cases where
our justified beliefs are at best only partly based on seemings, intuitively
many of them would have been justified had they been based solely on the
relevant seeming. Consider the relationship between perceptual experiences
and some perceptual seemings. For example, suppose you were reading a
printed version of this paper in an isolated environment (e.g., the middle of
some desert). In such a circumstance it would seem true to you and you
would believe, at least upon consideration, that:
(N) There is, but there might not have been, English text nearby.
Consider now what basing relations might obtain between the following three
states:
(PET) One’s perceptual experience as of English text.
(SEN) Its seeming true to one that (N).
(BEN) One’s belief in (N).
Here are the possible basing relations:
95

For opponent’s of Huemer’s self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism who
nevertheless do not challenge this weaker claim, see DePaul (2009), DePoe (2011), Littlejohn (2011), and Hasan (forthcoming).
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(#1) (BEN) is based solely on (PET).
(#2) (BEN) is based solely on (SEN).
(#3) (BEN) is based partly on (PET) and partly on (SEN).
(#4) (BEN) is based on (PET) and (BEN) is based on (SEN).
(overdetermination)
(#5) (BEN) is based on (PET) and only partly on (SEN). (partial
overdetermination)
(#6) (BEN) is based on (SEN) and only partly on (PET). (partial
overdetermination)
Here’s the crucial question:
Which relations are suﬃcient for one to have a justified belief in
(N)?
All that is needed to support (A2)(ii) is the claim that relation (#2) is
suﬃcient for one to have a justified belief in (N). It doesn’t matter what
relation actually obtains so long as it’s possible for (#2) to obtain and for
that to be suﬃcient for one to justifiedly believe (N). Thus even if one were to
argue that some basing relation other than (#2) would obtain in the specified
circumstances, this would not be enough to show that (A2) is false. For (A2)
to be false it must be the case that if (#2) were to obtain, one would lack a
justified belief.96
96

Hence the significance of pointing out (#1) and (#3)-(#6) is to show that even if one
could show that these are genuine options and would typically obtain when (BEN) obtains
in the specified circumstances, this would not be enough to undercut (A2)(ii).
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So, then, is relation (#2) suﬃcient for one to have a justified belief in
(N)? An initial consideration in favor of (#2)’s suﬃciency is that (SEN)
must be a source of at least some degree of justification for (N). For the
perceptual experience, (PET), alone lacks the content needed to justify one’s
belief in (N) because (N) concerns how things might not have been, something
which perceptual experiences are unable to represent, and thus unable to
justify.97 Could (SEN) only contribute a small degree of justification without
contributing enough to justify belief in (N)? Perhaps, but such a view is in
need of motivation in light of the following considerations.
First, it’s counterintuitive to think that one who did base their belief in
(N) solely on (SEN) would fail to have a justified belief.
Second, given (A)(i), we do have other justified beliefs which are solely
based on seemings. But if basing beliefs on these other seemings is suﬃcient
for having justified beliefs, how could (#2) could fail to be suﬃcient? One
who denies the suﬃciency of (#2) owes an explanation for this disanalogy.
Third, consider the possibility of a race of humans whose visual imagery
“switches oﬀ” at a certain age though their perceptual system continues to
97

Since (N) is a conjunction, equivalent in meaning to the following:
(N*) (i)There is English text nearby, and (ii) there might not have been.

One might argue that a perceptual experience is what aﬀords us justification for (N*)(i),
while an imaginative experience is what aﬀords us justification for (N*)(ii). As indicated,
I’m happy to allow our perceptual experiences a role in justifying (N*)(i). What I find difficulty with is the idea that imaginative experiences can aﬀord us justification for (N*)(ii).
Here’s the problem: imaginative experiences purport to show us possibilities, but (N*)(ii),
if true, is not merely a possibility, but a “nearby” one insofar as it’s a counterfactual claim
about what might be. And I do not think imaginative experiences are a guide to how
things might have been (or would have been), but (at best) only how thing could be.
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work by taking normal perceptual stimulus and outputting seemings directly;
that is, they have all the same seemings about their immediate environment
that we would have, though their seemings occur independently of the usual
visual phenomenology that typically accompanies (and is often responsible
for) the seemings we experience. Intuitively, the “perceptual” beliefs this race
would form solely on the basis of their seemings would be justified (absent
defeaters). But if they can form justified beliefs about their immediate environment solely on the basis of seemings, then the only way to resist the
suﬃciency of (#2) for having a justified belief in (N), would be to maintain that the epistemic power of seemings disappears when there is available
something else on which to (partly or solely) base one’s belief (e.g., (PET)).
But such a view is bizarre. For, in general, if x aﬀords one justification to
believe p, then the only thing that can upset one’s having of justification by
x is some kind of defeater for p. So, for example, denying (#2)’s suﬃciency
in our case while aﬃrming it in the case of this peculiar race would seem
to require us to take (PET) to be some kind of defeater for (N). But sense
cannot easily be made of this.98
98

These considerations in favor of the suﬃciency of (#2) may prompt a worry concerning
the degree of justification one might have in a case where one has a seeming and a visual
experience that justify the same content. Suppose visual experience, VE, causes a seeming
with content p, and that both the seeming and VE give one justification to believe p. One
might object to Liberalism on the grounds that it implies that one’s degree of justification
for p is greater than the degree of justification aﬀorded one by either VE or the seeming
independently. I agree that this is counterintuitive. But it is not a problem for Liberalism
does not entail, nor is it otherwise committed to, the following additive principle: if X
brings it about that one has enough justification to believe p (i.e., prima facie justification
for p) and Y does also, then one’s degree of justification for p exceeds the degree of
justification aﬀorded one by X or Y alone.
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Such is the case in favor of (A2).
In Defense of (A3)
Liberalism is the thesis that, absent defeaters, seemings provide one with
justification to believe their contents. Since having a justified belief requires
one to base their belief in a justifying ground, it’s quite easy to see that
Liberalism can explain (A2). For according to Liberalism seemings are (potential) justifying grounds,99 thus any undefeated belief based on them will
be justified.
Is Liberalism the best explanation? Notice that given (A2) we already
have to accord very many of our actual seemings the ability to bring about
justification. For we could not have justified beliefs which are (or could
have been) based on seemings unless those seemings had that ability. The
question, then, is whether there is some minimal thesis that can accommodate
that fact which is weaker than Liberalism.
Consider a weakening of Liberalism along the following lines:
State Qualified Liberalism. Provided one lacks defeaters for p,
if it seems to one that p and

obtains, then one thereby has

justification to believe p. The seeming does not itself provide one
with justification; rather, it is the seeming plus

that provides

99
An actual justifying ground for p is something X which is such that (i) one actually
bases their belief in p on X, and (ii) X gives one justification to believe p. A (merely)
potential justifying ground is something X which is such that X gives one justification to
believe p though one may not have formed any belief in p (or if one has, one has not based
it on X).
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one with justification.
The first thing to note is that instances of State Qualified Liberalism may be
consistent with Liberalism (depending on one’s instance of ). The second
thing to note is that no instance of this thesis can explain (A2). For, as (A2)
indicates, we justifiedly believe many things solely on the basis of seemings
(or we could have done such). But if an instance State Qualified Liberalism
is correct (and Liberalism is false), then any belief that is based solely on
a seeming will be unjustified, unless it is also based on

. So even if an

instance of State Qualified Liberalism is correct, the truth of (A2) requires
something more like Liberalism, namely, a thesis according to which seemings
are themselves able to be justifying grounds.
Importantly, State Qualified Liberalism is distinct from:
Explanatorily Clarified Liberalism. Provided one lacks defeaters
for p, if it seems to one that p, then one thereby has justification
to believe p. The reason why seemings have this ability is owed
to the fact that (explanation here).
Some possible explanations of Liberalism were enumerated above in section
2.2. Explanatorily Clarified Liberalism diﬀers from State Qualified Liberalism in its implied conditions for having justified beliefs: Explanatorily Clarified Liberalism entails, whereas State Qualified Liberalism does not entail,
that one can have a justified belief in p when one’s belief is based solely
on its seeming to be the case that p. The upshot of instances of Explana87

torily Clarified Liberalism is that they (purport to) explain why seemings
are themselves justifying grounds without requiring that explanation itself
to be a ground of one’s belief. This is no small benefit, for any theory of
justification that requires believing agents to base their beliefs on theoretical
explanations concerning the source of one’s justification risk making justification too hard to come by, e.g., they put justification out of reach for all
save philosophically reflective individuals.
Interestingly, Explanatorily Clarified Liberalism oﬀers many diﬀerent ways
of weakening Liberalism that explain, without vitiating, (A2). For example:
Explanatorily Clarified Reliabilist Liberalism. Provided one lacks
defeaters for p, if it seems to one that p, and seemings are reliable, then one thereby has justification to believe p. Explanatory
Clarification: its seeming to be the case that p is one’s (potential)
justifying ground, and the reason it is one’s (potential) justifying
ground is owed to the fact that seemings are reliable.100
Or if one thinks only certain kinds of seemings are reliable:
Explanatorily Clarified Restricted Reliabilist Liberalism. Provided
one lacks defeaters for p, IF it seems to one that p, and that
seeming has reliable origins, THEN one thereby has justification
100

The function of the explanatory clarification is to clarify the “thereby” clause. For
to say “if A obtains and B obtains, then C thereby obtains” is unambiguous in the sense
that it tells us that C depends on and is explained by the obtaining of A and B. But it is
ambiguous in the sense that it does not specify the nature of the dependence relation that
obtains between A, B, and C. The present principle clarifies this ambiguity.
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to believe p. Explanatory Clarification: its seeming to be the case
that p is one’s (potential) justifying ground, and the reason it is
one’s (potential) justifying ground is owed to the fact that that
seeming has reliable origins.
But even if Explanatorily Clarified Reliabilist Liberalism is true, provided
we maintain (A2), the weakened version of Liberalism that follows will be
liberal indeed, allowing for seemings of most kinds to bring about justification, e.g., perceptual, memorial, introspective, and intuitive seemings. Such
a weakening of Liberalism will entail something like this:
Liberalism For All Practical Purposes. Provided one lacks defeaters for p, if it perceptually, memorially, introspectively, or
intuitively seems to one that p, then one thereby has justification
to believe p.101
Although this is, strictly speaking, all (A2) requires it’s hard to see how it
diﬀers from Liberalism. For what is characteristic of perceptual, introspective, and quasi-perceptual memorial seemings is that they are had in virtue of
certain kinds of conscious, phenomenologically distinct experiences, whereas
in the case of intuition and merely propositional memorial seemings there
is no such additional conscious experience in virtue of which one has the
101

A full characterization of seemings that are perceptual, memorial, etc., would, I think,
characterize them in etiological terms, connecting them in some way with certain, natural
kinds of experiences (perceptual, introspective, quasi-perceptual memorial experiences)
or certain kinds of cognitive competences (understanding, merely propositional memory).
Space does not permit a thorough exploration of this matter, nor does much hang on my
preferred way of carving matters here.
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seeming. So long as this exhausts the kinds of seemings that one could have,
then Liberalism For All Practical Purposes is equivalent to Liberalism. But
if there are other kinds of seemings one could have, then they will not be
equivalent.
It is true that Liberalism For All Practical Purposes is a minimal weakening of Liberalism, and that no stronger thesis is required to explain (A2).
But explaining (A2) is not the only thing to be explained. An advocate of
Liberalism For All Practical Purposes who resists Liberalism is committed to
(i) there being seemings other than perceptual, memorial, etc., seemings and
(ii) there being some explanation for why it is that only perceptual, memorial, etc., seemings bring about justification while others seemings do not.
For my own part I do not know what these other seemings might be nor am
I sure what could explain the epistemic eﬃcacy of the seemings with which
we are familiar but explain the epistemic impotence of the others with which
we are unfamiliar.102 In the absence of some reason to think that there are
other kinds of seemings which would be epistemically impotent (where their
impotence cannot be explained by defeaters), one should find Liberalism the
better of the two explanations for (A2).
Such is the case, then, for (A3). There may yet be considerations that
force the Liberal to the more modest position of Liberalism For All Practical
Purposes, but the epistemological costs of retreating to such a position are
102

My uncertainty here is owed, in part, to my uncertainty as to how to best answer
(Q2), and I leave it as an exercise to sort how answers to (Q2) ought to aﬀect one’s views
with regard to Liberalism and Liberalism For All Practical Purposes.
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hardly remarkable for those who think that seemings are a defeasible source
of justification.

4.4

From Liberalism to Rationalism

The movement from Liberalism to Rationalism is straightforward. Intuitions,
I’ve argued, are seemings (section 2.3). Liberalism tells us that seemings of
all sorts have justificatory power in the absence of defeaters (section 4.3).
Thus it follows that intuitions also have justificatory power in the absence of
defeaters. Hence Rationalism.
This argument for Rationalism will not be to the skeptic’s liking, for in
making assumption (A1) I have assumed that we know/justifiedly believe
much of what we think we do. And since this includes knowledge had on the
basis of intuitions, I have not issued any argument that will respond to core
skeptical worries. However interesting and important that project might be,
it was not the project I set myself to. My project was intended to provide
an explanation for how it is that we have intuitive justification, and I take
Liberalism to have provided us with such an explanation.
Now, Liberalism itself only oﬀers us a partial explanation for Rationalism,
for it is not wedded to any particular explanation for its own correctness. I
outlined possible options one might take in section 3.2 by discussing Brutalism, Phenomenalism, Really Impure Coherentism, Pragmatism, Reliabilism,
and Perspectival Reliabilism. However, I oﬀered no arguments in defense of
any particular option. That is a project I leave for future work.
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4.5

Experimental Philosophy and Rationalism

One of the most pressing contemporary arguments for the rejection of the
epistemic powers of intuition comes from the researches of experimental
philosophers whose studies have been argued to indicate that, at least some
of, our intuitions are responsive to non-alethic factors, i.e., factors which
would make one’s intuitions unreliable. For example, the experimental research, purportedly, indicates that some intuitions covary with one’s cultural
and educational background, socio-economic status, aﬀective biases, and even
more contingent factors such as the order in which one considers a series of
thought-experiments.103
John Bengson has helpfully indicated just how these experimental results,
if correct, would threaten Rationalism.104 He begins by pointing out that in
the studies conducted by experimental philosophers their subjects are first (i)
presented with a question about a particular example or case,105 and then (ii)
those subjects are instructed to provide an answer to that question. Answers
103

For instance, the research of Machery, et al. (2004) seems to show that Westerners
typically have intuitions about reference consistent with Kripke’s causal-historical view
of reference while East Asians typically report intuitions consistent with the descriptivist
view. The research of Swain, et al. (2008) seems to indicate that people’s intuitions
about Lehrer’s Truetemp thought-experiment is aﬀected by the order in which people
are presented with other related thought-experiments. The research of Petrinovich and
O’Neill (1996) seems to indicate that moral intuitions depend on how thought experiments
are worded and framed. The research of Weinberg, et al. (2001) seems to indicate that
epistemic intuitions systematically vary not only between Westerners and East Asians but
also between people of diﬀerent socioeconomic groups.
104
Bengson (forthcoming).
105
For example, in the study conducted by Weinberg, et al. (2001), subjects were given
gettier cases and were then instructed to answer the question whether the gettiered subject
“really knows” or “only believes” the gettiered claim in question.
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provided by subjects in these studies are called “prompted answers.” Bengson
goes on to put the experimental challenge to Rationalism schematically:
The Experimental Argument Against Intuition
(EAA1) Subjects’ prompted answers have feature F (e.g., sensitivity to non-alethic factors).
(EAA2) F is an epistemically problematic feature.
(EAA3) Subjects’ prompted answers express subjects’ intuitions.
Therefore,
(EAA4) Subjects’ intuitions have an epistemically problematic
feature.
(EAA5) Subjects’ intuitions are representative.
Therefore,
(EAA6) Intuitions have an epistemically problematic feature.106
Bengson does not explicitly identify what epistemically problematic feature
intuitions have if (EAA6) is true, nor does he specify the epistemic consequences that follow from their having such a feature. But it is fairly clear that
the epistemically problematic feature is supposed to be roughly the same as
whatever F is, e.g., sensitivity to non-alethic factors, and that one epistemic
consequence of this is that intuitions fail to be an actual source of justification. Let’s F to be the epistemically problematic property of being sensitive
106

Bengson (forthcoming).
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to non-alethic factors, and let us refer to it as being SNAFE.
There are diﬀerent points at which The Experimental Argument Against
Intuitions may be challenged. Bengson himself only challenges (EAA3), arguing that it is not only possible that there is a gap between the intuitions
of the tested subject and their prompted answers, but that we have good
reason to think there is an actual gap.107 Others have challenged the remaining premises. For example, Earnest Sosa has argued against (EAA1),
claiming that some form of equivocation may be occurring such that subjects
are interpreting either the thought-experiments or the questions asked with
regard to them in an unintended way. If correct, then subjects’ prompted answers may in fact lack feature F, pace (EAA1).108 Earnest Sosa, David Sosa,
and Bealer, have opposed (EAA2), arguing that F is not truly epistemically
problematic for it is also a feature of other forms justification-conferring experiences (e.g., perceptual experiences). Finally, (EAA5) has been opposed
by Bealer, Williamson, and Ludwig on the grounds that there is a distinctive
class of intuitions (“modal”, or “conceptual”, or “expert” intuitions) which
experimental studies fail to test.109
I find something promising in each of these responses to the The Experimental Argument Against Intuitions, but I will not be critically assessing
them here. For, as I stated in the last section, my investigation of the nature
107

Begnson (forthcoming).
I.e., subjects’ are failing to interpret either the thought-experiement or the question
posed to the thought-experiment in the intended way. Sosa (2007a).
109
Bealer (1998, 213), Williamson (2007, 191), and Ludwig (2007, 149).
108
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of intuitive justification attempts to explain rather than justify the existence
of intuitive justification, and thus my investigation tables the skepticism issue
and presupposes that intuitions are indeed a source of justification.
But even so, I want to flag an observation apt to be overlooked. For it
is not clear just what kind of problem The Experimental Argument Against
Intuitions poses to Rationalism. Assuming that SNAFE intuitions are apt
to be unreliable, SNAFEness is epistemically undesirable. But what kind of
problem does that pose for Rationalism? After all, Rationalism is not the
view that intuitions are reliable, but the view that intuitions are a defeasible
source of justification. Thus one can consistently maintain Rationalism while
also aﬃrming that intuitions are SNAFE.
To see this let us distinguish between defeated and undefeated defeasible
sources of justification, where a defeasible source is defeated if every deliverance of that source is defeated (i.e., fails to yield propositional justification
to believe that deliverance), otherwise it is undefeated.110 Rationalism is the
view that intuitions are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification,
not that they are an undefeated defeasible source of non-inferential justifica110

We could then go on to distinguish between undefeated sources which are, nevertheless,
defeated in certain contexts or domains. For example, one might hold that it is not
intuitions generally which are an undefeated defeasible source of justification but only, say,
modal intuitions (see section 2.3.2). And one might further hold that empirical evidence of
the unreliability of modal intuitions in ethics and epistemology results in modal intuitions
being a defeated defeasible source of justification in ethics and epistemology but not on
other matters. Maintaining such a view requires more precisification, but for present
purposes we needn’t worry about that. For the point I am going to make on behalf of
Rationalism (which is a thesis that is not restricted to any context or domain) is quite
general and can be made on behalf of restricted forms of Rationalism.
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tion. Accordingly, the fact that intuitions may be unable to actually justify
any belief owing to their SNAFEness does not imply that Rationalism is
false without some further assumption. Thus, on its own The Experimental Argument Against Intuitions can at most show that SNAFE intuitions
are a defeated defeasible source of justification,111 which is consistent with
Rationalism.
An interesting fall out from this is that even if intuitions are a defeated
defeasible source of justification, it remains possible for them to confer some,
possibly significant, degree of justification on their deliverances. For all that
follows from the fact that intuitions are a defeated defeasible source of justification is that each of their deliverances are defeated. But that only means
that we lack ultima facie justification to believe anything on the basis of our
intuitions. But this still allows for intuitions to aﬀord us some degree of
justification.112 And this may be all that is needed to legitimize the habit
philosophers have of treating intuitions as evidence. (However, the prospect
of such a position will hang on (i) one’s theory of defeaters (i.e., to what
111

Under the plausible assumption that evidence of a source’s unreliability would compromise its ability to justify any belief.
112
Again, throughout when I speak of “having justification to believe p” (= propositional
justification) I always mean “having ultima facie justification to believe p”, where one has
ultima facie justification to believe p iﬀ one has undefeated prima facie justification to
believe p. To have prima facie justification to believe p is to have a degree of justification
strong enough to merit belief in p from the epistemic point of view. (See Alston (1989,
7), Pollock and Cruz (1999, 32), and Senor (1996).) A defeater for a proposition p is any
mental state one is in (e.g., a belief or experience or combination thereof) that prevents one
from having ultima facie justification to believe p. (This is roughly Pollock and Cruz’s
(1999, 195) definition; cp. Bergmann (2005) who defines defeaters in terms of justified
belief (= doxastic justification) rather than propositional justification.) Also, one lacks
defeaters for p iﬀ one either has no defeater for p or one has only defeated defeaters for p.
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extent evidence of unreliability decreases the degree of justification aﬀorded
by a source) and (ii) how extensive the implications for unreliability are from
experimental studies of intuitions.)
One might wonder whether The Experimental Argument Against Intuitions could ever pose a challenge to Rationalism? The answer is “yes,” but in
order to pose a threat to Rationalism, The Experimental Argument Against
Intuitions must be such that the truth of its conclusion, (EAA6), in conjunction with with some other assumption implies the following:113
(¬Rationalism) If intuitions are SNAFE, then intuitions lack some
property needed for them to be a defeasible source of justification.
Clearly (EAA6) does not entail (¬Rationalism) alone. So what further assumption is needed? One way of reaching (¬Rationalism) from (EAA6) is
with the following assumption:
(Assm#1) (a) Reliability is needed in order for intuitions to be
defeasible sources of justification, and (b) SNAFE intuitions are
unreliable.
However, there may also be a second way in which The Experimental Argument Against Intuitions can be used to show that Rationalism is false.
This way has nothing to do with the truth of (EAA6), but with our having
justification to believe (EAA6). Assuming one is in a position to acquire
113

Again, I’m taking F to be SNAFEness.
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justification to believe (EAA6) given The Experimental Argument Against
Intuitions, one can reach (¬Rationalism) with the following assumption:
(Assm#2) (a) One’s having justification to believe intuitions are
reliable is needed in order for intuitions to be defeasible sources of
justification, and (b) we lack justification to believe that SNAFE
intuitions are reliable.
Both (Assm#1) and (Assm#2) involve substantial epistemological commitments, and it is diﬃcult to see how one might argue for either assumption
without treating intuitions as an undefeated, defeasible source of justification.
This fact raises diﬃcult issues concerning the dialectic between opponents
and proponents of Rationalism. I address some of these issues in chapter
6. For now, all I want to note is that The Experimental Argument Against
Intuitions does not pose a direct threat to Rationalism, even if its conclusion
is true or we have justification to believe it is true. Further assumptions are
needed.
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5

The Epistemology of Seemings III: Objections

Section 5.1 clarifies the relation between Liberalism and “basic knowledge”
or “basic justification” views, according to which a source’s ability to justify
a claim is independent of one’s justification to believe that source reliable. I
show that Liberalism is consistent with the aﬃrmation as well as the denial
of basic knowledge/justification, and then set forth two arguments of Cohen’s
which threaten Liberals who endorse basic knowledge/justification: the first
is that Liberalism allows one to acquire justification for thinking seemings reliable too easily; the second is that Liberalism is deeply incoherent. Sections
5.2 and 5.3 respond to these objections and show that the rejection of basic
knowledge/justification either (i) forces one to endorse an implausible skepticism or (ii) allows us to come by propositional justification all too easily.
Section 5.4 responds to the charge that my defense of Liberalism has been
problematically epistemically circular, and section 5.5 addresses the problem
of cognitive penetrability.

5.1

Liberalism and Basic Knowledge/Justification

Views like Liberalism are often associated with what are called “basic knowledge” or “basic justification” views. Such views claim that one can come by
knowledge or justification for p via a source s independently of knowledge or
justification for thinking that s is reliable. Indeed, Cohen, Vogel, Bergmann
99

and others appear to think this the defining feature of views like Liberalism,
and, if correct, then Liberalism stands in opposition to the following thesis:
Justification for Reliability (JR). One’s justification to believe
any deliverance of any belief source s depends on one’s having
justification to believe s reliable.114
Again, to have justification to believe p is to have propositional justification
for p, where one has such justification only if one’s degree of justification
is high enough to merit belief in p from the epistemic point of view.115 A
‘belief source’ (or simply ‘source’) is any way of forming beliefs, and they are
individuated by rules which tell one what to believe in certain circumstances
(e.g., rule (RX): believe p when, and because, p seems true). The ‘deliverance’
of a source is whatever proposition one would believe if one were to employ the
source while one was in the specified circumstances (e.g., p is the deliverance
of (RX) when p seems true). Such sources are to be contrasted with ‘sources
of justification’ which refer to any source which yields justification to believe
its deliverances.
Cohen has argued that views which deny (JR) or similar theses116 are
susceptible to the following objections:
114

See Cohen (2002) and (2010), Vogel (2000) and (2008), and Bergmann (2004) and
(2006). See also Reed (2006) and Weisberg (2010).
115
See footnote 69.
116
Cohen doesn’t discuss (JR) but the following principles:
(K) A potential knowledge source s can yield knowledge for one only if one
knows s is reliable. (Cohen (2002, 309).)
(J) We cannot have justified (perceptual) beliefs via source s without having
a prior justified belief that s is reliable. (Cohen (2010, 141).)
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The Easy Justification Objection. Any theory that denies (JR)
and allows one to use a source to acquire justification to believe
that that very source is reliable makes the acquisition of such
justification objectionably easy (e.g., by legitimizing track-record
arguments), therefore giving us reason to reject any such theory.117
The Incoherence Objection. Any theory that denies (JR) and
allows for defeasible rules of inference actually implies (JR). Such
theories, therefore, are incoherent.118
As far as I can tell, the reason Liberalism has been assumed to entail the
denial of (JR) is owed to the fact that (i) Liberalism entails the denial of
Conservatism, and the tacit assumption that (ii) Conservatism is true if
and only if (JR) is true. But (ii)’s right-to-left direction is incorrect, and
Liberalism’s tension with (JR) is a mere appearance for there is at least one
way for Liberals to maintain that one’s justification to believe the content of
a seeming depends on one’s justification to believe seemings reliable. It is the
way of Perspectival Reliabilism, according to which it is one’s justification
to believe seemings reliable that makes seemings justifying grounds for belief
A natural reading of Cohen has us interpret the modal force of (K) and (J) as expressing
a kind of dependence relation. Thus, these principles are logically stronger than (JR), for
one cannot have knowledge or justified belief without having justification to believe. Thus
if Liberalism is inconsistent with (JR) it is inconsistent with (K) and (J) also.
117
Vogel (2008) and Cohen (2010) discuss the problem as I do here in terms of justification, but their earlier work puts it in terms of knowledge. See Vogel (2000) and Cohen
(2002).
118
Cohen (2010).
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in their contents (see section 3.2). Thus, even if Cohen is right about the
need to endorse (JR), this does not have any negative implications for every
form of Liberalism, only those that deny (JR). Let’s refer to any version of
Liberalism that denies (JR) and thus allows for basic knowledge/justification
as ‘LiberalismBK ’.
Most Liberals, I think, will find little comfort in Liberalism’s consistency
with (JR) for they will want to deny both Perspectival Reliabilism and (JR).
In what follows I undermine (JR), and show that LiberalismBK can survive
Cohen’s two objections.

5.2

Does LiberalismBK Make Justification too Easy?

LiberalismBK is thought to make knowledge/justification to believe seemings
reliable too easy because it appears to legitimize the following track-record
argument: let ‘p1 ...pn ’ denote specific propositions,
Bootstrap
(B1) p1 ...pn each seem true.
(B2) p1 ...pn are true.
(B3) So, it seems true that p1 ...pn , and p1 ...pn are true. (from
(B1) and (B2))
(B4) So, seemings were accurate concerning the truth of p1 ...pn .
(from (B3))
(B5) So, seemings are reliable. (from (B4))
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Bootstrap has many virtues. Notice that each transition that occurs after
premise (B2) appears impeccable: (B3) follows from (B1) and (B2) by andintroduction; (B4) is a semantic consequence of (B3); and (B5) follows from
(B4) by enumerative induction.119,120 Therefore, since each of the transitions
from those premises are legitimate, there is nothing necessarily problematic
about this argument qua argument. Moreover, only the most austere skeptic
would deny that it is at least possible for one to justifiedly believe premises
(B1) and (B2). But how might one actually come by justification for premises
(B1) and (B2)? Premise (B1) can be justified by introspection;121 and, if
LiberalismBK is correct, one’s justification for each proposition in (B2) may
be derived from undefeated seemings. Hence the problem: if LiberalismBK is
correct, it appears that we could use an argument like Bootstrap to justify
the claim that seemings are reliable. But such reasoning is so intuitively
problematic that many take any view that licenses it to be subject to a
reductio. Hence LiberalismBK ’s diﬃculty.
119

Perhaps, one may acquire justification to believe (B5) by inferring it from (B4) only
if (i) p1 ...pn in fact constitute a suﬃciently large and diverse collection of propositions (cf.
Alston (1989, 327)). Or perhaps the collection needn’t actually be large and diverse so long
as one is in some kind of positive epistemic position with regard to the proposition that
p1 ...pn constitute such a suﬃciency large and diverse collection. For example, perhaps one
need only (ii) justifiedly believe it, or (iii) have justification to belive it, or (iv) else have
no reason to think it false. (See section 7.5 for a short discussion of such requirements.)
However, the present objection to views such as Liberalism which deny (JR) does not turn
on this issue, and the objection will still go through even if we assume that (i)-(iv) are
satisfied.
120
See Cohen (2010) for an able defense of each of these transitions.
121
Only a very radical skeptical position would preclude this, and most party to the
debate concerning track-record arguments accept this. See Cohen (2002) and (2010), van
Cleve (2003), and Vogel (2008).
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Dogmatism-cum-(JR) is able to avoid commitment to the ability of trackrecord arguments to generate justification for their conclusions, given the
following principle:
Type I Epistemic Circularity
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
to its conclusion if (and because) in order to have propositional justification for i’s premises one must already have propositional justification for i’s conclusion which is independent of
one’s propositional justification for its premises.122
For if (JR) is right, then one needs justification to think seemings are reliable
if any seeming is to yield justification. Thus, having justification (B2) in the
above track-record argument requires one to already have justification for its
conclusion, (B5). Thus, if Type I Epistemic Circularity and (JR) are both
correct, then Bootstrap is not the sort of argument that is able to aﬀord
one any justification for its conclusion–a conclusion many find intuitively
correct.123
But notice that this is not the only way to avoid commitment to trackrecord arguments. One might insist on the following limit on the ability of
122

This condition is central to the debate over whether or not Moore’s proof provides
or merely assumes justification for it’s conclusion. Interestingly, those enmeshed in this
debate tend to agree that arguments which suﬀer from the indicated form of epistemic
circularity do fail to transmit; what they disagree about is whether or not Moore’s proof
runs afoul of this condition. Compare Pryor (2004, 359-60) and (forthcoming) with Wright
(2000), (2003), and (2004). See Silins (2005) and Tucker (2010a) for a critical discussion
of this type of condition.
123
See Cohen (2002) for an explanation; see Bergmann (2004) and (2006), van Cleve
(2003), and Weisberg (2010) for challenges to Cohen.
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arguments to generate justification for their premises:
Type II Epistemic Circularity
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification if
(and because) one’s propositional justification for i’s premises
depend on a method M , and i’s eventual conclusion is that ‘M
is reliable’ (or that ‘M is a source of justification’).124
Some might object to this principle on the grounds that it’s unacceptably ad
hoc. But I do not want to enter into a defense of this principle here. Rather,
what I want to show in the remainder of this section is that, whatever its
other virtues, (JR) is ultimately untenable and thus (i) it poses no threat to
LiberalismBK , and (ii) it cannot be used to resolve problems of inferential
justification which arise in connection with track-record arguments.
Consider a principle cousin to (JR):
(K/J) Necessarily, if one knows (justifiedly believes) p on the
basis of it’s being a deliverance of source s, that knowledge (justified belief) depends on one’s knowledge (justified belief) that s
is reliable.125
Originally, it was principles akin to (K/J), rather than (JR), that were used
to undermine views like Liberalism which seemed to allow one to employ an
argument like Bootstrap to acquire justification to believe some putative
124

For defense of just such a principle see Vogel (2008). For opposition see Cohen (2010).
For an alternative principle intended to aid those who reject (JR) see Weisberg (2010).
125
See Cohen (2002) and Vogel (2000).
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source of justification reliable by employing that very source. This was supposed to be so counterintuitive that it aﬀorded us reason to reject views like
Liberalism and to accept principles like (K/J).
However, it has been noted that principles like (K/J) have clear skeptical
implications. The problem is that any condition on knowledge (justification)
that requires one to have a belief which involves a concept such as RELIABILITY or a conception of one’s belief sources restricts knowledge (justification)
to those beings who actually possess the requisite concepts. But, intuitively,
children, the cognitively impaired, and intelligent animals who lack such concepts, nevertheless, have both knowledge and justified beliefs.126 Call this
the over-intellectualization objection.127 This problem appears to be a strong
reason to endorse (JR) and reject stronger principles like (K/J) that require
such beliefs. For a subject can satisfy (JR) without having any beliefs about
the reliability of their sources so long as they have propositional justification
for (= justification to believe) claims about the reliability of their sources.128
126

Schmitt (2001, 184-185) draws attention to empirical evidence which implies that
young children lack a concept of reliability and thus cannot form beliefs involving it.
127
It has been suggested to me that we may want to actually deny that cognitively unsophisticated subjects such as children lack knowledge and justified belief, and instead hold
that we just talk this way analogically or to encourage them to eventually become thinkers
that can have knowledge. I regard this as counterintuitive. Indeed, its an odd epistemology
that would disallow children, for example, simple perceptual knowledge in normal circumstances when they have the same cognitive faculties that we do and lack sorts of reasons
we have for rationally doubting the reliability of their faculties. Indeed, one might think
that it should be easier for children to have simple perceptual knowledge than adults, given
the way in which we, but not young children, are able to appreciate the force of skeptical
arguments. Even Cohen (2002) who recognized the over-intellectualization problem facing
(K/J) early on, was unwilling to accept this view outright (see next footnote).
128
Zalabardo (2005, 49-50) defends a principle akin to (JR) in response to the overintellectualization objection. Cohen (2002) also observed this problem and sought to
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But now we must ask what it takes for one to have propositional justification. For even if one need not have a belief in the reliability of a source, the
correct theory of propositional justification might require that one be able
in some sense to have such a belief. From which it would follow that creatures lacking such an ability will lack propositional justification in addition to
lacking doxastic justification and knowledge. Take for example John Turri’s
recent defense of the view that in order to have propositional justification for
p one must be in a position to acquire a justified belief in p:
(PJ) Necessarily, S has justification to believe p at t only if S has
justification to believe p at t because S currently possesses at
least one means of coming to believe p at t such that, were S to
believe p in one of those ways, S would thereby have a justified
belief in p.129
(PJ) entails that having propositional justification for p at t requires having
the ability to form a justified belief in p at t. If (PJ) is correct, then (JR) implies that creatures who lack the ability to form beliefs involving the concept
RELIABLE at t cannot have propositional justification to believe anything
involving those concepts at t. And this makes (JR) likewise susceptible to
deflect it by distinguishing between two kinds of knowledge, one of which does not have
(K/J) as a requirement and another kind of knowledge one which does–but with neither
sort of knowledge can one employ a track-record argument to show that one’s basic sources
of justification are reliable. Cohen has since defended a weaker version of the principle
akin to (JR), though it is unclear whether he has also rejected the stronger cousin principle
(see Cohen (2010), see also Vogel (2008)).
129
Turri (2010, 320).
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the over-intellectualization objection for surely children, et al. have propositional and doxastic justification as well as knowledge at t despite lacking the
ability to have beliefs involving the requisite concepts at t.
Advocates of (JR) can either accept this consequence or else provide a
theory of propositional justification that loosens the restrictions on what it
takes to have propositional justification so that children, et al. are able to
have propositional justification at t despite their lacking the ability to form
beliefs involving certain crucial concepts at t. But any theory of propositional
justification that loosens the requirements for propositional justification so
much so that creatures who lack not only the concept RELIABLE and a
conception of one’s belief sources but the ability to easily acquire them will,
ironically, risk making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy
for the rest of us. For example, there is much I do not know or even have
justification to believe due to limited computational abilities as well as the
lack of certain concepts. But if this doesn’t matter for having propositional
justification then this implies that I have propositional justification to believe
all sorts of things which I intuitively do not have justification to believe, e.g.,
certain diﬃcult mathematical theorems, certain obscure doctrines of physics,
the meaning of statements in languages I’m ignorant of, and so forth.130
As far as I can tell the most plausible way to avoid this problem of making
propositional justification too easy while avoiding the over-intellectualization
130

The exact consequences here will depend on just how loose one gets with propositional
justification. In the next section I discuss some particular consequences that follow from
Cohen’s (2010) view of propositional justification.
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objection is to deny (JR), and thus eliminate the threat it posed to LiberalismBK .
This does not show how LiberalsBK might avoid Bootstrap, but it does
show that the attempt to avoid Bootstrap with (JR) founders on a surprisingly similar problem in allowing us to come by justification too easily.

5.3

Is LiberalismBK Incoherent?

Cohen thinks that theories which deny (JR) and endorse defeasible rules of inference turn out to be incoherent because they imply (JR). Since Liberalism,
as described above, is itself consistent with (JR), the incoherence objection
only applies to LiberalismBK . But, as I hope to show, the objection fails to
demonstrate any incoherence in LiberalismBK .
Since Cohen’s discussion centers on theories of perceptual justification
which deny (JR) rather than on LiberalismBK in particular, in what follows
I will present Cohen’s objection as if Cohen had LiberalismBK in view while
making the objection. To see how the incoherence objection gains traction,
take the following defeasible rule of inference:
(R) From p seems true infer p.
With (R) and by engaging in suppositional reasoning Cohen thinks we can
show that we have pre-existing a priori justification to believe that seemings
are reliable. Letting ‘p1 ’ denote some arbitrary proposition, consider the
following argument:
A Priori Bootstraps
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(A1) p1 seems true. (assumption)
(A2) p1 . (from (A1) and (R))
Therefore,
(A3) If p1 seems true, then p1 . (suppositional reasoning from
(A1) and (A2))
(A1) is an assumption made for the purposes of constructing a conditional
proof, and (A2) follows from (A1) and (R). And by conditional reasoning we
can infer (A3) from (A1) and (A2). Notice (A3) implies that seemings are
reliable, and it does so independently of and prior to any particular experience
of a proposition seeming true. For (A3) follows just from the conditional
reasoning in the above argument and the rule of inference (R). Cohen then
goes on to argue, as I’ll show below, that we not only have justification to
believe (A3) but that we had justification to believe it independently of and
prior to any particular experience of a proposition seeming true. From which
it follows that we never have justification to believe p because it seems true
unless we also have a seemings-independent and pre-existing justification
to believe seemings are reliable. But that appears to imply (JR). Thus,
Cohen concludes, views which deny (JR) and endorse defeasible rules like
(R), actually imply (JR), thereby making them incoherent.131
There are two significant problems with Cohen’s argument. First, it
must be noted that even if we always had such a seemings-independent,
131

Cohen (2010, 150-155).
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pre-existing justification to believe (A3), that does not actually support
(JR). For (JR) tells us that the justification seemings generate depends on
that seemings-indepentent, pre-existing justification. But having seemingsindepentent, pre-existing justification to believe (A3) only entails the following:
(WJR) One has justification to believe a deliverance of a source
s only if one has justification to believe s is reliable.
And if LiberalismBK implies (WJR), that’s fine for LiberalismBK is consistent
with (WJR)’s merely material claim. So it’s not clear that Cohen has shown
there to be any incoherence in denying (JR).
The second problem with Cohen’s argument is that, as far as I can tell,
LiberalismBK implies neither (WJR) nor (JR) unless one makes implausible
assumptions about how we come to have propositional justification. To see
the problem consider the following question:
(Q3) By what means do we come to have this pre-existing propositional justification to believe (A3)?
To (Q3) Cohen provides an explicit answer:
I need not (and typically would not) engage in this suppositional
reasoning. Still, there is an important sense in which I am justified in believing the conditional (e.g., (A3)), whether or not I
carry out the reasoning. Using standard technical vocabulary,
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we can say that I am propositionally justified in believing P just
in case I can arrive at P via trivial reasoning. For example, before I considered this very sentence, I was justified in believing
that I cannot see the Southern Cross constellation from in front
of my house. Though I had not actually reasoned to this conclusion, I was justified in believing it in the sense that I could
arrive at it via trivial reasoning (from my justified beliefs that
I live in the northern hemisphere and that the Southern Cross
is visible only in the southern hemisphere). In the case of the
suppositional reasoning, I can arrive at the relevant conditional
via trivial reasoning simply in virtue of my competence in using
the rule.132
Cohen’s point is that we have propositional justification for (A3) even though
we may not actually have performed the condition proof above because we
are in a position where we could easily have done so. So a very natural
way to understand his proposed answer to (Q3) is thus: there are nearby
worlds, relevantly like ours, where I do engage in such reasoning and thereby
acquire a justified belief in (A3), and it is this that gives me propositional
justification for (A3) in the actual world.
But this answer to (Q3) re-introduces the dilemma of the previous section:
it either implies that certain subjects who actually have knowledge/justified
beliefs do not (the over-intellectualization objection), or it makes proposi132

Cohen (2010, 154).
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tional justification too easy to acquire. The first horn of this dilemma is
generated by the fact that for many thinkers (children, the cognitively impaired, “smart” animals) engaging in suppositional reasoning is not a nearby
possibility. Cohen could respond by directing us to those nearby worlds where
such thinkers can and do perform the above trivial reasoning and then claim
that because of their other-worldly achievements, in the actual world these
thinkers have propositional justification for (A3). But this generates the second horn, for it would make propositional justification too easy for the rest of
us. Suppose you were handed a sheet of mathematical statements that were
just beyond your ability to prove though each statement is a mathematical
theorem. Suppose further that if your cognitive faculties were improved to
the degree that a severely mentally handicapped adult’s would have to be in
order for him to engage in Cohen’s suppositional reasoning then you would
be able to complete the proofs. Intuitively, in the actual world you lack
justification to believe that those statements are theorems. But if we make
propositional justification so easy to come by that children, the impaired,
and “smart” animals can satisfy (JR), then you would have justification to
believe that those statements are theorems. But surely this is not so. In
my view, both horns of this dilemma are suﬃciently objectionable to give us
reason to reject Cohen’s answer to (Q3).
At most what Cohen has shown is that those of us who are in a position
to engage in his suppositional reasoning do have some kind of seemingsindependent, pre-existing justification to think seemings reliable. But this
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is perfectly consistent with LiberalismBK because it fails to imply that the
justificatory power of seemings depends on our justification to think them
reliable.

5.4

A Reflection on Epistemic Circularity

So far we have encountered two arguments naturally labled “epistemically
circular.” First, there was the argument I oﬀered in defense of Liberalism,
the Abductive Argument (section 4.3), which purported to show that
seemings are a source of justification while our justification to believe certain
premises of that argument depended on seemings for their justification.133
Second, there was the track-record argument, Bootstrap (section 5.1),
which purported to show that seemings are reliable while relying on seemings
to justify premise (B2). Both of these arguments are epistemically circular
in some shared sense, which we can characterize thus: let us say that an
argument

is epistemically circular just in case (i) one’s justification to

believe at least one premise depends on a source of justification s, and (ii)
the conclusion of

is that s has some epistemically desirable property, where

an epistemically desirable property is any property that is desirable from the
epistemic point of view. Since being a source of justification and being reliable
are both epistemically desirable properties, by the above characterization
133
Specifically, in defending (A2) and (A3) I relied in intuitions (intuitive seemings)
and introspective seemings to justify the claims I made about the relationship between
propositional and doxastic justification, and the claims I made about what it is we actually
do and could have based our beliefs on while retaining those beliefs justifiedly.
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of epistemic circularity the Abductive Argument and Bootstrap are
epistemically circular.
About such arguments it is natural to want to consider this question:
The General Question: What is the epistemic value of an epistemically circular argument?
Contrast two more specific questions we may ask about the value of epistemically circular arguments:
The Closure Question: Can one use an epistemically circular argument to show one that he has propositional justification to
believe its conclusion?
The Transmission Question: Can one use an epistemically circular argument to provide oneself with propositional justification to
believe its conclusion? That is, are epistemically circular arguments a source of propositional justification?
The diﬀerence between these two questions is that the first only asks if one
can use an epistemically circular argument to show that one has propositional
justification for its conclusion; while the second question asks if one can
use an epistemically circular argument not only to indicate that one has
propositional justification for its conclusion but also use such arguments as a
means of acquiring propositional justification for its conclusion. Accordingly,
an aﬃrmative answer to the Transmission Question entails an aﬃrmative
answer to the Closure Question, but the converse is not true. We can answer
115

the Closure Question in the aﬃrmative while denying an aﬃrmative answer
to the Transmission Question.
These two questions correspond to the diﬀerence between closure and
transmission principles in epistemology, whose schematic form may be presented thus:
Closure Schema for Propositional Justification
IF one has epistemic property E for the premises of an argument
, and , THEN one has propositional justification to believe ’s
conclusion.
Transmission Schema for Propositional Justification
IF one has epistemic property E for the premises of an argument
, and , THEN one has propositional justification to believe ’s
conclusion in virtue of one’s inference from ’s premises.
Here, E is to be substituted with some epistemic property such as knowledge, doxastic, or propositional justification, while

is to be substituted

with whatever other conditions must be satisfied such that whenever the
antecedent is true, so is the consequent.
Notice that closure principles say less than transmission principles for
transmission principles include an ‘in virtue of’ clause which attributes one’s
propositional justification for the conclusion to one’s propositional justification for the premises and one’s competent inference. In the case of propositional justification, this ‘in virtue of’ clause guarantees that anyone who
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satisfies the antecedent of a correct transmission principle has gained propositional justification to believe the conclusion. By contrast, satisfying a correct
closure principle leaves it open whether or not one has gained any justification
for the conclusion by inferring it from the premises.
Closure principles, in some form or other, are widely endorsed by epistemologists, and, perhaps surprisingly, all of them can be non-trivially satisfied
even when the argument at issue is an epistemically circular argument. For
example:
(a) For all agents, , , if an agent knows that , and knows that
entails , then that agent knows that (and thus has propositional
justification for) .134
(b) If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P, thereby
coming to believe Q, while retaining one’s knowledge that P, then
one comes to know that (and thus has propositional justification
for) Q.135
(c) If S is justified in believing P1...Pn and knows that P1...Pn
jointly imply Q, then S is justified in believing Q.136
(d) If S has a justified belief that p and comes to believe that
q solely on the basis of competently deducing it from p, while
retaining the justified belief that p throughout the deduction and
134

Pritchard (2005, 27) and Cohen (2002, 312).
Hawthorne (2005, 29).
136
Wright (2002), Silins (2007, 115), and Neta (2010, 692). Cf. Vogel (2008, section iv).
135
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lacking defeaters for the conclusion, then S has a justified belief
that (and thus propositional justification to believe) q.137
This is a fairly representative set of closure principles that appear in epistemological discussions and all of them allow one to satisfy the antecedent
when the argument at issue is epistemically circular. The conclusion to draw
from this is that the epistemically circular argument I gave for Liberalism,
and even Bootstrap, may be used to indicate that we have propositional
justification to believe their conclusions even if they happen to be epistemically circular and are not themselves able to provide us with propositional
justification to believe their conclusions.138
Thus, so long as one is committed to some kind of closure principle and
it’s possible for one to satisfy its antecedent, then one must endorse a positive
answer to the Closure Question and thus accept that epistemically circular
arguments are epistemically valuable at least insofar as they can indicate
that we have propositional justification to believe their conclusions when the
antecedent of the target closure principle is satisfied.
Now providing a positive answer to the Closure Question leaves open a
137
This single-premise closure principles is discussed, but not endorsed by Schechter
(forthcoming). He oﬀers what he takes to be a novel counterexample to this principle.
However, for reasons I discuss in section 7.6, I do not think his counterexample is successful.
138
One might object on the grounds that both the Abductive Argument and Bootstrap are not deductive, but ampliative arguments and as such their premises do not
entail their conclusions, which is something all but (c) require. But this seems to me
to be irrelevant. For the it would be very odd to maintain that it is an alethic relation
(i.e., entailment) holding between premises and conclusion that vindicates an otherwise
problematic epistemic relation (i.e., epistemic circularity) holding between the premises
and conclusion.
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further question: if our use of an epistemically circular argument can indicate
that we have propositional justification to believe its conclusion, what is the
source of that justification? If we oﬀer a positive answer to the Transmission
Question, then we can say that it is our use of the argument itself that is a
source of justification for that argument’s conclusion.139 But some will deny
that epistemically circular arguments can be a source of justification even if
they can indicate that we have justification for the argument’s conclusion.140
What, on such a view, might our justification be for the conclusion of epistemically circular arguments? Enoch and Schechter have argued that our source
of justification to think certain belief forming methods reliable (e.g., methods like treating seemings as evidence for their contents) can be grounded
in pragmatic considerations.141 Cohen and Sosa have argued that considerations of coherence may play a role here for when one believes the conclusions
that follow (deductively, inductively, abductively) from other things one believes one increases the degree of coherence in one’s belief system.142 White
and Field have suggested that we may have a default entitlement for the
conclusions of such arguments.143 (Notice that one can adopt one or all of
139

For some who endorse this sort of view see Alston (1989), Pryor (2000), Kornblith
(2009), van Cleve (2003), and Bergmann (2006).
140
Cohen (2002), Vogel (2008), and Wright (2004).
141
Enoch and Schechter (2008). Compare Wright (2004).
142
The crucial assumption here is the coherence is a source of justification. See Sosa
(2009, 239-243) and Cohen (2002). In section 5.3 I evaluated and then rejected Cohen’s
(2010) most recent attempt to explain how we have propositional justification for thinking
certain sources of justification are reliable.
143
White (2006) and Field (2000). Where by ‘default entitlement’ they appear to be
suggesting that its a kind of epistemic warrant that we get for free and from nowhere.
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these explanations while at the same time adopting a positive answer to the
Transmission question. To do so is to allow oneself the possibility of multiple sources of justification to think seemings reliable as well as sources of
justification.)
I will not be defending any particular answer to the Transmission Question nor will I argue for or against any of the other possible options just
mentioned. My point in this section is largely dialectical: so long as we have
reason to believe some standard version of closure holds, we can maintain
that epistemically circular arguments have the power to at least indicate
to us that we do have justification to believe their conclusion even if they
happen to be unable to provide us with it.

5.5

The Problem of Cognitive Penetrability

The epistemological problem of “cognitive penetrability” is a problem that
arises when one’s experience with content p is caused by factors which, intuitively, seem to prevent one’s experience from conferring some epistemically
positive status on p.144 In the present context the relevant sort of experience
is a seeming and the relevant epistemically positive status is propositional
justification (= having justification to believe). Here are a couple examples,
owed to Markie and Siegel, that motivate the problem.
144
The epistemological aspect of the problem has been discussed with regard to views
like Liberalism–views which say that some presentational state or other is a source of
justification–at least since Pryor (2000, 540-541). Those who have addressed it since
include Markie (2005), Chudnoﬀ (2010), Tucker (2010c), Siegel (forthcoming).
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Case 1: Angry-looking Jack. Jill believes, without justification,
that Jack is angry at her. The epistemically appropriate attitude
for Jill to take toward the proposition that Jack is angry at her
is suspension of belief. But her attitude is epistemically inappropriate. When she sees Jack, her belief makes it seem to her that
Jack is angry at her. If she didn’t believe this, it would not have
seemed to her that Jack is angry.145
Case 2: Desiring Gold. Suppose that we are prospecting for gold.
You have a developed expertise that allows you to identify a gold
nugget on sight but I have no such expertise. As the water washes
out of my pan, we both look at a pebble, which is in fact a gold
nugget. My desire to discover gold makes it seem to me as if the
pebble is gold; your learned identification skills make it seem that
way to you. According to (Liberalism), the belief that it is gold
has prima facie justification for both of us. Yet, certainly, my
wishful thinking should not give my perceptual belief the same
positive epistemic status of defeasible justification as your learned
identification skills.146
In Case 1, the reason it seems, to Jill, that Jack is angry is Jill’s unjustified
belief that Jack is angry; in Case 2 it’s your expertise that causes it to seem to
you that the pebble is gold, whereas it is my desire for gold that makes it seem
145

This example is Siegel’s (2011), but it has been modified slightly to fit more neatly
with the epistemic thesis I’ve been defending, i.e., Liberalism.
146
This example is Markie’s (2005, 356-357).
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to me that the pebble is gold. Intuitively, the way in which these experiences
were brought about also bring about epistemic diﬀerences, and, according to
Siegel and Markie, the diﬀerence is to be spelled out in terms of justification:
Jill’s experience as well as my own fail to bring about justification because
of the way in which they were caused. Yet, they argue, Liberalism about
perceptual justification fails to respect this diﬀerence for it implies that our
badly caused experiences do generate justification.
Markie and Siegel do not think cognitive penetration is always a bad
thing, sometimes it can improve one’s epistemic position as in the case of the
experienced gold prospector. His experience is penetrated by his acquired
expertise and thus puts him in an epistemically superior position to identify
gold. However, throughout this section when I speak of cognitive penetration
I am referring only to the bad sort that threatens acquisition of positive
epistemic properties via seemings.
There are various options that have been floated in response to the problem of cognitive penetration:
(Always#0) Cognitive penetration never occurs, so undefeated
seemings always provide one with justification.
(Always#1) Undefeated seemings always provide justification even
when they have been penetrated, and penetration has no further
epistemic consequence (e.g., it does not block knowledge).
(Always#2) Undefeated seemings always provide justification when
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penetrated, but one cannot have knowledge when one’s justification is the result of a penetrated seeming.
(Always#3) Undefeated seemings always provide justification when
penetrated, but cannot amount to knowledge when one is epistemically responsible for the penetration.
(Sometimes) Undefeated seemings provide justification when penetrated only in those cases where one is not epistemically responsible for the penetration.
(Never) Undefeated seemings never provide justification when
penetrated.
(Always#0) is the rejection of the phenomena of cognitive penetration, and
has only been considered with respect to a rather limited form of Liberalism,
namely, one that only allows perceptually basic seemings to generate justification. The rough idea is that visual seemings can have more or less robust
content. An example given by Pryor is a case where one sees a police oﬃcer.
The following two claims will seem true to the average person living in, say,
the United States: (i) that there is an object in front of me, and (ii) that
there is a police oﬃcer in a blue uniform in front of me. (i) and (ii) diﬀer in
that (i) is in some intuitive sense perceptually basic whereas (ii) is not. Thus
one can avoid the entire problem of cognitive penetration by restricting the
form of Liberalism they endorse to exclude non-basic seemings and then argue that a person’s seeming to be angry and that a yellowish pebble seeming
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to be gold fail to be basic in the target sense.147 The form of Liberalism I
have been arguing for makes no such distinction, allowing for both basic and
non-basic seemings to generate justification. So this is not a response I will
pursue.
(Always#1) is an endorsement of the idea that cognitive penetration has
no epistemic consequences whatsoever when one lacks reason to think a given
seeming has been penetrated, and thus amounts to a denial of the problem
of cognitive penetrability.148
(Always#2) is an endorsement of the idea that cognitive penetration has
no justificatory consequences, though it does have consequences for knowledge. For example, Tucker maintains that a cognitively penetrated belief may
be epistemically justified but cannot amount to knowledge because cognitive
penetration prevents a belief from being caused in the right sort of way and
because being caused in the right sort of way is a necessary condition for
knowledge.149 Yet, one needn’t endorse a theory of knowledge on which a
causal condition must be satisfied. For example, according to Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge, knowledge requires the absence of true propositions which if one were aware of them, one would have a defeater. Since
cognitive penetration would make for such defeaters, this sort of defeasibility
147

Pryor (2000) and (2004) limits his Liberalism about perceptual justification to only
perceptually basic perceptual seemings, though he does not give a precise characterization
of what these amount to. Chudnoﬀ (2010) also considers this sort of view in response
to the problem of cognitive penetration. Pollock and Oved (2005, 337-338) allow for any
perceptual seeming, basic or otherwise, to bring about justification.
148
Chudnoﬀ (2010).
149
Tucker (2010c).
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theory of knowledge would be another way of maintaining (Always#2).
(Sometimes) is a suggestion floated by Siegel, and is meant to capture the
intuition that when one is epistemically responsible for a belief’s penetration
one is thereby prevented from acquiring justification. For example, Tucker
gives a case where one induces a demon to deceive him and then erase from
his memory the fact that he has been and sought to be deceived. Here one
is epistemically responsible for their own epistemic plight. In response one
might think that even though one is not aware of their plight or aware of
their own epistemic wrong-doing in seeking such a plight the fact that one
is epistemically blameworthy generates some epistemic badness.150 (Sometimes) says this badness consists in one’s being prevented from acquiring
justification. (Always#3) says this badness consists in one’s being prevented
from acquiring knowledge.
(Never) is Markie’s preferred option.151
(Always#0)-(Always#3) obviously pose no problems for Liberalism. So if
any of these are correct, then Liberalism remains unthreatened by cognitive
penetrability. By contrast, (Sometimes) and (Never) seem to be inconsistent with Liberalism, for they seem to imply that there are some undefeated
seemings that do not provide one with justification. However, even if (Sometimes) or (Never) are correct, this does not automatically create an objection
to Liberalism. Consider the following to interpretations of what the upshot
150
151

Tucker (2010c).
Markie (2005).
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of (Sometimes) and (Never) are:
(A) Either (Sometimes) or (Never) is correct and the problem of
cognitive penetrability indicates that Liberalism is false because
there are some undefeated seemings that fail to bring about justification.
(B) Either (Sometimes) or (Never) is correct and the problem of
cognitive penetrability indicates that our theory of defeaters is
wrong.
Notice if (B) is correct then the truth of (Sometimes) or (Never) does not
upset the thesis that seemings are a defeasible source of justification. Rather,
what (Sometimes) or (Never) indicate is that there is a source of defeasibilty
that is not captured by usual theories of defeaters on which defeaters are
mental states one is in or one epistemically ought to be in. If correct, then,
(B) suggests that there is a kind of etiological defeater that can prevent one
from acquiring justification via a seeming. Since Liberalism is not itself committed to any given theory of defeaters, the fact that there may be etiological
defeaters does not threaten Liberalism.
But let us assume that (B) is false and that there are no etiological defeaters. What response, then, should we have toward cognitive penetrability? For my part, I find (Always#2) attractive because the cases involving
cognitive penetration that seem to pose a problem for Liberalism share a
common feature with standard Gettier-type counterexamples to knowledge:
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when one has a cognitively penetrated seeming, if one gets it right, one is,
in some intuitively problematic sense, lucky. And this kind of luck seems
to be the sort that prevents one from acquiring knowledge, not justification.
Consider how the two cases that introduced the problem of cognitive penetration appear to be of a kin with Goldman’s fake barns: cases where one
responds to one’s evidence appropriately (and thus has justification) but due
to external factors one’s success in forming a true belief on the basis of that
evidence is too much a matter of luck. My intuitions don’t change when I
move Gettier-type cases where one exhibits no epistemic irresponsibility to
cases of cognitive penetrability where one is epistemically responsible so long
as one is in unaware, or unable to easily become aware that that seeming is
in some untoward way the result of cognitive penetration. In both cases one
appears to lack knowledge, but not justification.
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6

Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and
the Defense of Intuition

Rationalism is just the view that intuitions are a defeasible source of justification. In section 4.5 I drew a distinction between the view that intuitions are
an undefeated defeasible source of justification (one might call this ‘Strong
Rationalism’), and the view that intuitions are a defeated defeasible source
of justification (one might call this ‘Skeptical Rationalism’). The concern of
this chapter is with a certain line of defense on behalf of the former view
(i.e., Strong Rationalism).152 For some have defended the actual epistemic
value of intuitions against arguments which purport to show that intuitions
lack epistemic value by showing that said arguments are epistemically selfdefeating. The aim of this chapter is to show the limits of this sort of defense
of intuition. Section 6.1 provides a characterization of the notion of epistemic self-defeat at issue in these extant defenses of intuition. Section 6.2
shows that a certain type of unreliability argument can still pose a threat
to intuitions even if it is epistemically self-defeating. Section 6.3 concludes
by indicating that, in certain circumstances, the net eﬀect of epistemically
self-defeating arguments against the epistemic value of intuition is that we
should suspend judgement in the epistemic worth of intuitions.
152

Throughout this chapter when I speak of people defending the epistemic value or
worth of intuitions, I mean to refer to defenders of Strong Rationalism.
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6.1

Intuition and Epistemic Self-Defeat

In the next chapter we will attempt to give a full account of what an epistemically self-defeating argument is. For now, let us say an argument is epistemically self-defeating when belief in an argument’s conclusion would defeat
one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises.153 Accordingly, unless one has some other source of justification for the conclusion
of such an argument one lacks justification to believe that conclusion. We
are not unfamiliar with such arguments. Take any argument

whose con-

clusion is that we cannot have justification to believe anything. Any such
argument must be epistemically self-defeating, for if

’s conclusion is true

or if we happen to believe it then we lack justification to believe any of ’s
premises.154
Considerations of epistemic self-defeat constitute an essential ingredient
in some extant defenses of intuition and its role in philosophical thought and
theorizing. For example, Joel Pust has argued that certain attempts to argue against the evidential worth of intuitions are bound to be self-defeating
because they include as a premise an epistemological principle whose jus153

This should be restricted to essential premises, where such premises are ones that are
needed if the premise set is to evidentially support the conclusion.
154
Being epistemically self-defeating is not a monadic property of arguments; it’s a relation between thinkers and arguments. An argument whose conclusion is ‘the author
of this paper is not justified in believing anything’ is epistemically self-defeating for this
paper’s author only, not its readers. Also, there are other ways for an argument to be
epistemically self-defeating that I will not be discussing. For instance, an argument’s conclusion can call into question the form of inference the argument exemplifies, or it can
call into question one’s ability to reliably make such inferences, or a conclusion can be a
self-defeating proposition (‘this proposition is unjustified’ or ‘p and I am not justified in
believing p’).
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tification itself seems to rely on the evidentiary value of our intuitions.155
But this would defeat one’s justification to believe the conclusion of such an
argument against intuitions.156,157 George Bealer has argued that it’s epistemically self-defeating to reject the evidentiary value of intuitions for it is by
our intuitions (alone) that we are able to make basic epistemic classifications
integral to any theorizing. That is, we rely on intuitions to determine what
counts as an experience, an observation, a theory, an explanation, a simple
explanation, a law of nature, a deductively valid argument, a logical truth,
a theoretical virtue, etc. Thus, any theory that makes these basic epistemic
classifications and yet rejects the evidentiary value of intuitions will itself be
unjustified.158 As a final example, Laurence BonJour argues that in order for
one to have justification to believe the conclusion of an argument one must
155

By speaking of intuitions having evidential value or worth I mean that intuitions are
a source of evidence that justify beliefs.
156
The epistemological principle Pust attacks is this: “Aside from propositions describing
the occurrence of her judgments, S is justified in believing only those propositions which
are part of the best explanation of S’s making the judgments that she makes.” See Pust
(2001, 236, 249-51).
157
Michael Huemer (2007, 39-41) has argued along similar lines, though in defense of the
more general claim that seemings of all sorts have evidential worth (intuitions are just
one kind of seeming according to Huemer). For in order to reject the evidential worth of
seemings, says Huemer, it is a contingent fact that one will end up epistemically basing
their opposition to seemings on seemings. Thus, those who deny that seemings have
evidential worth “are in a self-defeating position, in that their views cannot be both true
and justified,” (30).
158
Bealer (1992, 104-108, 119ﬀ). Bealer’s point is not so much that an argument is selfdefeating, but that a given epistemological position (namely, an empiricism that rejects
intuitions) is epistemically self-defeating in the sense that if it were true, we would not
be justified in believing it. Nevertheless, Bealer’s thesis clearly implies that any argument
against intuition which employs premises that make use of any basic epistemic classification
will be an epistemically self-defeating argument. For convenience, in this essay I will speak
as though Bealer’s concern was with epistemically self-defeating arguments.
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have a reason to think that the conclusion is true or else likely to be true
if the premises are true. But intuition alone is fit to give us such a reason.
Thus, any (non-question begging) argument against the evidential value of
intuition must presuppose its epistemic worth, thereby making arguments
against intuition epistemically self-defeating.159,160
Defending intuition after this manner has the structure of a reductio: the
intuition defender provisionally grants his opponent’s premises but then goes
on to show that if the conclusion is true some badness follows, where the
badness at issue forms a central aspect of the defender’s defense against his
opponent. In each of the three cited cases, the badness at issue is epistemic
self-defeat. And the upshot of establishing that one’s opponent uses a selfdefeating argument is that such arguments fail to give anyone a reason to
accept their conclusion.
However dialectically successful the appeals to epistemic self-defeat made
by Bealer, BonJour, and Pust might be, there is one kind of argument against
intuition where considerations of self-defeat cannot provide an adequate de159

BonJour (1998, 4-6). BonJour does not often use the term ‘intuition’, preferring
instead the term ‘rational insight’ to designate our source of a priori justification. See
BonJour (1998, 102). Note also the higher-order requirement on inferential justification
that BonJour presupposes: it is not enough that an inference makes the conclusion likely
to be true or that one competently employ such an inference, one must also have reason
to think that the inference at least makes the conclusion likely to be true. Externalists of
various sorts will buck such stipulations.
160
Each of these authors take intuition to be a source of a priori justification. However,
not all agree with this view of intuition. (See Kornblith (2002, 7-8) and Devitt (2010,
292).) This issue is of marginal relevance here, for all that Bealer, BonJour, and Pust
need to run the arguments summarized above is that intuition be a source of justification;
it does not matter what type of justification it yields.
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fense of intuition. This kind of argument moves from the premise that intuition is not reliable to the conclusion that we should not treat it as a source of
evidence that justifies beliefs. What we will see is that the Bealer-BonJourPust reductio strategy fails to suﬃciently defend intuition against this type
of argument even if it is epistemically self-defeating. The problem is that
their reductio strategy can at most show that epistemically self-defeating
arguments are unable to justify the rejection of intuitions as evidence, but
this leaves open the position that at least some epistemically self-defeating
arguments might justify suspending judgement in the evidential value of intuitions.
To evaluate this kind of unreliability argument I will proceed after the
Bealer-BonJour-Pust fashion of granting the key premises and then showing
how epistemic self-defeat might be generated by an argument that employs
them. But the upshot will not be a defense of intuition–or at least not a
complete defense of intuition.

6.2

Epistemic Self-Defeat and the Unreliability Argument

In what follows I will often speak of propositions being justified and (equivalently) of thinkers having justification to believe, or having justification
for, certain propositions. To say that a proposition p is justified (for some
thinker) is to say that one has ultima facie justification to believe p, whether
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or not one in fact believes it. I will not be concerned with the related epistemic properties of having mere prima facie justification or of having some
justification; rather, my sole concern is with the sort of justification that is
needed for one to have a justified belief.
The employment of intuitions by philosophers has its detractors, those
who claim intuition is deficient and ill-suited to philosophy’s aims. Such
claims have been made on various grounds, but the particulars of these
grounds needn’t concern us.161 Our concern is with what help considerations of epistemic self-defeat might oﬀer defenders of intuition vis-a-vis its
detractors who argue in the following way:
(¬Ri) Intuition is not reliable.162
and from (¬Ri) infer:
(¬Si) Intuition is not a source of evidence that justifies beliefs.
161

For example, there are Benacerraf-style explanatory worries about intuition since intuition is thought to yield knowledge of abstract facts despite the fact that intuitions are not
plausibly causally dependent on such facts. This makes the supposed reliability of intuition
seem unexplainable; and if such reliability is unexplainable, it has seemed to some that
intuition could not be, or at least should not be thought to be, reliable. (For concerns of
this sort see Field (1989, 230-239), Boghossian (2000) and (2001), Kitcher (2000, 75), and
Devitt (2005, section 3-4).) This is what we might call philosophical grounds for thinking
intuition unreliable. But there are also empirical grounds stemming from the recent work
of experimental philosophers whose studies are said to show that intuition’s deliverances
are sensitive to features of one’s situation that have nothing to do with the truth of what is
intuited (e.g., the ordering of thought experiments considered, cultural biases, educational
background, aﬀective biases), thereby giving us reason to think intuition unreliable. (See
Weinberg et al. (2001), Nichols et al. (2003), Alexander and Weinberg (2007, esp. 62-63),
and Swain et al. (2008) for some relevant studies and discussions motivating this concern
with intuition’s reliability.)
162
I’ve named these and some other propositions in such a way as to help the reader
recall their reference. The names themselves, unlike their propositional referents, should
not be taken to have any kind of semantic complexity.
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The inference surely seems valid, and it likewise seems as if one who had
justification for (¬Ri), and inferred (¬Si) from (¬Ri) would thereby come to
have justification for (¬Si). But for this to be the case, it seems that one
would need justification for:
(Sx!Rx) Something is a source of evidence that justifies beliefs
only if it is reliable.
Otherwise it would be unclear just how one could come to have justification
for (¬Si) solely on the basis of having justification for (¬Ri). (Sx!Rx)
expresses a necessary condition sources of evidence must satisfy if they are
to justify beliefs.163 Let us call this argument from (Sx!Rx) and (¬Ri) to
(¬Si), ‘the Unreliability Argument’.
Here the defender of intuition is in a ripe place to employ the BealerBonJour-Pust reductio strategy, which, as noted above, consists of two steps.
The first step is conciliatory, for it grants the following:
Dialectical Assumption (DA): The premises of the Unreliability Argument are both true and justified.
Of course, the defender of intuitions thinks (DA) is false: for he thinks that,
at least, (¬Ri) is false and unjustified, but he provisionally grants it for the
purpose of defusing the Unreliability Argument through considerations of
epistemic self-defeat.164 The second step is confrontational, for it argues that
163

Reliabilist and other externalist stances on justification entail (Sx!Rx). We will
discuss the threat (¬Ri) poses independently of (Sx!Rx) at close of this section.
164
It may not be apparent why (DA) includes considerations of justification, for the above

134

Epistemic Self-defeat (ED): The Unreliability Argument is
epistemically self-defeating.
For example, following Pust, one might argue that the Unreliability Argument is epistemically self-defeating because (Sx!Rx) is an epistemic norm
and as such our justification for (Sx!Rx) depends upon intuition being a
source of evidence that provides us with justification for it; or following
Bealer, one might argue that the Unreliability Argument is epistemically
self-defeating because of the role intuition plays in concept application. If
either of these thoughts are correct, then the Unreliability Argument is epistemically self-defeating.
To see that (ED) follows from these considerations note that each one
implies the following conditional because each entails a certain justificatory
dependence relation between the premises and the conclusion of the Unreliability Argument:
(1) If (¬Si) is justified, then (Sx!Rx) is not justified.
And given (DA) we have:
(2) (Sx!Rx) is justified.
Together these entail:
summary of the Bealer-BonJour-Pust strategy did not clearly include such considerations.
The reason is that it is no concession to an opponent to grant the truth of some proposition
p without also granting justification for it at least where p is to serve as a premise in some
chain of reasoning. For the purpose of reasoning from premises is the transmission of
justification from premises to conclusion, and no reasoning can succeed at transmitting
justification to a conclusion without having justified premises.
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(3) (¬Si) is not justified.
That is, we lack justification to believe that intuition is not a source of
evidence that justifies beliefs. Thus (ED) follows if either Bealer or Pust’s
considerations are correct. But (ED) also follows if BonJour is correct that
intuition is required if one is to acquire justification for the conclusion of an
argument on the basis of the premises from which it was inferred. For if this
is right, and if our justification for (¬Si) depends on some inference from
justified premises, then the following conditional is true:
(4) If (¬Si) is justified, then (¬Si) is not justified.
which also entails (3). The result, then, is that even if (DA) were true, we
would lack justification for (¬Si), i.e., we would not have justification to
believe intuition lacks evidentiary value.
Such a result might appear to be a victory for the defender of intuitions
for the defender has been able to show that from premises his opponent accepts (namely, (DA)), it follows that he lacks justification to believe (¬Si).165
But this is only an apparent or, at best, a partial victory for those who think
intuitions evidentially valuable. The problem is that the defender of intuitions thinks that we are justified in thinking that intuition is a source of
evidence that justifies beliefs, i.e., (Si) is justified. But this claim can be jus165

This is clearly the case in the argument from (1) and (2) to (3). Whether or not
this is the case in the argument from (4) to (3) depends on the correctness of BonJour’s
conviction that (i) in order to be justified in believing the conclusion of an argument from
premises one must have reason to think the premises make the conclusion at least likely
to be true, and that (ii) intuition alone can give one such a reason.
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tified only if we lack justification to believe that intuition is unreliable. Thus,
if there is suﬃcient reason to think (¬Ri) true, then (Si) cannot be justified
and the fact that the Unreliability Argument is epistemically self-defeating
fails to show otherwise.
In order to locate the lingering problem facing defenders of intuition it
helps to put ourselves in their shoes by taking (DA) as an assumption. In
making this assumption one puts oneself in a position to carry out the following conditional argument:
(5) (Sx!Rx) and (¬Ri) are each justified. (assumption)
(6) If (Sx!Rx) and (¬Ri) are justified and one competently deduces (¬Si) from (Sx!Rx) and (¬Ri), then (Si) is not justified.
(premise, discussed below)
(7) (Si) is not justified. (from (5) and (6))
Thus, given that the defenders have competently deduced (¬Si) from (Sx!Rx)
and (¬Ri), what follows from our assumption of (5) is:
(8) If (Sx!Rx) and (¬Ri) are justified, then (Si) is not justified.
(conditional reasoning from (5)-(7))
Accordingly, if (DA), and thus (5), is correct, what follows from (8) is:
(9) (Si) is not justified.
Will the defender of intuitions concede (9)? That is, will the defender grant
that he is not justified in thinking intuition is a source of evidence that justifies beliefs? Of course not. The defender will respond by pointing out that
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(DA) is just an assumption that is neither true nor justified. But that’s the
point: showing that one’s opponent’s argument is epistemically self-defeating
is not a suﬃcient defense of intuition vis-a-vis the Unreliability Argument.
Rather, arguments against (DA) must be given if there is some (undefeated)
reason to think it’s true. Thus, the general lesson in the oﬃng is that there
is a limit on the usefulness to which we can put the observation that an
argument is epistemically self-defeating for there are at least some epistemically self-defeating arguments, such as the Unreliability Argument, that can
epistemically undermine one’s position.
There are some concerns one might have about the above conditional
proof for (8). In that argument much turns on premise (6) and this is something that opponents of intuition might not accept, perhaps because the only
reasons for accepting it are based in some way on intuition. But that’s fine.
The point here is to see a problem defenders of intuition face, and they
will likely accept, or at least take very seriously, both (6) and the following
arguments I have to oﬀer on its behalf.
I take (6) to follow from (i) the assumption that the contradictory of any
justified proposition is itself unjustified,166 and (ii) a reasonable deductive
166

One might wish to emend (i) in the following way:
(i*) The contradictory of any justified proposition that is justified in virtue
of being deduced from other justified propositions is itself unjustified.

This qualification may be added to avoid concerns about Uniqueness: the thesis that one’s
total evidence determines a unique rational doxastic attitude towards any proposition. For
even if Uniqueness is false and it is therefore sometimes epistemically permissible to either
believe or not believe p on one’s total evidence, it remains implausible to think that when
one’s total evidence entails p and one has deduced p from one’s evidence that it can be
epistemically permissible to not believe p. See White (2005) for a defense of Uniqueness
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closure principle for justification.167 Such a closure principle will resemble
the following:
Closure. If premises P1 ...Pn are propositionally justified and one
deduces C from them, then C is propositionally justified.168
Yet certain qualifications are needed if Closure is to retain its plausibility
in the face of counterexamples, and one might worry that epistemically selfdefeating arguments constitute one type of counterexample that a reasonable
closure principle must take account of. If so, then, provided the Unreliability Argument is epistemically self-defeating, (6) could not be taken to follow
from Closure. However, it is unclear whether this epistemically self-defeating
arguments does threaten Closure, for it seems plausible to think that it is
impossible for the premise (Sx!Rx) of the Unreliability Argument to remain
justified when one has competently deduced the conclusion, especially when
one has recognized the self-defeating character of the argument. That is, in
such cases one loses their justification to believe the premises, thereby avoiding the threat to Closure. (In the next chapter I will oﬀer some epistemically
and Brueckner and Bundy (2011) for criticism.
167
I do not take (i) to extend to inconsistent propositions generally since recognition that
two propositions are inconsistent may be well beyond one’s ken. I do not think this the
case with contradictions because their form (p and not-p) makes their inconsistency plain,
at least for my target audience.
168
This closure principle gives a suﬃcient condition for when one has justification to
believe, as opposed to when one justifiedly believes, the conclusion of a deductive inference.
If our concern were with justified belief in the conclusion we would have to strengthen
the antecedent of Closure so as to include justified belief in the premises, belief in the
conclusion, and that one’s belief in the conclusion satisfies whatever epistemic basing
constraints there are, and perhaps other conditions as well to help deal with the lottery
and preface paradoxes.
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self-defeating arguments which, I think, do threaten Closure.)
But even if Closure needs some qualification to account for epistemically
self-defeating arguments, (6) need not come into question. For one could also
defend (6) by arguing that it follows from:
Quasi-Closure. If premises P1 ...Pn are propositionally justified
and one deduces C from them, then ¬C is not propositionally
justified.
The idea behind this principle is that competent deduction from justified
premises can preclude certain claims from being justified, namely, the contradictory of what was deduced. Quasi-Closure is quite plausible for its denial
implies that ¬C may be justified when propositions that clearly entail that
¬C is false are themselves justified. But this does not seem possible, for in
such a case one would have a rebutting defeater for ¬C which is inconsistent
with one having justification for ¬C. So (6) seems reasonably safe, thus securing our earlier conclusion that observing the epistemically self-defeating
character of the Unreliability Argument fails to preserve one’s justification
for (Si) if there is suﬃcient reason to think (Sx!Rx) and (¬Ri) are true.169
169

A referee pointed out to me that some might think that (8) cannot be justified if we
are working in a context that takes (Sx!Rx) and (¬Ri) for granted because they clearly
imply (¬Si) and, presumably, one depends on intuition for their justification to believe (6).
Notice, however, that one’s actual justification for (6) is not impugned by the fact that
one has assumed (5) for a conditional proof. Conditional proofs are like ordinary proofs
in that one is allowed to include in the proof anything one has (undefeated) justification
to believe as a premise. In the present conditional proof the assumption is (5) whereas
the premise the defender of intuitions takes themselves, or should take themselves as I
argue, to have justification for is (6). Thus, one’s actual justification for (Si) remains
intact–provided that one does not actually acquire justification for both (Sx!Rx) and
(¬Ri), thereby making them more than mere assumptions.
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Now, there is a further argument for this same conclusion, one which
does not depend on the externalist conviction that (Sx!Rx) obtains nor
the aforementioned Closure and Quasi-Closure principles. This argument
capitalizes on the relationship between justification and reliability. For even
if the reliability of a source of evidence is not necessary for that source to
generate justification, justification for thinking a source unreliable is enough
to prevent that source from generating (undefeated) justification, and thereby
prevents that source from justifying beliefs. Thus:
(10) If (¬Ri) is justified, then (Si) is not justified.
Consider what the denial of (10) would amount to: the admission that one
could have undefeated justification to believe that intuition is unreliable and
also have undefeated justification to believe that it is a source of evidence
that justifies beliefs. But intuition cannot justify any belief when one has undefeated reason to think it unreliable since undefeated justification for (¬Ri)
constitutes an undercutting defeater for every claim supported by intuition,
thereby preventing intuition from justifying any belief.170 This situation is
analogous to the use of sense perception in a demon world when one has justification to believe that one is in a demon world. For being in a demon world
makes sense perception unreliable, and so if one were justified in thinking
they inhabited such a world, they would not be justified in regarding sense
170

Roughly, one has an undercutting defeater for p if one either believes or has reason to
believe that their (supposed) source of justification for p does not make p likely to be true.
And if one has justification for (¬Ri) then one does have such a reason for any proposition
whose only support is its being the content of an intuition.
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perception as a source of evidence able to justify beliefs.
Again, we are in a position to see the limitations of defending intuition
by appealing to epistemic self-defeat. For if we grant (DA), then we thereby
grant that (¬Ri) is justified, which in conjunction with (10) implies (9),
i.e., they imply that one lacks justification to believe intuition is a source of
evidence that justifies beliefs. Thus, since the defender of intuitions must
endorse (10), (DA) poses a direct threat if, as I keep emphasizing, there is
suﬃcient reason to think it true. But more specifically, what the argument
of the previous paragraph shows us is that it does not matter how things
pan out with respect to (Sx!Rx) for there is a direct threat to intuitions so
long as there is suﬃcient reason to think (¬Ri) true. Thus the only adequate
defense of intuitions is to undermine whatever reasons there might be to
think (¬Ri) true. Appealing to considerations of epistemic-self defeat cannot
help.171

6.3

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen that intuitions cannot be adequately defended
merely by employing the strategy of Bealer, BonJour, and Pust. The defenders of intuition have to “get their hands dirty,” dealing with whatever
reasons there might be for thinking that (¬Ri) is true. But we have also
seen that if the Unreliability Argument is epistemically self-defeating, then
171
And by undermining (¬Ri) we thereby undermine the further claim that is part of
(DA), namely, that we have (undefeated) justification for (¬Ri).

142

opponents of intuition cannot be justified in believing that intuition is not a
source of evidence that justifies beliefs. Thus, if opponents are to be justified
in their rejection of intuition’s evidentiary value, they must undermine whatever reasons there are for thinking the Unreliability Argument epistemically
self-defeating, i.e., they must undermine the arguments of Bealer, BonJour,
and Pust at the very least.172
But there is a final lesson to tease from our inquiry, one that follows from
the previous two: if one has undefeated reason to think (¬Ri) is true and
undefeated reason to think (ED) is true, then skepticism with respect to intuition’s evidentiary value follows. That is, one is not justified in thinking
172

In this paper we have focused on the epistemically self-defeating character of the
Unreliability Argument and have been dealing with ‘intuition’ in a non-discriminatory
way by ignoring the possibility that, say, intuitions in some domains are reliable while
others are not. For instance, perhaps when it comes to math and logic, intuition is reliable
but when it comes to metaphysics and ethics it is not. It must be observed that any
attempt to defend the Unreliability Argument in this manner must alter its premises and
conclusion in some way so that the conclusion does not indict all uses of intuition. The
particulars, of course, depend on just how one attenuates their opposition to intuition.
Notice that any emended argument will have a conclusion like the following:
(11) Intuitions of domain D are not a source of evidence that justifies beliefs.
And given that (11) is itself an epistemological proposition, it seems that any argument in
support of it will have to employ some general epistemological principle (akin to (Sx!Rx)).
And, as Pust and Bealer have pointed out, it is diﬃcult to see how else one could justify any such principle without at least some epistemological intuitions having evidentiary
value. If this is right, then we could not be too restrictive concerning which intuitions
have evidentiary value for whatever reasons there are for thinking, say, moral and metaphysical intuitions are unreliable (e.g., pervasive disagreement among certain groups) are
also reasons for thinking that epistemological intuitions are unreliable. So, in the end, one
might expect non-skeptical opposition to intuition to be quite moderate, allowing for quite
a range of intuitions. But assessing the various arguments and positions one might take
concerning intuition’s reliability and justificatory power goes beyond the concern of this
paper, which was to assess the usefulness of the self-defeat argument for intuition vis-a-vis
the Unreliability Argument.
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that intuition is a source of evidence that justifies beliefs nor is one justified
in thinking that intuition is not a source of evidence that justifies beliefs.
This would be surprising for one would think that if the Unreliability Argument suﬀered from epistemic self-defeat the challenge to intuitions would
dissolve with it. But no such result follows so long as (¬Ri) remains undefeated. Moreover, one would think that if we were justified in thinking that
intuition is unreliable, we would be justified in thinking it lacks justificatory
power. But, again, no such result follows if the Unreliability Argument is
epistemically self-defeating.173
173

Ironically, this is a fact we can appreciate only if intuitions have evidentiary value
given that I’ve relied on various intuitions to justify my arguments in this paper.
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7

Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments, Inferential Justification, and Transmission Failure

We often expand the set of propositions we have propositional justification
to believe by making inferences from other things we have propositional justification to believe. When everything goes well such inferences transmit
such justification from their premises to their conclusion, thereby making
the conclusion something it previously might not have been: a proposition
worthy of belief.174 But not all inferences transmit propositional justification,
transmission sometimes fails.
In this chapter I will isolate a previously unrecognized source of transmission failure, one that arises in connection with a class of arguments that
are aptly labeled “epistemically self-defeating.” For example, an argument
whose conclusion is that

is itself an unreliable form of argument would

seem to be epistemically self-defeating in some sense, as would an argument
⇤

whose conclusion called into question one’s justification to believe

⇤

’s

premises. As I will show, what is interesting, and troubling, about these
sorts of arguments is that we cannot always chalk up their inability to justify
their conclusions to the presence of any actual defeater. This in turn threat174

Many hold that inference transmits epistemic properties, e.g., Wright (2004), Tucker
(2010a), Silins (2005), Sosa (2009), BonJour (1985), Alston (1989), Bergmann (2006a),
Plantinga (1993), Pryor (forthcoming), Vogel (2008), and Hawthorne (2004).
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ens our ability to articulate plausible, counterexample-free transmission and
closure principles for justification.
En route to isolating an overlooked cause of transmission failure that
occurs in connection with epistemically self-defeating argument we will encounter intermediate insights of independent interest: (1) we will unearth
a new epistemic paradox along with a solution; (2) we will uncover various
arguments for the dependence of propositional justification on doxastic justification; (3) we will see how this dependence resolves a couple related puzzles
involving non-inferential propositional justification; and (4) we will discover
an intuitive explication of the notion of an “epistemically self-defeating argument.”
Section 7.1 provides the setup for the problem cases involving epistemically self-defeating arguments. Section 7.2 provides the problem cases themselves and introduces our first intermediate insight. The solution to the
problem cases is a new condition for transmission failure, and section 7.3 offers and defends that solution in addition to providing the second and third
intermediate insights. Section 7.4 refines that solution, proposing a kind of
epistemic modality that is intimately linked to the acquisition of propositional justification generally, and here we find our final intermediate insight.
Sections 7.5 and 7.6 discuss the role the solution plays in formulating transmission and closure principles.
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7.1

Preliminary Distinctions

Inferences are a vehicle for the transmission of epistemic properties from
premises to conclusions, at least when all goes well. In what follows I want
to examine cases which concern the transmission of propositional justification via inference. By “propositional justification” I always mean to refer to
ultima facie justification to believe something, whether or not one actually
believes it.175 Accordingly, propositional justification is a fairly robust epistemic property, making any proposition that has it worthy of being believed.
The typical contrast to propositional justification is doxastic justification.176
To have doxastic justification is to have a justified belief, and to have this
kind of justification one must not only have propositional justification but
one must also satisfy the epistemic basing requirement–more on this later.177
One might also wonder about the conditions required for the transmission of other epistemic properties such as knowledge, doxastic justification,
or having only some justification. But in what follows my principal concern
is with propositional justification. One reason for focusing on propositional
justification is that it seems implausible to think that properties like doxastic
175

One has ultima facie justification to believe p iﬀ one has undefeated prima facie justification to believe p. Thus understood, prima facie justification is justification suﬃcient
to merit belief in the absence of undermining factors. See Alston (1989, 7), Pollock and
Cruz (1999, 32), and Senor (1996).
176
For endorsement and discussion of this distinction see Feldman (2002, 46), Korcz
(2000, 525-526), Kvanvig (2003, section B1), Pryor (2004, 352), Pollock and Cruz (1999,
35-36), Silins (2005), Swain (1979, 25), and Turri (2010).
177
To further clarify, whenever we say that one has a justified belief, what ‘justification’
is being predicated of is one’s belief state (the believing), not simply the content of that
state (what is believed ).
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justification and knowledge, which require propositional justification, can be
transmitted via inference without propositional justification also transmitting. Indeed, one would think that those stronger epistemic properties transmit (partly) in virtue of propositional justification transmitting, thus making
a complete account of the transmission of these other epistemic properties
dependent upon one’s account of the transmission of propositional justification. Furthermore, it’s reasonable to think that propositional justification
can be transmitted to a conclusion even if knowledge and doxastic justification are not transmitted. A final reason, as we will see, for focusing on
the transmission of propositional justification has to do with certain puzzles
involving epistemically self-defeating arguments which can only be properly
appreciated if one considers them in terms of propositional justification.
It will be helpful to regiment our discussion by defining what it means for
propositional justification to transmit via inference. To provide such a definition we need to say something about the relationship between arguments
and inferences. For our purposes, an argument is an ordered pair consisting
of a premise set and a conclusion, and an inference is the (token) mental
act of accepting some argument.178 We can now define the transmission of
propositional justification as a relation holding between a thinker and an
inference:
An inference transmits propositional justification from premises
to a conclusion for a thinker S at t =df at t (a) S has proposi178

Tucker (2010a).
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tional justification for the premises, and (b) S has propositional
justification for the conclusion in virtue of having competently
inferred it from the propositionally justified premises.179
First, notice that I’ve defined the transmission of propositional justification
in terms of actual inferences one makes on a given occasion. Thus, I’m setting
to the side cases where propositional justification might transmit when one
is in a position to make an inference, though, for whatever reason, one does
not actually make that inference. This is a simplifying assumption because
it allows us to set to the side questions about what one’s epistemic position
is when one fails to or is otherwise prevented from recognizing the consequences of what one has propositional justification to believe. Second, this
definition of the transmission of propositional justification is not limited to
valid deductive inferences; it encompasses the transmission of propositional
justification for any type of inference (abductive, inductive). Whether “bad”
forms of inference (aﬃrming the consequent, hasty generalization) can transmit justification is a substantive question which should not be built into a
definition of transmission. Finally, we’ve defined transmission over only competent inferences. By speaking of one making a competent inference I mean
to exclude those instances where an individual might accept an argument for
179

Compare the characterizations of transmission in Wright (2003, 58), Silins (2005, 7475), and Tucker (2010a) which diﬀer primarily in what is being transmitted. Wright’s
concern is with the transmission of a particular warrant, Silins’ is with the transmission
of the property having a warrant, and Tucker’s is with the property having doxastic justification. My concern is with the property having propositional justification. See Tucker
(2010a) for an illuminating discussion of transmission-talk.
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defective reasons that make it a conceptual stretch to say that one has “made
an inference.” Suppose, for example, one accepts an instance of modus ponens because the grass looks greener today than it did yesterday or because
their spiritual adviser insisted that one do so. In neither case does it seem
correct to say the person in question made an inference, or at least not the
sort that can transmit justification.
Now, when an inference transmits propositional justification to the conclusion of an argument one thereby gains inferential propositional justification for that conclusion. Yet, inferences can fail to transmit propositional
justification, and epistemologists have investigated the question of when they
fail to transmit. Given the above definition we can provide a trivially correct
answer by claiming that whenever (a) or (b) are prevented from obtaining
transmission fails. Although this answer is necessarily true, it is uninformative because it fails to specify the types of conditions whose obtaining can be
responsible for transmission failure. A non-trivial answer to the question of
when transmission fails is one that specifies features of one’s circumstance in
virtue of which (a) or (b) can fail. In sections 5 and 6 we will see how specifying substantive conditions for transmission failure can help us construct
plausible transmission and closure principles.

7.2

Puzzling Cases of Transmission Failure

To understand the puzzling nature of the puzzling cases of transmission failure we need to say a few words about defeaters. As I will use the term,
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a defeater for a proposition p is any belief or experience (or combination
thereof) one has that prevents one from having (ultima facie) propositional
justification for p.180 There are three kinds of defeaters to take note of: rebutting, undercutting, and higher-order defeaters. One has a rebutting defeater
for p iﬀ (i) one either believes that not-p, or (ii) one believes others things or
has certain experiences (or some combination thereof) that make it the case
that one epistemically ought to believe that not-p. One has an undercutting
defeater for p iﬀ (i) one either believes that one’s grounds to believe p are
not suﬃciently indicative of p’s truth, or (ii) one believes others things or has
certain experiences (or some combination thereof) that make it the case that
one epistemically ought to believe that one’s grounds to believe p are not
suﬃciently indicative of p’s truth. Lastly, one has a higher-order defeater for
p iﬀ (i) one either believes one lacks propositional justification for p, or (ii)
one believes others things or has certain experiences (or some combination
thereof) that make it the case that one epistemically ought to believe that
one lacks propositional justification for p.181
The idea behind the second clauses in my construal of rebutting, undercutting, and higher-order defeaters is that one cannot avoid, say, having a
rebutting defeater for p by simply failing to believe that one has only very
180

This is roughly Bergmann’s (2005) definition of a defeater, the chief diﬀerence being
that I, like Pollock and Cruz (1999, 195), define defeaters in terms of propositional rather
than doxastic justification. Since doxastic justification for p requires propositional justification for p, anything that defeats one’s propositional justification will also defeat one’s
doxastic justification.
181
For endorsements and discussion of higher-order defeaters see Bergmann (2005, 423),
Goldman (1986, 62), Kvanvig (2012, 34), Almeida (2007, 65), and Smithies (2011).
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poor evidence for p while recognizing that one has extremely good evidence
for not-p. Usually, in such a case one epistemically ought to believe not-p,
and that alone is suﬃcient to defeat their propositional justification for p
whether or not they believe not-p.182 I have no general answer to the question of when one epistemically ought to believe p. When I appeal to the
notion in what follows I do so on an intuitive, case-by-case basis.
By their very nature, defeaters can cause transmission failure for they can
prevent one from acquiring propositional justification for the conclusion of
an argument. Thus, the following principle expresses a non-trivial condition
for when transmission fails:
Defeaters
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
if (and because) i’s conclusion is subject to either rebutting,
undercutting, or higher-order defeaters.183
Although Defeaters can explain transmission failure in great variety of
cases, there are certain epistemically self-defeating arguments whose inability
to transmit justification Defeaters cannot explain. For example, take an
abductive argument against abduction:
Abduction
182

This is Jennifer Lackey’s (2000) and (2003, 707) idea of a normative defeater. If one
does not think there are such defeaters, i.e., if one thinks only beliefs can be defeaters,
that will only help my case in what follows.
183
The form of such ‘if-and-because’ conditionals is the following: ((Q ! R) ^ R) ! (Q
because R)). The truth of any such conditional fails to entail that either Q or R obtain.
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(Abd1) Abductive arguments A1 ...An have been shown to have
false conclusions.184
(Abd2) The best explanation of (Abd1) is that abductive arguments are unreliable.
Therefore,
(Abd3) Abductive arguments are unreliable.
Suppose you had propositional justification for the premises of this argument.
Even so, intuitively, your inference involving this argument fails to transmit
propositional justification, but explaining just why is diﬃcult. For not only
are the premises consistent with the conclusion but you can simultaneously
have propositional (and doxastic) justification for the premises and the conclusion. For example, you could have non-abductive grounds for (Abd1),
(Abd2), and (Abd3); and if you did, you would not, or at least need not,
have any kind of defeater for (Abd3). So, Defeaters cannot account for
the failure of transmission in this case.
One might think that Defeaters is the wrong place to look for an
account of why your inference involving Abduction must fail to transmit
propositional justification, suggesting the following:
Inferential Ignorance
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
if (and because) one lacks propositional justification to believe
184

Let us assume that A1 ...An are a representative sample of abductive arguments.
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that i’s premises and conclusion are logically related in such a way
that if the premises are true, that is a good reason for supposing
that the conclusion is at least likely to be true.185
Although externalists will tend to disagree with Inferential Ignorance,
even they should think there is something wrong with the idea that you may
acquire propositional justification for (Abd3) via Abduction. We could
turn this into an argument against externalism if Defeaters and Inferential Ignorance specified the only causes of transmission failure that
could possibly account for the inability of inferences involving Abduction
to transmit. For then externalists would be saddled with having to allow
clearly objectionable arguments to transmit justification. But, as we will
see, these are not the only two possible conditions for transmission failure.186
Here’s the second puzzling case:
The Case of the Magic Ball
Suppose you were part of a very large community of highly educated researchers, CHER, who were in possession of a magic ball.
This ball is like a magic 8 ball except that it seems to deliver
all and only true propositions when it is shaken (via a little dis185

Strong forms of internalism will require more than merely having propositional justification to believe that the premises and conclusion are so related, insisting that one must
also have doxastic justification, e.g., Fumerton (1995), Leite (2008), and Cling (2003).
Strong forms of externalism will require much less, making the having of propositional justification to believe the premises support the conclusion irrelevant so long as the premises
do in fact support the conclusion, e.g., Alston (1986).
186
Note that transmission failure can be overdetermined when one’s inference satisfies
multiple conditions suﬃcient for transmission failure.
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play panel on one side of it). CHER’s sole research project is
to discover whether the magic ball ever errs. To this end CHER
has continued to shake and record every deliverance of the magic
ball over the past several decades and has sought independent
confirmation of each deliverance. On many, many, many, many
occasions CHER has been able to confirm the truth of the ball’s
deliverances and has never been able to disconfirm any deliverance. Moreover, so far as CHER has been able to tell, the ball’s
accuracy is restricted to no particular subject matters: in those
instances where CHER has been able to confirm its deliverances,
the ball has delivered all and only substantive truths on such matters as aeronautical engineering, ancient history, the psychological
states of specific individuals, discrete mathematics, chess strategy, advanced physics, materials science, economics, philosophy,
etc. Thus, you have good reason to think that if the magic ball
“says” p then p. But suppose one day you shook the magic ball
and it told you the following: you lack propositional justification
for the claim that if the magic ball “says” p then p.
Consider, then, the following argument:
Magic
(M1) If the magic ball “says” p, then p.
(M2) The magic ball “says” I lack propositional justification for
155

(M1).
Therefore,
(M3) I lack justification for (M1).
Intuitively, your inference involving this argument is unfit to give you propositional justification for (M3). But again, explaining why is no facile task.
Magic is a deductive argument whose premises and conclusion form a consistent set. Moreover, you have propositional (and doxastic) justification
for the premises simultaneously: the fact that CHER has never disconfirmed
any deliverance but has rather independently confirmed so many of the magic
ball’s deliverances on such diﬀerent subjects surely justifies you in believing
(M1),187 and provided you read the ball’s display in normal conditions you
would have propositional justification for (M2).
Neither Inferential Ignorance nor Defeaters can explain why
your inference involving this argument must fail to transmit propositional
justification. Inferential Ignorance cannot help because Magic is a
deductive argument whose validity you have no reason to doubt. Might Defeaters help? Not a bit. For Defeaters to help it must be the case
that anyone who has propositional justification for (M1) and (M2) also has
a defeater for (M3). But what could that defeater be? To be sure, believing
(M3) is an undercutting defeater for itself. This is because believing (M3)
187

Let the exact number of confirmations be so large that one’s justification for (M1)
is not easily called into question, e.g., five hundred million independent confirmations. If
inductive generalizations are ever justified, this surely is one such case.
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is a higher-order defeater for (M1) which is what (M3)’s justification would
partly depend on. But suppose you did not believe (M3), but instead suspended belief in (M3). Then, you would no longer have a defeater for (M3).
Let me explain.
There are roughly two ways of having a defeater for any given proposition
p. One can (i) believe something problematic about p which defeats one’s
propositional justification for p, or one can (ii) have some combination of
beliefs and/or experiences which make it the case that one epistemically ought
to believe something problematic about p which defeats one’s justification for
p. Now it is easy to see why you lack a defeater for (M3) in the case above
when you suspend belief in (M3). If you don’t in fact believe (M3), then
the only way for one to have a defeater for (M1) (and thus (M3) itself)
is for it to be the case that you epistemically ought to believe (M3). But
the problem with claiming that you epistemically ought to believe (M3) is
that this can only be if justification transmits! That is, for it to be the
case that you epistemically ought to believe (M3) on the basis of having
competently inferred it from the propositionally justified premises (M1) and
(M2) it must be the case that you have propositional justification for (M3).
For without it it is not epistemically permissible to believe (M3). And since
you epistemically ought to believe (M3) only if it is epistemically permissible
to believe (M3), it follows that you epistemically ought to believe (M3) only
if justification transmits. But this is just what we wanted to avoid.
Thus, since you needn’t have any defeater for (M3), Defeaters cannot
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explain why your inference involving Magic fails to transmit propositional
justification to its conclusion.
Let us consider one final case. Take the following claim inspired by the
knower paradox:
(J) I do not have propositional justification for sentence (J).
Now consider this argument:
Justifier
(J1) It’s impossible for one to have propositional justification for
(p and that one does not have propositional justification for p).
(premise)
(J2) (J) is false. (supposition for reductio)
(J3) I have propositional justification for (J). (from (J2))
(J4) I have propositional justification for ((J) and that I do not
have propositional justification for (J)). (from (J3))
(J5) I do not have propositional justification for ((J) and that I
do not have propositional justification for (J)). (from (J1))
(J6) I have and I do not have propositional justification for ((J)
and that I do not have propositional justification for (J)). (from
(J4) and (J5))
Therefore,
(J7) (J) is true. (from (J2)-(J6) by RAA)
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I assume you one can have propositional justification for (J1).188 Every other
line in the above argument follows from (J1), our reductio assumption (J2),
the meaning of (J), and some plausible inference rules.189,190 (This is the first
promised intermediate insight, and as far as I have been able to tell, this is
a new sort of epistemic paradox.)
But is Justifier the sort of argument that you can use to acquire propositional justification for (J7)? Intuitively, it is not. There’s also an argument
that supports this intuition. Even though (J7) itself doesn’t, or at least
needn’t, contradict anything you take yourself to have justification for, what
does generate contradiction is the higher-order proposition that you have
propositional justification for (J7). For if you have propositional justification for (J7) then (J4) is correct, and this contradicts (J1). But surely it can
be more reasonable to deny that your inference involving Justifier fails to
transmit propositional justification than to deny (J1).191
188

An assumption is enough for our purposes because the problem does not turn on
whether one actually has justification for (J1), but the possibility that one can have justification for (J1). Put diﬀerently, the whole point of this argument is to show that there is
a possible circumstance wherein transmission fails, but not for any of the usual reasons.
189
(J3) follows from (J2), one’s understanding of the meaning of (J), and an application
of double negation elimination (assuming, as I do, that (J) is semantically equivalent to
“It is false that I have propositional justification for (J)”); (J4) follows from (J3) and the
meaning of (J); (J5) follows from (J1) and a plausible inference from necessity to actuality;
and (J6) is a contradiction derived from (J4) and (J5). Thus, by reductio reasoning and
(J1) we deductively arrive at (J7).
190
In personal conversation, Roy Sorensen and Patrick Greenough have also indicated
the same.
191
The Justifier argument diﬀers from the knower paradox as well as the lottery and
preface paradoxes. It diﬀers from the lottery and preface paradoxes because the conclusions of those arguments themselves contradict other things we know (or at least justifiedly
believe) to be correct (e.g., that no one will win the fair lottery or that this book contains some error). But (J7) itself doesn’t contradict anything we take ourselves to have
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But if Justifier cannot transmit justification, what might explain this?
Defeaters cannot easily explain why your inference involving Justifier
must fail to transmit justification. To see the diﬃculty consider the two ways
in which Defeaters might explain what’s gone wrong in cases involving
Justifier. First, if you either believe or else epistemically ought to believe
(J1), then you will have a higher-order defeater for (J7).192 This is because
(J7) expresses the same proposition as (J),193 which, given its self-referential
nature is equivalent to an instance of (p and I do not have propositional
justification for.
Now compare the knower paradox in which one can derive:
(K) This sentence is not known to be true.
from the meaning of (K), the factivity of knowledge, and a few other plausible assumptions. (See Maitzen (1998).) A key diﬀerence between the Justifier argument and the
knower paradox is that the knower argument does not cause problems for the transmission of justification for one can have both propositional and doxastic justification for (K)
on the basis of one’s deductive inference even though one cannot know (K). Or at least
that is arguable since (K) itself doesn’t preclude having doxastic or propositional justification for (K), indeed, this much seems to be taken for granted in the formulation of the
problem (e.g., see Lee (2000, 226)). Moreover, one can have justification for (K) even if
one believes that they don’t know it. Perhaps there is an epistemic norm to the eﬀect
that if one believes that one does not know p then one lacks justification for p, but any
such norm would require much argument because certain features of knowledge seem to
make it reasonable for us to, at least sometimes, suspend judgment as to whether we have
knowledge. Consider the fallibilist doctrine that one can have reasons that provide one
with knowledge-level justification for p even though p might be false; or consider the way
in which Gettierization precludes knowledge but not justified belief. If one ever has just a
very small reason to suspect that either obtains with respect to p, it would be reasonable
for one to suspend judgment as to whether they know p though such weak reasons cannot
defeat one’s justification for p. So (J) appears to raise issues for inferential justification
and transmission and closure principles for justification that the knower paradox does not
raise. (For defense of the idea that one can have justification for p while withholding belief
about whether one knows p vis-a-vis Williamson (2000), see McGlynn (2011).)
192
I assume that if believing that one lacks propositional justification for p is a defeater
for p, then so is believing that one cannot have propositional justification for p.
193
I’m taking deflationism about truth for granted here.
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justification for p). Second, if you either believe or else epistemically ought
to believe (J7), then you will also have a higher-order defeater for (J7). This
too is due to (J)’s self-referential nature, for to believe (J) is to believe that
one lacks propositional justification for (J).
The diﬃculty in trying to explain why Justifier cannot be used to transmit justification by appealing to Defeaters, then, is that it seems perfectly
possible, indeed plausible, that you can have propositional justification for
(J1), competently deduce (J7) from it, and yet it not be the case that you
have either of the above mentioned defeaters for (J7). Clearly you might not
believe either (J1) or (J7). So if you have a defeater for (J7) it will stem from
its being the case that you epistemically ought to believe (J1) or (J7). (J7)
is a transparently self-defeating proposition, so it appears unlikely that it
would be even epistemically permissible for you to believe it. As for (J1), it
seems easy to imagine circumstances in which you retain your propositional
justification for (J1) though it fails to be the case that you epistemically
ought to believe it. For example,
The Humble Epistemologist
You see that (J1) is supported by intuitive examples and you have
some carefully worked out arguments in defense of (J1). However,
you are unaware of any past discussion of (J1) in the literature
despite your reasonable eﬀorts to discover such discussion. Also,
you have not yet had the opportunity to share your reasons in
favor of (J1) with the epistemological community. Being very
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familiar with the extent and degree of disagreement in epistemology you know that some epistemologists are likely to lack and
perhaps have even contrary intuitions about the cases that seem
to support (J1) in addition to finding problems with your carefully worked out arguments for (J1). You therefore suspend belief
in (J1) until you are able to share and discuss your reasons for
(J1) with other epistemologists.
It seems to me that in this sort of case your suspension of belief is completely
reasonable and that you are under no epistemic requirement to believe (J1)
despite your propositional justification for it.194 If this is correct, then it fails
to be the case that you epistemically ought to believe (J1), and thus you fail
to have a defeater for (J7).
So we have a problem. Intuitively, your inferences involving arguments
like Abduction, Magic, and Justifier must fail to transmit propositional
justification. The most natural place to look for an explanation of this fact is
to Defeaters, but that principle cannot do the needed explanatory work.
So it is unclear why your inferences involving these arguments must fail to
transmit propositional justification.195
194

Although actual disagreement among epistemic peers might count as a kind of undercutting defeater, merely possible disagreement does not. Thus, I maintain that one may
have (ultima facie) propositional justification for (J1) in the above case.
195
For the most part I will speak as though it is more or less impossible for anyone in
any circumstances to acquire justification via Abduction, Magic, and Justifier. This
is for convenience. I acknowledge that there may be cases where one’s cognitive/epistemic
situation may be so impoverished that they can use these arguments to acquire justification, and eventually I make accommodations for this (see section 4). But since those
reading this paper are unlikely to be in so destitute a situation, I take liberty to speak
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7.3

A New Condition For Transmission Failure

In my view the problems involving Abduction, Magic, and Justifier are
owed to the fact that they satisfy the following condition for transmission
failure:
Impossibility of Justified Basing (IJB)
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
if (and because) it is impossible for one to justifiedly believe (=
have doxastic justification for) i’s conclusion solely on the basis
of one’s inference from i’s justifiedly believed premises.
The idea is this: if propositional justification is to transmit to the conclusion
of some argument, thereby giving one propositional justification for it, there
must be some possible world where one justifiedly believes both the premises
and conclusion and justifiedly believes the conclusion solely on the basis of
one’s inference from the justifiedly believed premises. If there is no such
world, then transmission fails. For now let the sort of modality at issue
be logical possibility, section 4 suggests some restrictions. The qualification
that it be possible for one to base their belief solely on the basis of one’s
inference from the justifiedly believed premises is owed to the fact that one
might base their belief both on the their inference and on something else g,
where g happens to give one justification to believe the conclusion. In such a
somewhat loosely. (This is also why the cases involving these arguments were constructed
using the second person reference “you”.)
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case one would have a justified belief, but it would be a mistake to say that
justification transmitted from the premises to the conclusion.
There are several considerations that weigh in favor of (IJB). First, it is
intuitively plausible. There is something wrong with the idea that one could
have propositional justification to believe p and yet it be impossible for one
to justifiedly believe it on the basis of the inference in virtue of which one has
justification to believe it. To be sure, in the actual world and in nearby worlds
one may be unable to believe that which one has justification to believe due
to, say, brainwashing, strange pills, or other cognitive aﬄictions.196 But such
limitations are contingent and are overcome elsewhere in modal space.
Second, (IJB) solves the problems raised by Abduction, Magic, and
Justifier. Concerning Magic, we saw that you could not justifiedly believe the premises and conclusion of that argument because believing the
conclusion constituted a higher-order defeater for one of the premises. Thus,
there is no possible world in which you justifiedly believe its premises and
conclusion. So according to (IJB) the transmission of propositional justification fails. In the case of Abduction we saw that if you were to believe the
conclusion of that argument solely on the basis of your inference from the
premises you would have an undercutting defeater for the conclusion. Thus,
there is no possible world in which one justifiedly believes the conclusion
solely on the basis of one’s inference from the justifiedly believed premises.
Thus, according to (IJB), transmission fails. Finally, concerning Justifier,
196

Feldman and Conee (1985, 17); Alston (1989, 92-96).
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one cannot justifiedly believe it’s conclusion, (J7), for two reasons: because
believing premise (J1) constitutes a higher-order defeater for (J7) and because believing (J7) constitutes a higher-order defeater for itself. So here too
transmission fails according to (IJB).
Given the role defeaters play in explaining why you cannot justifiedly
believe the conclusions in the above cases, one might prefer the following
condition to (IJB):
Impossibility of Believing Without Defeaters (IBWD)
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification if
(and because) it is impossible for one to believe i’s conclusion
solely on the basis of one’s inference from i’s justifiedly believed
premises without having a defeater for the conclusion.
Notice what (IJB) and (IBWD) have in common. They tell us that transmission can fail in one’s actual circumstances because of how things are at other
possible circumstances. This is unlike Defeaters and all other proposed
cases of transmission failure (see section 5) which locate sources of transmission failure in features of one’s actual circumstances. Both principles also tell
us that, in the case of inferential justification anyway, having propositional
justification depends partly on the possibility of having doxastic justification.
I have no deep objections to (IBWD). Indeed, (IJB) entails (IBWD) because defeaters prevent one from having justified beliefs. Why, then, do I
even bother with (IJB)? Well, there is a further reason to endorse it, a reason
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which is independent of the present worry about arguments like Abduction,
Magic, and Justifier. (Here is the second promised intermediate insight.)
Presumably, if a person has justification to believe p, then there is something in virtue of which one has justification to believe p. Now take the
following thesis:
(P) If it is possible for one to have propositional justification for
some proposition p, then it is also possible for one to justifiedly
believe (= have doxastic justification for) p by basing one’s belief
in p on one’s justifying grounds for p.
where one’s justifying grounds for p are whatever it is that gives one propositional justification for p. This is quite plausible if the space of worlds at issue
is not highly restricted. Now, recall, to say that transmission fails in a given
case is just to say that one lacks inferential justification to believe the conclusion of the argument in virtue of one’s inference from its propositionally
justified premises. Thus (IJB) is equivalent to the following:
(IJB*) If one has inferential propositional justification for p, then
it is possible for one to justifiedly believe the conclusion solely
on the basis of one’s inference from the propositionally justified
premises.
And since (P) entails (IJB*), we have a further reason to endorse (IJB).197
197

It is easy to see that (P) entails (IJB*). Let ‘J P p/g ’ be the claim that one has
propositional justification for p, where g is one’s justifying ground for p; and let ‘J D p/g ’
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Is there reason to endorse (P)? Absolutely. Denying (P) is quite diﬃcult
for it would require one to maintain that there are some justifying grounds
that are impossible for one to epistemically base their belief on. But what
could explain this fact? After all, the basing relation is a contingent relation and thus if one has propositional justification to believe p in virtue of
some justifying ground g and also believes p, what could necessarily prevent
one from epistemically basing their belief in p on g? The most prominent
theories of the basing relation have it that what it takes for a belief to be
based on some ground g is (very roughly) either (i) one’s belief in p being
non-deviantly caused by g,198 or (ii) it being the case that one’s belief in p
be the claim that one justifiedly believes p and bases that belief on g. We can now
represent (P) thus: 8p8g(⌃J P p/g ! ⌃J D p/g ), letting ‘p’ range over propositions and ‘g’
range over justifying grounds. Now (IJB*), unlike (P), is concerned with a specific kind
of propositional justification, namely, inferential justification, which is distinguished from
other kinds of propositional justification by the type of justifying ground that generates
one’s propositional justification (i.e., an inference from propositionally justified premises).
Thus, to avoid complications in this little proof we will prove the more general formula:
(G) 8p8g(Jp/g ! ⌃J D p/g ), which basically says that if one has propositional justification
for p in virtue of a justifying ground g, then it is possible for one to justifiedly believe p
on that basis. So (G) entails (IJB*) because (IJB*) is concerned with just one kind of
ground a person could have, namely, inferential grounds. So if (P) entails (G), then (P)
also entails (IJB⇤ ). The following (abridged) reductio indicates that (P) entails (G):
1. 8p8g(⌃J P p/g ! ⌃J D p/g ) ((P) premise)

2. ¬8p8g(J P p/g ! ⌃J D p/g ) (¬(G), assumption for reductio)
3. J P p/g ^ ¬⌃J D p/g (from 2)

4. ⌃J P p/g (from 2 and the assumption that actuality implies possibility)
5. ⌃J D p/g (from 1, 4)
6. ¬⌃J D p/g ^ ⌃J D p/g (from 3 and 5)

7. 8p8g(J P p/g ! ⌃J D p/g ) (RAA from 2-6)
198

Alston (1989, 227-230) and Turri (2011).
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would have been so caused by g in appropriate circumstances,199 or (iii) one
having a meta-belief to the eﬀect that g is a good reason to believe p,200 or
(iv) some combination of (i)-(iii).201 But it is a contingent matter whether
(i)-(iv) obtain. So it seems unlikely that one could both believe p and have
propositional justification to believe p in virtue of g, and yet it remain impossible for one’s belief in p to be based on g. Accordingly, we would do well
not to reject (P).202
One might worry that certain self-referential statements may generate
counterexamples to (P). For instance:
(Q) I don’t believe (Q).
Now, I either believe (Q) or I don’t. If I believe (Q), I will, typically and
upon reflection, be aware that (Q) is false. But if I do not believe (Q), I will,
typically and upon reflection, be aware that (Q) is true. One might claim
of such a situation that because (Q)’s truth value is usually transparent to
me upon consideration I have propositional justification to believe (Q), yet
I cannot form a justified belief in (Q) because doing so obviously falsifies it.
My preferred response is to deny that one ever has ultima facie propositional
justification for (Q) even though one’s evidence for its truth value is typically
199

Swain (1979) and (1985) develops this but maintains it only as a suﬃcient condition
for basing.
200
Tolliver (1982) and Leite (2008).
201
Audi (1986), Korcz (2000), Swain (1979) and (1985), and Moser (1989, 157).
202
It may also be of note that Turri’s (2010, 320) recent account of the relationship
between propositional and doxastic justification also entails (P). Roughly, he argues that
one has propositional justification for p at t in virtue of having some means available to
one at t by which one could form a justified belief in p.
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quite good.203 There are a couple reasons to think this correct stance to take
on (Q). First, consider the distinctly epistemic goal of having true beliefs and
avoiding false beliefs: because (Q) cannot ever be truly believed, how could
believing it ever be valuable from the epistemic point of view? Or again,
above we noted that for one to have ultima facie propositional justification
for p is for p to be worthy of belief. But how could (Q) ever be worthy
of belief for a thinker who realizes that believing (Q) necessarily falsifies
(Q)? Intuitively, the rational doxastic stance to take towards (Q) is that
of suspension. This is not to say that (Q) might not have some epistemic
merit–indeed, it may even be prima facie justified. My claim is only that
one’s justification for (Q) never rises to the level of ultima facie propositional
justification.204
The second reason to reject the view that one could have ultima facie propositional justification for (Q) rests on the tendentious assumption
that rational thinkers with limited cognitive resources who consider (Q) with
understanding can justifiedly suspend belief in (Q) despite recognizing its
truth.205 Now, suppose such a thinker who justifiedly suspends belief in (Q)
203

Although I always mean ultima facie propositional justification when I speak of having
propositional justification, it is helpful to be explicit about it in what follows.
204
There are other positive rational stances one can take towards (Q). For example, I
think one can rationally act on the basis of this mere prima facie justification to believe
(Q), e.g., one can rationally place a bet on the question of whether or not they believe
(Q). Or perhaps if we make a distinction between belief and other, belief-like attitudes
like trust or commitment, we might be able to defend the view where one has some kind
of ultima facie non-epistemic warrant to trust or to be committed to (Q) though they
cannot have ultima facie propositional justification to believe (Q).
205
This is tendentious yet reasonable. For if one could not justifiedly suspend belief
in (Q) while recognizing it’s truth, then one epistemically ought to continually oscillate
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can also have ultima facie propositional justification for (Q). If one were to
recognize that this was their situation, then one ought to believe the following
conjunction:
(R) I have ultima facie propositional justification to believe (Q),
but I do not believe it.
But believing (R) involves one in an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox,
for it is a case where one’s higher-order belief conflicts with one’s first-order
doxastic state, which ought not be. Put diﬀerently: it seems epistemically
irrational to take any other doxastic stance towards p than belief when one
recognizes that one has ultima facie propositional justification for p.206 So
if we are to avoid an epistemic Moorean absurdity while also maintaining
that one can justifiedly suspend belief in (Q), then we must deny that one
can have ultima facie propositional justification for (Q). So (P) seems to get
matters right: we should not allow propositional and doxastic justification
to come apart to the point where one can have propositional justification for
p but it be impossible for one to justifiedly believe p.207
between belief and disbelief in (Q). But surely there is no such epistemic requirement on
us.
206
Smithies (2011) explores the sort of Moorean irrationality involved in propositions like
(R).
207
Other examples related to (Q) have been suggested to me, to which I would give the
same response. For instance, on some views of self-knowledge one may be meditating
and forming no beliefs but given one’s special awareness of their own mental life have
justification to believe I am not now forming any beliefs, even though one cannot justifiedly
believe it. Or again, suppose you had outstanding evidence for the claim I believe P iﬀ
not-P. Here, one’s awareness of their doxastic state concerning P quickly leads to paradox.
(See Conee (1982) and (1987), Kroon (1993), Sorensen (1987), and Christensen (2010) for
discussion of this kind of case.) Or yet again, suppose you had spectacular evidence for
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Now I want to flag the third promised intermediate insight. (P) not only
provides us with further reason to endorse (IJB) and thereby resolve the puzzles involving inferential justification, (P) also gives us a principled way of
resolving similar puzzles concerning non-inferential justification. For example, memory and testimony despite being sources of propositional justification can have outputs whose very content prevent them from being sources
of propositional justification for just those outputs. Take a case of testimony
where a usually reliable testifier tells you that (T) her testimony is generally
unreliable.208 Or take a case where one seemingly remembers that (M) one’s
memory is generally unreliable. Testimony and memory are both sources of
propositional justification, but these cases are just as puzzling as the cases
involving Abduction, Magic, and Justifier. Again, as in the case of
Magic, we cannot appeal to defeaters for one needn’t actually believe (T)
or (M). But why then might one fail to have propositional justification for
(T) and (M) when these usual sources of proposition purport to provide one
which such justification? (P) oﬀers us an explanation for (P) tells us that it
must be possible for one to justifiedly believe (T) and (M) on the basis of
another’s testimony or on the basis of one’s memory if one is to have proposome proposition P but also had undefeated evidence that your reasoning with respect
to P is unreliable, and would continue to be unreliable no matter what further evidence
you obtain. (See Egan and Elga (2005), Bommarito (2010), and Christensen (2010) for
discussion of this kind of case.) Although the details of these cases diﬀer, I think the correct
response to them is to maintain that one lacks ultima facie propositional justification for
the propositions at issue, even though one may have as much as prima facie propositional
justification for them.
208
I’m assuming anti-reductionist view of testimony here.
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sitional justification to believe them. This cannot happen because believing
(T) and (M) will generate an undercutting defeater for (T) and (M), thus,
according (P) one lacks proposition justification (T) and (M), which is the
intuitively correct conclusion.209

7.4

The Restriction Problem for (IJB)

We should now consider what type of modality is involved in (IJB) (and (P)
and (IBWD)). For a problem arises if we leave (IJB) at logical possibility, and
thus leave the range of possible worlds at issue completely unrestricted. For
surely there is a logically possible world where one might have propositional
justification for (Abd1) and (Abd2) and abductively infer (Abd3) from it,
but fail to see that one has just made an abductive inference for some reason
for which one is wholly unresponsible (this might be a modified kind of
demon world or perhaps a world where one is inferentially blind, i.e., unable
to recognize the types of inferences one uses though one always uses them
well). Arguably, in such worlds one may have propositional justification for
(Abd3) in virtue of inferring it from (Abd1) and (Abd2). But surely we do
not want to have to say that propositional justification transmits for one in
the actual world where one is not benighted in any of these ways simply
209
(P) indicates that propositional justification is crucially dependent on the possibility
of doxastic justification. This is a fact that I have given reason to think true, though it is
not one I have attempted to explain. In other work I explain this by locating our sources
of propositional justification in certain ways of forming beliefs that are both accessible (in
a specific sense) and intrinsically rational from the epistemic point of view. Thus, making
propositional justification deeply dependent on the possibility of doxastic justification.
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because one has a benighted counterpart elsewhere in modal space for whom
propositional justification transmits.
In addition to problems caused by being too permissive in the range
of possible worlds at issue, problems can arise if we are too parsimonious.
Suppose we were to restrict the possible worlds to those where one has the
cognitive capacities one has in the actual world–call these cognitively possible
worlds. Such a restriction would have counterintuitive consequences. For one
can have propositional justification for a proposition even if one is actually
prevented from taking advantage of that justification. Imagine one who has
outstanding evidence for p, but has a chip in her brain that halts the belief
forming process. This is a case where the unfortunate has propositional
justification for p even though it is cognitively impossible for her to justifiedly
believe it. So the modality at issue in (IJB) cannot to too restrictive.
Call the problem of finding an appropriate restriction on the range of
possible worlds at issue in (IJB) the Restriction Problem.
To avoid these problems I propose that we restrict the modality at issue in
(IJB) to the intersection of normal worlds, cognitively improved worlds, and
justificatory worlds. Following Goldman, we can let the set of normal worlds
be those worlds which are suﬃciently like the way we take the actual world to
be, thereby excluding demon-like worlds and, more generally, worlds where
our environment and cognitive processes diﬀer significantly from how we take
the actual world to be.210 We will take the cognitively improved worlds to be
210

Goldman (1986, 107).
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those worlds where one’s cognitive abilities are at least as good as, but not
too much better than, the way they are in the actual world. This will exclude
worlds where one reasons, say, abductively but lacks the ability to recognize
the fact that one is reasoning in such a way. Finally, we let the justificatory
worlds be those worlds where one has propositional justification for those
things one actually has propositional justification for. That is, everything
one has propositional justification to believe in the actual world is something
one’s justificatory possible counterparts also have propositional justification
for. Limiting the modality in (IJB) to justificatory worlds prevents counterexamples involving counterparts whose epistemic situation is significantly
diﬀerent from one’s own. For convenience, let us call the intersection of
normal, cognitively improved, and justificatory worlds epistemically possible
worlds and the corresponding kind of modality be called epistemic modality.
As far as I’m able to tell epistemic modality, or something roughly like it,
is the sort of modality that resolves the Restriction Problem, and is thus
crucially related to the having of propositional justification.
Now for the final intermediate insight. Having provided an answer to the
restriction problem we can now say with a bit more precision what it is for
an argument to be epistemically self-defeating. We can say that an argument
is epistemically self-defeating for an agent S just in case there is no epistemically possible world in which S justifiedly believes ’s conclusion solely
on the basis of her inference involving
211

.211 This provides an illuminating

The characterization omits consideration of premises, for there are premiseless argu-
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criteria for what is common to a whole host of arguments that are naturally
called “epistemically self-defeating.” For example, this characterization captures what is common to the following, epistemically problematic argument
types: (i) arguments whose premises, if believed, would defeat their conclusion (e.g., Justifier), (ii) arguments whose conclusion calls into question
the trustworthiness of their very inference type (e.g., Abduction), (iii) arguments whose conclusion, if believed, would defeat some premise of that
very argument (e.g., Magic), and (iv) arguments whose conclusion is, what
we might call, a subjectively unjustifiable proposition: a proposition which
is such that one cannot acquire propositional justification for it. Here are
some candidates for such propositions: this statement is false; p but I lack
propositional justification for p; not-p but I have propositional justification
for p; p but I don’t believe p; not-p but I believe it; p but my evidence for
p is probably misleading; global skepticism about propositional justification
is true; etc. These propositions seem to be such that their content prohibits
one from acquiring propositional justification for them even if one might be
able to marshall an argument in their favor.212
ments (conditional proofs and reductios) that one may wish to regard as epistemically
self-defeating. E.g., by conditional proof from the Liar sentence one can derive a contradiction, which, ex hypothesi, cannot be justifiedly believed.
212
This is consistent with claiming that these propositions can have a weaker positive
epistemic status than propositional justification.
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7.5

Transmission Principles

Transmission principles are principles which provide a suﬃcient condition for
when one has propositional justification for the conclusion of an argument
in virtue of competently inferring it from that argument’s propositionally
justified premises. (TP) is one such principle:
(TP) Necessarily, IF S competently infers C from P1 ...Pn and S
has propositional justification for P1 ...Pn , THEN S has propositional justification for C in virtue of competently inferring it from
the propositionally justified premises P1 ...Pn .213
The problem with (TP) is that it fails to take into account those conditions
that can prevent propositional justification from transmitting, e.g., premise
circularity. What is needed, then, is an informative permutation of (TP)
that takes such conditions into account.
Here’s a list of potential, non-trivial suﬃcient conditions for transmission
failure:
Premise Circularity
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
213

One worry about transmission is that the requirement of having justified premises
would seem to prohibit one from gaining justification via conditional or reductio reasoning (when such reasoning fails to involve premises). This is mistaken because such
reasoning is a source of non-inferential justification, and the debate over transmission is
a debate that concerns inferential justification only. Accordingly, this worry conflates the
means by which one acquires justification (inference) with diﬀerent types of justification
(inferential/non-inferential).
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if (and because) i involves a premise circular argument.214
Defeaters
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
if (and because) i’s conclusion is subject to either rebutting,
undercutting, or higher-order defeaters.
Inferential Ignorance
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
if (and because) one lacks propositional justification to believe
that i’s premises and conclusion are logically related in such a way
that if the premises are true, that is a good reason for supposing
that the conclusion is at least likely to be true.215
Type I Epistemic Circularity
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
if (and because) in order to have propositional justification for
i’s premises one must already have propositional justification for
i’s conclusion which is independent of one’s propositional justification for its premises.216
214

Although premise circular inferences may preserve justification, no one thinks premise
circular inferences transmit justification. The deductively valid premise circular inference
P therefore P, does not cause us to fail to have justification to believe either its premise or
its conclusion; rather it causes us to fail to have propositional justification for its conclusion
in virtue of competently inferring it from the propositionally justified premise.
215
See footnote 8.
216
This condition is central to the debate over whether or not Moore’s proof provides
or merely assumes justification for it’s conclusion. Interestingly, those enmeshed in this
debate tend to agree that arguments which suﬀer from the indicated form of epistemic
circularity do fail to transmit; what they disagree about is whether or not Moore’s proof
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Type II Epistemic Circularity
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification if
(and because) one’s propositional justification for i’s premises
depend on a method M , and i’s eventual conclusion is that ‘M
is reliable’ (or that ‘M is a source of justification’).217
Impossibility of Justified Basing (IJB)
For any inference i, i fails to transmit propositional justification
if (and because) it is epistemically impossible for one to justifiedly believe i’s conclusion solely on the basis of one’s inference
from i’s justifiedly believed premises.
Let us refer to this list of potential suﬃcient conditions for transmission
failure as ‘The List’. Each member of The List identifies non-trivial
conditions suﬃcient for transmission failure, and thus The List allows us
to make headway on formulating a substantive transmission principle for
propositional justification. Inferential Ignorance, Type I, and Type
II Epistemic Circularity are much more controversial than the first two
runs afoul of this condition. Compare Pryor (2004, 359-60) and (forthcoming) with Wright
(2000), (2003), and (2004). See Silins (2005) and Tucker (2010a) for a critical discussion
of this type of condition.
217
Type II Epistemic Circularity is a prohibition against a specific type of reasoning
(“bootstrapping”) legitimized by certain theories of epistemic justification. One can aﬃrm
that Type I Epistemic Circularity prevents transmission while denying that Type II
Epistemic Circularity does only if the following principle is also denied:
(JR) We have propositional justification for a deliverance of a belief source M
only if we first have propositional justification for believing that M is reliable.
For discussions of bootstrapping see Alston (1989), Cohen (2002) and (2005), Fumerton
(1995, 177), Kornblith (2009), van Cleve (2003), Vogel (2000) and (2008), and Weisberg
(2010).
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members of The List, and whether or not we ought to endorse them is
a topic for another time since my purpose is to flag what I take to be an
additional condition for transmission failure, namely, (IJB).
With The List in hand we are able identify an informative and useful
transmission principle for propositional justification:
(TP⇤ ) Necessarily, IF S competently infers C from P1 ...Pn , S has
propositional justification for P1 ...Pn , and no condition on The
List is satisfied by S’s inferring C from P1 ...Pn , THEN S has
propositional justification for C in virtue of competently inferring
it from the propositionally justified premises P1 ...Pn .
The adequacy of (TP⇤ ) is contingent upon the adequacy of The List. If
there are conditions for transmission failure that The List fails to capture
then (TP⇤ ) will be subject to counterexamples. If I’m right about (IJB),
then it needs to be part of The List if (TP⇤ ) is to avoid counterexamples.
For example, not only would Abduction, Magic, and Justifier prove
problematic for (TP⇤ ) if (IJB) were not on The List, but so would arguments
such as the following:
Consumer
(C1) Consumer Reports is reliable in its assessment of consumer
products, i.e., if Consumer Reports “says” that some consumer
product x is F , then x is probably F .
(C2) Consumer Reports “says” that Consumer Reports is not
179

reliable.
Therefore,
(C3) Consumer Reports is probably not reliable.218
Arguments such as Consumer are akin to Abduction, Magic, and Justifier in that, intuitively, they cannot be used for the purposes of acquiring
propositional justification for their conclusions, though the premises and conclusion are consistent, the premises entail the truth of the conclusion, and
one can have propositional justification for the premises. (IJB), unlike the
other conditions on The List, can explain why Consumer must fail to
transmit justification.

7.6

Closure Principles

This discussion of transmission and transmission principles also helps us make
headway on formulating an adequate closure principle for propositional justification. There are a couple important diﬀerences between closure principles
and transmission principles. The most obvious diﬀerence is that closure principles say less than transmission principles for transmission principles include
an ‘in virtue of’ clause which attributes one’s propositional justification for
the conclusion to one’s propositional justification for the premises and one’s
competent inference. In the case of propositional justification, this ‘in virtue
of’ clause guarantees that anyone who (non-trivially) satisfies a correct trans218

The example is owed to Lewis (1971).
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mission principle has gained inferential propositional justification to believe
the conclusion. By contrast, satisfying a correct closure principle should leave
it open whether or not one has gained any, much less inferential, justification
for the conclusion. For example, a closure principle should be satisfied when
one justifiedly believes p and performs a premise circular inference from p to
p. Transmission principles, however, should not be satisfied in such cases.219
For concreteness let us focus on deductive closure principles for propositional justification. Presumably, there is some correct closure principle of
the form:
(CP) Necessarily, IF S has propositional justification for P1 ...Pn ,
deductively infers C from P1 ...Pn , and

THEN S has proposi-

tional justification for C.
Here

stands for whatever condition must be satisfied to yield a true instance

of (CP). For example, we will need a no-defeaters clause for an instance of
(CP) to avoid counterexamples involving the lottery and preface paradox
and other cases where one has a defeater for an argument’s conclusion. Is
anything else needed? Well, recall, Magic, Justifier, and Consumer are
each deductive arguments whose premises can be propositionally justified,
but whose conclusions cannot be even though one may lack a defeater for
them. Thus, if an instance of (CP) is to avoid counterexamples involving
219

The distinction between these two kinds of principles was first made by Wright (1985,
438) and has sense been endorsed and discussed by others. See Davies (2000), Dretske
(2005, 15), and Pryor (forthcoming), Silins (2005), and Tucker (2010a).
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Magic, Justifier, and Consumer we will need to add an (IJB)-inspired
condition. Thus, for example:
(CP⇤ ) Necessarily, IF S has propositional justification for P1 ...Pn ,
deductively infers C from P1 ...Pn , has no defeaters for C, and
it’s epistemically possible for S to justifiedly believe both C and
P1 ...Pn , THEN S has propositional justification for C.
Notice that (CP⇤ ) does not require it to be possible for S to justifiedly believe
C on the basis of her inference from P1 ...Pn . This is because her inference
may be epistemically circular or even premise circular, in which case, her
justification for C is not grounded in her inference from P1 ...Pn but something
else and it is this something else that it must be epistemically possible for S
to base her belief in C on. Quite appropriately, (CP⇤ ) leaves this open.220
In conclusion, I have argued that we must acknowledge (IJB) to be an
additional suﬃcient condition for transmission failure. Put diﬀerently, I’ve
220

Schechter’s (2011) argument against closure principles fails to cause trouble for (CP⇤ )
and (TP⇤ ). Schechter’s argument is that a very long string of single premise deductions
constitute a counterexample to even single premise closure principles. Roughly, the problem is that with each deduction, one’s rational degree of confidence in the conclusion should
diminish ever so slightly. Thus, at the end of a very long sequence of such deductions,
one’s rational degree of confidence should be problematically close to .5. Although this
cuts against closure principles for doxastic justification first (which are the principles at
issue in Schechter’s paper), the results extend to propositional justification and might be
thought to threaten (TP⇤ ) and (CP⇤ ). In my view Schechter’s counterexample is insensitive to higher-order defeaters. For Schechter’s counterexample can surface only where
one either believes or epistemically ought to believe that: C is the end result of a chain of
inferences where one’s degree of confidence in C epistemically ought to be problematically
close to .5. But because that implies that one lacks propositional justification to believe
C, this just amounts to a higher-order defeater for C. Accordingly, the ban on defeaters
takes care of Schechter’s concern.
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argued for a necessary condition on having inferential propositional justification for p: namely, the ability to justifiedly believe p solely on the basis of
one’s inference from justifiedly believed premises in some epistemically possible world. Such a condition helps illuminate those conditions needed for one
to acquire inferential justification, resolves the puzzles with which we began,
and is needed if we are to formulate counterexample-free transmission and
deductive closure principles for ultima facie propositional justification.
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